On January 3, 2026, American forces entered Venezuela and arrested President Nicolas Maduro to bring him to New York to stand trial for drug-trafficking charges. Following Maduro’s capture, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would assume temporary control of Venezuela and American oil companies would enter the country to improve Venezuela’s oil infrastructure. The United States’ recent intervention in Venezuela to capture Maduro reveals the broader foreign policy goal of the Trump Administration to increase the United States’ presence and power in Latin America. The Trump administration’s policies on Latin America mirror the Monroe Doctrine, which was a US foreign policy doctrine set out by US President James Monroe in 1823, warning European countries to stay out of the Western Hemisphere and to let the US be the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere.
Trump’s Latin American policies have been named by the media as the “Donroe Doctrine,” except instead of blocking European interference in the region, Trump is trying to curb the influence of countries like China, Russia, and Iran in the region. Through his “Donroe Doctrine” policy, Trump has sought to support right-wing political leaders in Latin America who are supportive of his increased involvement in Latin America, but the policy has been mixed in its success. For example, Trump’s involvement in Argentina has largely been successful in achieving its goals, while Trump’s involvement in Brazil has not had its intended effect.
In Argentina, the Trump administration has sought to use Argentina’s economic issues and high inflation to leverage the influence of the United States in the country. In late 2025, in response to the Argentine peso rapidly depreciating, the Trump administration organized a $20 billion currency swap fund with Argentina to help stabilize the country. But the currency swap fund would only be made available to the country if President Javier Milei’s party won the following midterm elections. The Trump administration has identified Milei and his party as important allies in Latin America, and the currency exchange fund was seen as a move to boost Milei’s standing ahead of an important election. Milei and his party hold many libertarian political positions and have pushed an economic agenda supported by Trump with spending cuts and tax reforms.
During the midterm, what was thought would be a close election ended up being a nine-point victory for Milei’s party. Milei’s party gained over 70 seats in the legislature, so Milei’s party could continue passing his economic agenda, uphold vetoes, and halt any impeachment attempts against Milei. Following the successful result for Milei, the Argentinian government swapped $2.5 billion in Argentine pesos for US dollars from the currency swap fund, and the United States provided over $800 million to Argentina from reserve funding held with the IMF. Milei has continued to support the Trump administration’s increased involvement and influence in Latin America after his party won the midterm elections and has remained one of Trump’s most important allies in the region. For example, after the American intervention in Venezuela, Milei defended the United States’ actions despite criticism and concern about international law violations from other world leaders. Milei characterized the capture of Maduro as a win for democracy and supported the move as important for combating narcoterrorism in the region. More broadly, Milei’s support of and reliance on the US is a shift from the previous Argentine president who sought to build a closer relationship with China including joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative and accept more that $23 billion in investment funding.
The Trump administration has also sought to influence the Brazilian government in support of a Trump ally, Jair Bolsonaro. Trump threatened Brazil with a 50% tariff if the country did not drop the charges against Bolsonaro, the former right-wing president of Brazil and Trump’s close political ally. Trump and Bolsonaro both characterized the trial as a “witch hunt” to end Bolsonaro’s political career and prevent him from running for president again in the next election. But, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula and who defeated Bolsonaro to become President of Brazil, refused to stop the trial against Bolsonaro for an attempted coup and threatened reciprocal tariffs against the US if Trump went ahead with his plan. The US government also revoked the visas of nine Brazilian Supreme Court Justices who were overseeing Bolsonaro’s case. Trump’s economic threat against Brazil was not very effective since the US has a trade surplus with Brazil, meaning the US exports more goods and services to Brazil than Brazil exports to the US. The United States stood to face more economic loss from the tariffs than Brazil because of the trade surplus.
The Trump administration’s effort to intervene in Bolsonaro proved to be unsuccessful, highlighting the limits of the US’ influence in Latin America. Bolsonaro was sentenced to over 27 years in jail for his involvement in an attempted coup against Lula’s government. Additionally, as part of his sentence, Bolsonaro was banned from running for public office until 2060, effectively stopping him from ever returning to politics. Trump’s attempt to influence domestic issues in Brazil in support of Bolsonaro highlights his administration’s growing discontent with Lula’s administration moving away from the United States. Trump is opposed to many of Lula’s more left-wing policies and friendlier stances toward Cuba and Venezuela compared to Bolsonaro. Under Lula, Brazil also developed stronger ties with other BRICS countries like China, India, and Russia. China overtook the United States as Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2009 and, at a recent BRICS summit, announced plans to build infrastructure projects in Brazil and increase its diplomatic presence in the country. Lula has been able to use the disapproval of Trump in Brazil to bolster his own popularity and become a critic of Trump’s actions and policies in Latin America. For example, in contrast to Milei’s support for American intervention in Brazil, Lula criticized the action and called for a “vigorous response” from the United Nations.
The “Donroe Doctrine” in support of right-wing leaders in Latin America has had mixed results in advancing US influence over the region, and it is too early to tell if the long-term outcomes of the policy will have the intended long-term outcome of increasing American influence over Latin America and weakening the influence of countries like China and Russia. Nevertheless, almost one year into the second Trump administration, it is clear that Latin America will be a major focus of the administration’s foreign policy efforts. Beyond these two prominent examples of Argentina and Brazil, Trump’s embrace of right-wing leaders in Latin America and criticism of left-wing leaders is also very visible. For example, the Trump administration has developed closer ties with El Salvador and right-wing President Nayib Bukele since Bukele agreed to accept deportation flights and hold deported individuals in Salvadoran prisons and has praised right-wing leader, Jose Antonio Kast, who was recently elected president of Chile and ran on a similar conservative platform to Trump. In contrast, the Trump administration has repeatedly threatened military intervention and tariffs against Mexico in response to the administration’s perception that left-wing President Claudia Sheinbaum is not preventing border crossings at the US-Mexico border and is increasing imports to China. If Trump is successful in achieving his foreign policy, it could improve the US’s standing in Latin America, but given some of the failures mentioned it may only improve the standing of other countries seeking to gain influence in the region.
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