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China Development Economics Energy International Trade Sustainability The International Economy United States

The New Dynamics of the Trade Wars Around China’s EVs

Electric vehicles (EVs) produced by Chinese companies have shocked the world in the last 5 years. Their quality and unbelievable price point, sometimes tens of thousands of dollars below their American and European counterparts, have drawn the awe of buyers, Tik Tok viewers, and YouTube reviewers, while sparking harsh tariffs from any country hoping to protect their native industries. On October 28th, the Chinese government released their newest 5 year development plan, in which EVs were no longer listed as a targeted industry for government support. Far from a signal that Chinese EVs will command less international attention, this move instead will likely provoke further international trade disputes.

China first designated EV manufacturing as a “strategic emerging industry” in 2010. At the time, China’s yearly EV sales were just over 5,000 units. Fast forward to 2024, China produced 12.4 of the 17.3 million EVs made worldwide, over 70% of total production. Its net exports totaled 1.25 million cars, and its export totals have increased by over 400% since just 2021. The explosion of China’s electric vehicle industry has come on the back of massive government subsidization, tax cuts, and grants. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that the Chinese government has spent in total over $230 billion in subsidies, grants, sales tax exemptions and rebates on its domestic EV industry in the 15 years that the industry has remained on the government’s list of “strategic industries.” This number doesn’t even include the massive tax cuts regional governments have given to EV manufacturers to coax their factories which bring jobs and development.

Chinese government strategy has allowed its domestic industry to produce cars at prices simply unattainable in any other manufacturing nation, while intense competition (there are over 200 EV manufacturers in China) and slim profit margins have pushed companies to produce vehicles at a quality rivaling any foreign competitor. The rest of the world has been quick to notice these advantages, as Chinese EVs have been at the center of the current movement towards protectionist policy in international trade. The US and Canada have maintained 100% tariffs against Chinese EVs since the Biden era, while Europe currently levies 17–33% tariffs, on top of its general 10% tariffs on Chinese goods. Canada actually threatened to lower its tariffs on Chinese EVs specifically in response to Trump raising general tariffs on Canada by 10%, displaying the EVs importance in international trade debates.

The removal of Electric Vehicles from the CCP’s priority list brings a new chapter in the Chinese EV trade debacle. All is not well in the Chinese EV industry. The intense government subsidization, along with contracts between regional governments and automakers which prioritized pure production numbers over traditional profit incentives, has led to massive overproduction. The domestic market for Chinese EVs is flooded. Lots filled with unsold cars eventually head to government auction, influencers sell cars over Tiktok, and companies have begun a practice of selling brand unsold cars as “used,” dropping the price enough to gain any potential buyer. Profit margins for the EV manufacturing industry have dropped considerably since 2022, and of the 169 EV producers surveyed in China, a report from Jato Dynamics found only 14 have a market share above 2%. Surveys found that only 30% of car dealerships in China are profitable.

When government subsidies dry up, the race for profitability will enter into hyperdrive. Industry experts project only 10% of car manufacturers in China will reach 2030 revenue targets, and the CEO of Xpeng, one of China’s largest EV companies, has stated publicly he believes that only “5 Chinese manufacturers will remain in 5 years.” Given the oversaturation in the Chinese market, where the EV prices now start at $10,000, nearly every Chinese manufacturer has leveraged the survival of their company on one goal: expanding their presence on the international market.

In September, the secretary-general of the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) projected that Chinese EV exports would double by 2030. BYD—the largest Chinese EV manufacturer by market share—announced that in 2025 it is targeting to double the amount of cars it sold internationally just the previous year.

Chinese firms have set their sights not just on foreign sales, but also foreign manufacturing. In 2024, Chinese EV manufacturers passed a massive milestone: they officially invested more money abroad ($16 billion) than domestically ($15 billion). EV-related investments now make up 25% of all of Chinese companies’ Foreign Direct Investment as of 2024, with that number increasing from just 5% in 2021. As of 2025, Chinese auto companies have finished construction on manufacturing plants in over 10 countries such as Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, and Brazil.

The new emphasis on foreign manufacturing allows Chinese companies to avoid the nearly worldwide high tariffs, and reach new consumer bases. Many countries have welcomed these Chinese investments, but just like the export battles before them, trouble likely looms. In 2024, the Chinese government directly requested that domestic EV companies cease investments in European countries which voted to approve new tariffs. The current rare earths saga shows that China will use its monopoly power over export industries to gain political concessions. As Chinese brands continue to expand into Europe, their competition with native industries will become a political issue sooner rather than later.

As a young person, I’m concerned about the long term effects of what I believe is a miscalculation by multiple news outlets, reporting that the CCP’s termination of the EV industry from its targeted industry list will mean a drawback in exports. I believe most evidence and statements from within the industry show the exact opposite is true: export pressures and foreign investments will likely surge in the coming years. Failure to properly understand the current situation could lead to Chinese EVs overtaking massive amounts of the international EV supply chain, significantly harming native industries and increasing international trade dependence on China.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

February 9, 2026 0 comment

China Diplomacy Donald Trump

BRICS Is Growing, But Its Future Remains Uncertain

written by Zack Apt

President-elect Donald Trump’s recent tweet threatening a 100% tariff on BRICS nations comes at a pivotal moment in the group’s history. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) was created sixteen years ago by Russian President Vladimir Putin to create a counterweight to the Western-dominated financial and political order. At the 16th BRICS Conference held in Kazan, Russia welcomed four new members: Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The threat of tariffs, if countries choose to abandon the dollar, provides an insight into the strategy for countering the growing organization, which demonstrates the expanded role it will play in the global future. While BRICS is unlikely to overtake the liberal international order, the inevitable multipolarity calls for a reevaluation of US-led institutions and deeper engagement with critical developing regions.

BRICS aims to increase economic opportunities for developing nations in the Global South by coordinating trade deals and creating an alternate currency for global trade. The organization created new financial institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB), which President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping hope will compete against the World Bank. While this is unlikely in the near term, BRICS has proved effective in evading Western sanctions and can provide an effective alternative trading system. New members such as the UAE and Iran are notable due to their large oil and energy exports (increasing BRICS global oil share to 44%) and the increase of prominent African nations in the organization is a sign of a shifting continent. The members also presented a list of 13 ‘partner countries’ including Indonesia, Bolivia, and Nigeria, indicating a growing reach in the Global South. Leaders such as President Xi and President Putin have been explicit about the goal of BRICS: to create a multipolar world in which America and the dollar are not singularly dominant in global finance and international relations.

Russia’s push for BRICS expansion reflects its reliance on the bloc to counteract the impact of Western sanctions. British policymakers recently warned that the realization of a BRICS alternative currency “would make it impossible for the West to impose sanctions on countries like Russia, China, and Iran”. Western sanctions are levied on a variety of behaviors, but if the main three adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) are immune to sanctions, they are essentially given a free pass to continue acting with impunity. Even without a BRICS financial system, Russia’s economy has not weakened to the extent experts predicted following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia surpassed expected growth in 2024 by 0.4% due to its ability to find alternative trading partners for oil export. As BRICS expands and adds nations adversarial to the US, the rise in sanction evasion reduces the US’ ability to enforce its version of international law.

China’s growing prominence on the international stage and decades-long desire to dethrone the US is reflected in its active role in expanding BRICS. Through this forum, China is undeniably a dominant global player who oversees the burgeoning world order as Western institutions decay. China must note how Russia has swiftly avoided the threat of Western sanctions through BRICS as it eyes a potential invasion of Taiwan. A strengthened BRICS means their sphere of influence grows with the hope that reliance on the US diminishes in the long term. As China continues its unprecedented non-wartime military buildup, BRICS increases reliance on the Chinese economy and makes middle powers hesitant to oppose potential Chinese aggression. Russia and China undeniably seek to use BRICS to reshape the global order and dethrone the US, though it remains to be seen whether the heterogeneous group they assembled seeks the same.

A key country to watch as BRICS grows is India, which has proven uniquely effective in walking the tightrope between the East and West. As an original member, India’s global influence has grown in recent years as China and the US have increasingly courted their support. While its recent surge in trade with Russia, particularly in oil imports, has helped Moscow evade sanctions and bolstered BRICS’ position against Western pressure, India’s trade relationships with the US remain indispensable. The US is India’s largest trading partner, with a diversified portfolio of exports including IT services, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. President Biden solidified the status of “The Quad”, an intelligence-sharing organization that incorporates India into Western security-related institutions. However, Trump’s threat of tariffs could force Modi’s hand, reducing his ability to balance relations between BRICS and the West. As the animosity between the US and BRICS intensifies, India’s ability to act as a stabilizing force in global geopolitics will be critical in determining the trajectory of this competition. As the US builds relations with India, it remains to be seen whether it is a transactional effort to grow economically or a deliberate effort to draw India deeper into Western institutions. This dual reliance underscores India’s challenge in navigating an increasingly polarised global order and will be an indicator of geopolitical winds.

The incorporation of prominent African nations into BRICS is a telltale sign that the West is losing influence in Africa. China aggressively courted the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative, investing heavily in Egypt and Ethiopia. Russian proposals have bolstered Africa’s economic outlook through the development of power plants, favorable bilateral trade deals, and the promise of global leadership. The UN Secretary-General recently stated that “no African countries had a seat at the table during the creation of Bretton Woods”, implying that the new world order would be created with the needs of the Global South at the forefront. Many African nations view Russia and China as good faith actors compared to the old global order tainted by colonialism and slavery. Public opinion in Africa shifted to favor China over the US for the first time in decades, as the US fails to match the Chinese efforts to modernize Africa. These worrying signs reiterate the obvious: the US must articulate a compelling vision for African partnership that prioritizes development and collaboration, or risk being left behind in shaping the continent’s dynamic future.

Despite undeniable progress, BRICS remains undecided on its identity as an organization. There is a clear split between middle powers who seek to benefit from both West and East, and burgeoning superpowers who want to create a rival global system. Members of BRICS range from monarchies (UAE and Iran) to democracies (South Africa, India, and Brazil) to autocratic regimes (China and Russia), creating a lack of shared values and varied obligations to public opinion. In addition, China’s slumping economy may give pause to member countries who joined on the assumption that China can compete against and surpass the American economy. Member nations disagree on significant topics, such as the war in Ukraine or UN Security Council reforms. It appears each nation utilizes the ambiguity of BRICS to improve its own geopolitical standing without consistent and shared values, calling its long-term viability into question.

The US must improve institutions and conditions for Global South nations to slow the momentum of BRICS. They can begin by improving trade relationships with middle powers such as India and Egypt, and formalizing trade deals in Africa. US trade with Africa was cut in half between 2010 and 2017, and is among the lowest trading partners of the continent. Since 2006, the US dropped from having 130 major trading partners to just 49 in 2021. The US must use its economy as an asset to assist development projects and create lasting trading partners in critical regions such as Africa and Latin America where it is losing influence. The US should also look to the future and formalize AI governance rules that safeguard democracy as technology continues to dominate crucial industries. By assuring countries that they take this issue seriously and will assist in the proper implementation and security of AI, the US will gain credibility in the future. Finally, the US should re-engage with crucial partners in the BRICS sphere as it has done with India. These steps can effectively counter BRICS by providing legitimate reasons to deepen relations with the US beyond punitive measures.

If recent social media posts are any indication, a confrontation between BRICS and the West is imminent, and the US needs to be careful not to respond in a manner that self-fulfills the prophecy China dispels. An effective American foreign policy to counter BRICS must involve strengthening global institutions to provide more economic opportunity for developing nations in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and Latin America. The instinct to sanction BRICS nations into compliance is a counterproductive step that ignores the causes behind BRICS expansion. The US must revamp the existing international order to fit the needs of developing countries, or they will be successfully persuaded by China. The dollar will not be dethroned anytime soon, but the growing influence of China and Russia must be countered with better solutions, not only tariffs and threats.

December 23, 2024 314 comments

China International Trade United States

A Trade War Reborn: Trump’s China Gambit

written by Jade Faircloth

Many remember Trump’s first presidency by his trade war with China and controversial statements about COVID-19’s origins there. Before imposing tariffs, Trump initially showed admiration for Chinese President Xi Jinping, which only adds to uncertainty around his unconventional legislative style. His emphasis on personal diplomacy has often led to misunderstandings, overreactions, and an overall chaotic and unstable U.S.-China relationship. On the contrary, Biden’s more structured diplomatic approach focused on economic discussions and maintained open channels for dialogue on critical issues such as tariffs, technology restrictions, and financial stability.

After Trump’s victory in the recent election, China’s Foreign Ministry stated that it “respected” America’s choice and stressed “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.” Meanwhile, Xi personally congratulated Trump, expressing hope that their nations could “find the right way” to “get along in the new era.” Despite the plunging U.S.-China relations during Trump’s previous term, Trump has often praised Xi as a “very good friend,” consistent with his admiration for authoritarian leaders. This dual response from China reveals both caution and optimism, underscoring the delicate balance of U.S.-China diplomacy. Additionally, there is uncertainty surrounding whether Trump will follow through on his campaign promises or pursue a policy approach similar to his first term. From an economic standpoint, Trump’s campaign proposal to impose a 60 percent tariff on all Chinese goods could further destabilize China’s economy, perhaps sabotaging its current growth model and cutting its growth by up to two percentage points. While China’s economy is currently struggling with a housing crisis, dwindling consumer demand, failing prices, and rising local government debts, it remains heavily driven by exports and manufacturing.

Trump’s potential move would not only impact China but also American consumers, particularly lower-income households. While Biden’s tariffs targeted key sectors rather than broad-based goods, Trump’s tariffs could lead to a significant increase in the price of everyday goods. Moreover, this will impact other economies that are reliant on global supply chains and industries that depend on international inputs. In retaliation, China would likely impose its own tariffs on the U.S., while U.S. allies, such as the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, might respond with tariffs on American goods. This would create a state of fear and confusion as countries and companies begin to brace for a trade war. On a larger scale, an escalating trade war risks isolating the U.S. and diminishing its global economic influence.

Conversely, Trump’s policies might create new opportunities for China to exploit. For instance, China may seek to strengthen economic ties with Europe, anticipating that Trump’s tariff policies will be unpopular there – especially if Trump already plans on distancing the U.S. from the alliances and institutions that Biden has worked to preserve, such as NATO. Trump has previously stated that he would not support NATO allies in the event of a Russian attack if they do not meet spending targets, signaling a shift from traditional U.S. commitments. Historically, Washington has attempted to contain China through initiatives like an “Asian NATO.” The U.S. has defense treaties with the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, and this past April, an unprecedented trilateral summit brought together the Philippines, Japan, and the U.S.. However, if Trump disengages from such international alliances, China could focus on the Global South, asserting its influence more freely.

A Trump presidency could dramatically reshape China-Europe relations. Trump has maintained that he could quickly end the war in Ukraine, and if U.S.-Russia relations were to improve, they could drive a wedge between Russia and China. Notably, Trump views China, rather than Russia, as the U.S.’s main adversary.

Regarding Taiwan, the previous Trump administration demonstrated support for the country through increased arms sales and diplomatic visits. Yet, during his campaign, Trump asserted that Taiwan should “pay” for US protection and accused it of “stealing” the chip industry from the U.S., illustrating Trump’s transactional stance toward Taiwan. This is ironic considering the country built its semiconductor industry independently and has been a main purchaser of U.S. weaponry. In an interview, Trump suggested that China would not invade Taiwan because Xi respected him and knew Trump was “crazy.” Sensing ambivalence, China may seek to leverage economic incentives and coercive tactics to push the U.S. toward reducing its military and political backing for Taiwan.

In response to technology restrictions, Trump is certain to prioritize national security considerations, which will add another layer of regulations that embody the U.S.-China relationships. He is expected to uphold Biden’s export controls on advanced technologies relating to AI and semiconductors, potentially restricting China’s access to these technologies even further. Regarding autonomous vehicle technology, Trump will also need to decide whether to continue limiting Chinese access. Amid rising tensions over Taiwan and fears of Chinese espionage, Trump is anticipated to advocate for even stricter technology controls.

Should Trump maintain and expand his China policies, the result may be an era marked by heightened tension, confrontation, and diminished cooperation. It remains uncertain whether a severe economic crisis could be on the horizon – or if the U.S.-China relationship can withstand another Trump presidency.

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

December 4, 2024 314 comments

China International Trade United States

Miles Apart: The Larger Issues Hampering a U.S.-China Trade Deal

written by Zachary Durkee

Forging a trade deal with China has proved to be a frustrating, fluctuating saga for the Trump administration. It has taken nearly two years for China and the United States to reach a limited “phase one” trade deal, indicating the two remain at a distant divide regarding larger issues that are breeding conflict in the trade relationship.

Reaching a comprehensive trade deal will take far more than simply getting China to purchase more American products.

The recent deal signed between the two countries on January 15th is a first step but ultimately fails to alleviate the true issues plaguing trade with China. The deal leaves open questions regarding enforcement and covers less contentious issues such as Chinese agricultural purchases.The divide between the two is grounded in deep structural economic and political differences, China’s ambition to gain the upper-hand in coveted industries, and the competitive pressure exerted by China’s rise on the global stage.

Why is striking a deal proving to be so difficult?

It must be kept in mind that the Chinese Government is highly authoritarian and holds much of its power through its grip over economic modes of production. Where U.S. officials view Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as distorting cheaters of the global economy, the Chinese Government sees them as a vital means to consolidating power and maintaining regime legitimacy. To the Chinese Communist Party, SOEs provide crucial sources of employment and serve as a powerful arm of the state in its pursuit of national economic goals.

Simply arguing that China ought to become more market-driven is not an option for political leaders in Beijing. For any authoritarian country, maintaining a strong grip on power is of first priority. Liberalizing an economy in which resources are exceedingly centralized in the parameter of government influence can open the door for instability and unleash forces that can grow outside of the state’s control (Remember the Soviet Union?).

This balancing act between privatization and state-led direction of the economy is illustrated in how the Chinese economy has fared since the end of the Mao era. The government has made sure that its move to extract wealth and grow its economy from exposure to market forces has not ceded the state’s overwhelming monopoly over resources, influence, and power, or jeopardized the survival of the regime. Even today, China’s brand of state-pseudo capitalism has been quite resilient. The state has defied conventional wisdom, liberalizing parts of its economy and allowing the flourishment of some powerful private enterprises while simultaneously becoming more politically illiberal. Before China’s rise, U.S. policymakers and experts widely held the belief that if China liberalized its economy, political liberalization would follow due to increased demands posed by a newly emboldened middle-class. China has managed to successfully blend elements of capitalism with its authoritarian model to a degree that enables the Communist Party to remain relevant.

Maintaining massive subsidies, controlling broad access to capital, and propping up unproductive SOEs and is simply part of the nature of China’s political-economic nexus. Its challenge in maintaining this order is twofold. On one hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has seeked to extract party legitimacy through a strong economy that is exceedingly evolving to require higher levels of efficiency and innovation which ultimately requires unleashing individual creative capacity and enabling businesses to operate untamed and unshackled from encroaching government influence. On the other, the regime’s survival in its current state requires the government to hold the vast majority of the cards and influence large aspects of the economy. The former requires a sacrifice of the latter. People’s acceptance of the one party system has been driven in large part by economic prosperity and double-digit growth. Without this sustained prosperity, people’s acceptance of CCP domination may become strained, especially if reformist or liberal factions within the party seeked to exploit turbulent times. This challenge leads to the second area of trade contention: coveted industries and unfair trade practices.

The nature of China’s economic model forces it to adopt controversial trade practices to substitute its innovation deficit. A world-class economy requires world-class ideas and inventions to sustain its growth and separate itself from the rest of the pack. America’s economic strength and ability to create is directly linked to its political system: people are free to express themselves which leads to a proliferation of ideas, and, coupled with exposure to market forces, drives companies and individuals to maximize productivity. At the forefront of the trade war is America’s adamant demand that China curbs intellectual property (IP) theft and ends the regulatory pay-to-play bulwark designed to protect domestic companies and force American ones into joint-ventures with Chinese firms if they wish to have access to the market.

As high technology continues to increase in economic importance, China will be less inclined to halt this kind of trade conduct. Stability in U.S.-China trade is important, but so is pushing ahead in securing a dominant position in coveted high-tech industries. Picking off IP and leapfrogging across the backs of American firms has been a key factor in China’s ability to make such substantial progress in closing the technological gap between the two countries in such a short span of time. Huawei, a Chinese tech firm, was accused last year of conspiring to steal T-Mobile’s technology.

When all is taken into account, the broader competitive streak manifesting itself within both countries on a growing number of fronts is not helping the situation. Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi are both looking to walk away as winners in the trade war, with both seeing anything short of a definitive upper-hand in a deal as unacceptable. Behind all the structural realities guiding Beijing’s refusal to cave to American demands lies a powerful propagation of nationalism, pride, and fervor of prestige pushing back against compromise. There is a growing perception in China that America is simply looking to contain and constrain China’s growth. With all of these complexities in play, the prospects of achieving a comprehensive trade deal appear dim.

March 6, 2020 451 comments

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Africa Featured Globalization International Trade

China’s Strategic African Exploitation

written by Tala Ahmadi

The minibus violently jostled left and right as we hit a road under construction. Awoken from my nap, I looked out the window half asleep. I figured I must still be dreaming as we passed Chinese signs, Chinese workers and Chinese machinery– wasn’t I in the West African country of Ghana? While accustomed to encountering diversity in Africa’s globalized metropolises, I was surprised to find a Chinese presence at a construction project en route to a small village in rural Ghana. As I traveled to more African countries, the image of Chinese investments against the continent’s cities and landscapes was a frequent recurrence.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has aggressively positioned itself in Africa through a host of economic activities ranging from infrastructure projects, construction, mining, social services, restaurants, retail and more. In what President Xi Jinping has deemed a “win-win” relationship, China extracts natural resources from the continent to fuel its economic development in exchange for cheap manufactured goods, roads, schools, hospitals, railways and more. A testament to its foreign policy commitment of “Go Global,” China surpassed the United States (US) as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009.

China’s appetite to forge international partnerships comes at a time when rising populism has forced many Western countries to look inward, with President Donald Trump notably proposing to cut foreign aid by one-third. The economic powerhouse is also ramping up its activities in Latin America in light of a diminishing US presence, doling out more development finance than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation combined. China has also set its eye on the Middle East, releasing its first Arab Policy Paper which describes how the country hopes to increase trade with the region mostly in exchange for oil.

By pouring $2.25 billion into Africa annually, China has positioned itself as a viable, and often more attractive, alternative to traditional Western aid and development organizations. Chinese money is accompanied by a policy of no interference, meaning few strings are attached for the recipient country besides access to natural resources or a local market. Unlike Western money that often comes with conditionalities like enforcing good governance, human rights or environmental protection, Chinese aid is doled out efficiently and projects are often completed on schedule or earlier. Their non-interference policy also means that the Chinese are willing to indulge African despots that many Western development organizations dare not. One such dictator includes Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s dictator that is purportedly using Chinese funds to increase surveillance capacities rather than assisting the 72% of Zimbabweans who live in poverty (national poverty line).

China has been criticized by many Western countries and media outlets as a neo-colonial force that disregards local labor regulations, funds dictatorial leaders, destroys local markets and invests in construction projects that lack quality and lifetime in the name of profit. While these accusations are valid, China is providing desperately needed infrastructure to a continent that still struggles to achieve fundamental levels of development even after the $30 billion in aid Africa has received since the 1970s. Western development agencies are known for their bureaucratic and top down approach to development that often imposes, unsuccessfully for the most part, western cultural norms and institutions on a continent that frequently does not share the same values. The Chinese have been able to successfully execute projects that Africans can make use of like roads, schools and hospitals.

China’s African foreign policy strategy is deeper than the superficial goal of economic exploitation or neo-colonialism. In light of shifting global paradigms, where the US seems more and more like a decaying empire, China is seeking to build strategic partnerships across the continent that result in international signs of support like at the United Nations. In fact, one of China’s first projects in Africa was the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Tanzania to Zambia. In exchange for the railway, China required support at the UN to be reinstated in the Security Council. AidData reveals that for every 10% increase in voting support at the UN, China increases aid by 86%. Another bargaining chip for access to Chinese money is often international recognition of China over Taiwan, which most recently occurred with the small, African island country of Sao Tome and Principe.

Another indication that China seeks strategic alliances rather than a form of pure exploitation is China’s establishment of the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. During the most recent FOCAC in 2015, where 50 African leaders attended compared to four in the first forum, President Xi promised $60 billion investment in Africa. In 2013, President Xi also revealed his One Belt, One Road initiative, an ambitious vision with a $1.6 trillion price tag, linking Asia, Africa and the Middle East’s trade routes to create a stronger Eastern trade bloc. Perhaps a flex of its geopolitical muscle and a wink to the West, China started building its first African military base in Djibouti— only about ten miles from the US’ largest African military base.

China is presenting itself as a champion of the East and an alternative option for financing the development of emerging economies. While characteristics of China’s foreign policy are accurately likened to economic exploitation, it appears China’s deeper goal in Africa is to forge lasting partnerships in exchange for political loyalty. This may also be influenced by the fact that the longevity of the Sino-African “win, win” relationship is contingent on the Chinese economy’s success. With Chinese economic growth consistently slowing and commodity prices fluctuating, a purely economic agenda may not be sustainable. China presents itself to African nations as an example of an alternative model for climbing out of poverty, an easier and more efficient financing partner and a global leader rivaling the Western hegemonic power structure. A testament to their attempt at cultivating an international image of partnership and leadership, the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana recently commented on the One Belt, One Road initiative, “The belt and road initiative comes from China, yet it belongs to the world.”

August 6, 2017 375 comments