Considered the 21st century’s first genocide, over 300,000 people were killed and 2.6 million were displaced in the Darfur region during Omar al-Bashir’s dictatorship in Sudan, leaving behind a legacy of “bloodshed, extremism, international isolation and economic ruin.”
When the Darfur region in the country rebelled against the government in 2003, al-Bashir responded swiftly, unleashing a scorched-earth campaign of murder, rape, and looting against local populations. Under al-Bashir’s 30-year reign, Sudan became one of the poorest countries in the world, despite possessing abundant natural resources. He was only removed from power on April 11th, 2019, after a year of widespread protests and a military coup.
As Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council (UNSC) referred the situation to the ICC, allowing it to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed from July 1st, 2002 onwards. The ICC issued an arrest warrant on March 4th, 2009, and a second one on July 12th, 2010, for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. This was especially significant given that al-Bashir was the first ever sitting head of state to be wanted by an international court and the first genocide charge ever brought by the ICC.
In the past, many African states strongly supported the creation of the ICC as a court of last resort, with several states even referring situations in their own countries to the ICC. In fact, African states were some of the most vocal supporters during the drafting of the Rome Statute. However, the ICC has been accused of disproportionately targeting African leaders while ignoring Western or allied states, as many critics argue the ICC is an instrument of “selective accountability” and has become a neo-colonial institution.
In particular, the African Union (AU) refused to cooperate with al-Bashir’s arrest warrant by refusing to acknowledge the warrant and passing numerous resolutions on head-of-state immunity, which have protected al-Bashir. While the AU’s anti-ICC countries believe that sitting heads of state should not be brought before the ICC until after they have left office, many leaders, such as al-Bashir, simply extend their terms beyond their constitutional limits. Other countries argue that sitting heads of state should be immune to ICC arrest warrants to carry out their duties. There are also concerns about racism and Eurocentrism embedded within the foundations of the ICC. Given the West’s influence over the UN Security Council and how it wields it to advance its geopolitical interests, this raises concerns about the ICC’s credibility and impartiality. Furthermore, commentators have pointed out that the ICC only targets losers of the conflict or militia leaders.
The AU’s lack of cooperation has since left al-Bashir’s case in the pre-trial stage, as the UN Security Council has failed to ensure al-Bashir’s arrest, despite referring the situation to the ICC.
Not only does this undermine the credibility of the AU, but it also exposes the ICC’s lack of enforcement power towards AU states that are party to the Rome Statute and refuse to cooperate. In fact, several ICC member states have hosted al-Bashir, despite their obligation to arrest ICC fugitives, and al-Bashir is currently reportedly in military custody in northern Sudan.
In the Darfur conflict, al-Bashir’s case had the most international media attention, but suspects also range from Sudanese government officials, militia/Janjaweed leaders, and leaders of the Resistance Front. Most recently, the ICC issued its first-ever Darfur conviction, convicting Janjweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman of war crimes and crimes against humanity on 27 counts on October 6th, 2025. After Sudan’s new government announced it would cooperate with the ICC, Abd-Al-Rahman fled to the Central African Republic and later turned himself in. This is significant given that, in December 2014, the ICC’s chief prosecutor shelved investigations into the Darfur case because other states were not enforcing the court’s arrest warrants. Reopening the case and issuing a Darfur conviction exhibits how the ICC is one step closer to fulfilling its mission of following through with arrest warrants and prosecuting suspects.
The current situation in Darfur involves the Janjaweed—which later evolved into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—who have been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since 2023. The US, UN, and others have accused the RSF of committing another genocide in Darfur and triggering another humanitarian catastrophe. In the UN, a draft treaty on crimes against humanity is under discussion to address some of the “prevailing critiques of the ICC frequently charged by Global South states”—but voices of the Global South, particularly African states, have been largely ambivalent or absent in treaty discussions so far.
Reopening the Darfur case marks several milestones for international justice: it is the first ICC verdict arising from the Darfur situation, the first case ever referred by the UN Security Council, and the first ICC conviction for gender-based persecution. Taken together, these developments strengthen the ICC’s legitimacy by demonstrating that the Court can make meaningful progress even in the face of political resistance. This represents one step in the longer project of consolidating the ICC’s authority and advancing justice for victims of international crimes.
Although al-Bashir has not surrendered or been transferred to The Hague, the reopening of the Darfur file indicates a clearer signal to perpetrators that accountability may be delayed but not avoided. This marks a turning point in the broader effort to counter the perception that the ICC is powerless. At the same time, the Darfur case highlights both the promise and persistent obstacles facing international justice and the future of accountability. Landmark decisions may bolster the Court’s credibility, but selective enforcement and ongoing political constraints continue to limit its capacity to deliver consistent, universal accountability.
Image source: Wikimedia Commons
