Tag

Russia

Africa France Geopolitics Military Security and Conflict Terrorism

The Sahel Without the West

In September 2025, France suspended all counterterrorism efforts with Mali. This severing of relations followed Mali’s arrest of a French agent accused of plotting to destabilize the government. Mali and France, once teammates in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, had already begun to experience growing tension back in mid-2021. To understand the full scope and implications of this break, we must first examine the history of terrorism in the Sahel and France’s role in counterterrorism in the region.

The Sahel, a semi-arid belt south of the Sahara stretching from Senegal to Sudan, has become a hotbed for terrorism, driven by weak governance, corruption, and porous borders. Countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have faced escalating extremist threats, prompting international intervention. Starting in 2013, France launched Operation Serval at Mali’s request, later expanding it into Operation Barkhane to counter militant groups across the region. Alongside the G5 Sahel Force formed in 2017, France became the principal foreign actor supporting regional counterterrorism.

However, the campaign’s results were mixed. Militants dispersed rather than disappeared, and resentment toward France deepened in its former colonies. By 2022, France and its European allies ended up withdrawing from Mali, ending a decade-long intervention and leaving a power vacuum. In response, Mali turned to Russia’s Wagner Group for support, cutting all remaining defense ties with France and the EU. Despite their new alliance, violence surged in the Sahel. Mali’s military and its new partner, the Wagner Group, were enabling and exacerbating this violence through mass executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture of civilians in missions that they carried out. These operations deepened anti-government resentment and strengthened extremist movements in the Sahel. Mali’s government forces and the Wagner Group were even accused by the UN of committing war crimes. This extreme uptick in violence highlighted the full collapse of regional counterterrorism operations and their effects—demonstrating how vital France’s presence had been despite its mixed success, and how detrimental Russia’s intervention proved to be.

Despite France’s troop withdrawal, intelligence cooperation between Mali and France persisted until recently. Diplomatic tensions escalated in August after Mali arrested a French intelligence officer working at the French Embassy. The final break came in September 2025, when Mali expelled five French Embassy employees, declaring them persona non grata and ending all counterterrorism cooperation.

Even with Western international military and intelligence support, terrorism in Mali and the Sahel remained rampant; its escalation after the withdrawal of foreign assistance, however, underscores how vital that support was. Now, with the complete end of French and Western intelligence aid, the Sahel has become fertile ground for juntas and terrorist organizations to gain power. As foreign involvement recedes, insurgency and instability will almost certainly expand. The region risks becoming a hub for jihadist coordination, training, and recruitment, reminiscent of Afghanistan in the early 2000s. As extremist groups consolidate power, they can more easily plan transnational attacks and exploit weak neighboring governments. The stronger these networks grow, the harder they become to contain—raising the risk of a resurgence in global terrorism similar to its 2015 peak, when attacks and civilian fears surged worldwide.

Beyond security, the Sahel’s pivot from Western (French) to Russian support signals a broader erosion of Western influence. It opens the door for Russia—and potentially China—to fill the power vacuum, using security aid as a tool for political leverage. If Moscow continues aligning with unstable regimes, it will strengthen its geopolitical position and expand its sphere of influence, making the United States’ and its allies’ efforts to counter authoritarian powers even more difficult. Given current tensions between Russia and the U.S., this new alignment is especially troubling. In recent years, non-Western powers have risen—China’s economic expansion, India’s growth, and Russia’s resurgence all reflect this shift. Globalization and the diffusion of technology, capital, and information have dispersed critical resources worldwide, while allowing them to reconcentrate in certain non-Western states. Meanwhile, political and social divisions within Western democracies like the United States make global leadership increasingly difficult. Between 1996 and 2023, four Western countries increased their embassies in sub-Saharan Africa from 151 to 159, whereas four non-Western states rose from 95 to 143 embassies. This trend marks not the disappearance of Western power, but the waning of its dominance, as emerging actors step forward to shape global norms. Given these shifts, it may only be a matter of time before the conflicts in the Sahel escalate into something larger.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

December 6, 2025 0 comment

International Law Journalism Uncategorized

The Scope of International Law Protections for Journalists

written by Lucine Ekizian

“Protecting those who inform us is protecting the truth.”

– Thibaut Bruttin, Reporters Without Borders’ Director General

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 114 journalists were killed in 2024, the majority through crossfire, dangerous assignments, and murder. As of December 2024, 361 journalists are imprisoned worldwide.

International humanitarian law distinguishes journalists and war correspondents when delegating protections to media workers. War correspondents accompany the armed forces of a state and are entitled to prisoner-of-war status upon capture, according to the Third Geneva Convention. Under Article 82 of the convention, it states that “no prisoner of war may be tried or punished for acts that were lawful under the international laws of war.” POWs can only be prosecuted for war crimes. However, in the Fourth Geneva Convention’s Additional Protocol I, journalists are given the same protections as civilians. Civilian journalists should be considered civilians if captured and can be accused of espionage – a common accusation toward civilian journalists.

Rule 34 of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ study on Customary International Humanitarian law holds that “civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities.” Civilian journalists are further protected in international armed conflicts by treaty law in Article 79 of Additional Protocol I (AP I). But Additional Protocol II (AP II) – which covers non-international armed conflicts, such as civil wars – only broadly protects journalists under the category of civilians. Neither AP I nor II applies to violence involving terrorist groups or state repression without a structured insurgency. The safety of journalists is dependent on whether warring parties respect civilian immunity.

Newer measures have been implemented to broaden the scope of protections for journalists, such as the United Nations Pact for the Future, which reiterates that journalists “shall be considered as civilians in such situations, per international humanitarian law.” UNESCO’s decisions of its 216th sessions also included a provision for journalists, stating that it “strongly recommends that Member States: provide, or continue to provide, information on judicial investigations into the killings of journalists” and “develop effective multi-stakeholder safety mechanisms for this purpose.” United Nations bodies frequently call for action to protect journalists. Yet, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 was one of the deadliest years for journalists. Two-thirds of the 124 journalists killed in 2024 were Palestinian journalists. As a result, the Committee attributes the number of journalists killed in armed conflict to international conflicts doubling in the past five years.

The trial of Evan Gershkovich exemplifies the narrow scope of these international protections. The Wall Street Journal reporter was detained in March 2023 on espionage charges by Russia’s Federal Security Service. The Biden administration stated that Gershkovich was wrongfully detained. The alleged espionage claim allowed Russia to detain Gershkovich on deceptive grounds. The trial was done behind closed doors by Russia’s state-controlled judiciary, preventing both public scrutiny as well as independent verification of claims. This left the August 2024 prison swap between the U.S. and Russia as the only option for freeing Gershkovich, highlighting the insufficiency of protections for journalists covering armed conflicts.

Outside of the Geneva Conventions and their additional proposals, the lack of a specific convention for journalists is a clear gap in protecting journalists. A 2011 study from the City Law School proposes the adoption of a specific instrument for the protection of journalists, and states that although “it would merely specify existing obligations to a large extent, it would constitute an important political lever in diplomatic fora.” Even though there have been mentions of protections for journalists, a convention could centralize these protections and increase pressure on actors to ensure the safety of journalists. Moreover, the study recognizes that under Article 13 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly can entrust the International Law Commission to “provide one coherent instrument to be submitted to an inter-governmental conference.” A coherent instrument to protect journalists could be proposed: a centralized international convention enshrining rights and protections for journalists, such as mandating emergency support for journalists in armed conflict or creating an international body to investigate crimes against journalists.

The feasibility of a proposal to an intergovernmental body remains unclear, as the volume of proposals to these bodies consistently remains high, with 193 member countries trying to resolve conflicts. Moreover, the proposal would have to be palatable to the majority of member states – it could go through years of drafting, research, and approval, but it would still need to be able to stand out among numerous international proposals as well as be universal for all member states. The feasibility of a convention would also be threatened by undermining state sovereignty, as states would have to choose to be a signatory of the convention. Therefore, the convention must be palatable and appease hardliners by encouraging sovereignty and cooperation rather than interference, and promote journalistic ethics, which would appeal to states as it would enhance information systems.

Nonetheless, UNESCO could be an applicable fit as an intergovernmental conference to present a coherent instrument for the protection of journalists. The organization has recently called for technical proposals aimed at increasing the freedom and protection of journalists in Somalia, and it plans to implement the proposals between the second and fourth fiscal quarters of 2025. With a quick turnaround, UNESCO may be equipped with the sense of urgency and resources to bypass international organizations’ infamy for longer wait times. A proposal to UNESCO to provide a coherent instrument may not be the end-all to the protection of journalists in armed conflict, but it could be a step in the right direction to specifying and centralizing protections.

To preserve our truth, we must protect those who provide it.

April 2, 2025 293 comments

Russia Syra

The Fall of Assad and the Waning Power of the Kremlin

written by Josephine Murphy

Already facing economic turmoil and increasingly tarnished diplomatic relationships due to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia suffered a new blow on the international stage when the al-Assad regime fell in December 2024. While President Vladimir Putin has contended that this event does not reflect poorly on the Kremlin, the fall of al-Assad has made it clear that military and bargaining power of Russia is diminishing and that they have potentially lost their only true ally in the Middle East.

The Russian offensive in Ukraine has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of soldiers, abandonment of numerous military vehicles, and troops facing starvation and freezing conditions—all while failing to advance into Ukrainian territory and even losing newly occupied territory. Not only has Russia’s military been under constant distress, but its essentially failed war has made the state increasingly reliant on foreign aid. Coupled with sanctions from major players on the global stage, such as the United States, it has become clear that the nation has started to struggle economically, diminishing its image of self-sufficiency, both economically and politically, globally.

Russia has not reached a point of complete economic downturn, but rather one of stagnation. For the first two years or so of the war, Russia even saw growth in GDP and low unemployment rates. However, approaching three years in a struggling war, there are active labor shortages, and spending on infrastructure, including social spending and national economic programs, has been cut to accommodate significant military spending. Alongside a 9% inflation rate and 21% key interest rate, it is clear that Russia has increased its attempts to mitigate the costs of its war, although its methods are likely unsustainable. This is further evident through the slowing of GDP growth throughout 2024 from 4.1% to 3.1%.

However, Russia’s impending financial turmoil is not its biggest concern. President Bashar al-Assad, who led Syria for 24 years following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad, whose reign lasted 29 years, was overthrown by Syrian rebel forces on December 8th. Al-Assad fled to Moscow as the rebels entered Damascus, signaling the close relationship between Putin and al-Assad. The larger relationship between Russia and the al-Assad regime in Syria began during the Soviet Union, when military support was provided to Hazed al-Assad’s regime from its early days. Syria also benefited from the Soviet Union through its end, receiving $135 million worth of Soviet military equipment and arms. However, as the Soviet Union came to an end, Syria had to turn to the U.S. for assistance, albeit very reluctantly.

Following Russia’s 2005 forgiveness of $10 billion in Syrian debt, shielding of the al-Assad regime from international sanctions during the Arab Spring, and deployment of military forces in the mid-2010s, the modern relationship between Russia and the al-Assad regime was reborn. Russia’s Syrian military intervention in 2015 was the first intervention they had made since the end of the USSR in a non-former Soviet republic. Russia wanted to rebuild Russia as a true great power on a global scale, and in order to do so, it took into consideration the past relationship the nation held with Syria and the need for allies in the Middle East, likely leading to many of the aforementioned decisions. The close relationship between the two nations was consistent until December’s coup, making the fall of al-Assad a loss for Russia.

Russia’s international image has relied quite heavily on its ability to uphold its allies against internal and external threats, especially since its 2015 Syrian intervention. For example, when riots broke out across Almaty, Kazakhstan in January 2022 when the lift of subsidies by the government led to a sharp increase in gas costs, Russia deployed troops to curb the thousands of protesters. In doing so, President Kossym-Jomart Tokayev was able to maintain his office, and, to some extent, increase both his legitimacy and authority, having been able to put the achievement of curbing one of the nation’s largest rebellions in decades under his belt. This promoted Russia’s image as a powerful asset to its allies. However, Syria’s fall is telling of the fact that, under the many pressures that Russia is currently facing, it may no longer be able to maintain its image as a reliable ally. In the final weeks of the al-Assad regime, Russia attempted to provide reinforcements to the Syrian dictator through the bombing of rebel-held regions, yet it largely failed, with the rebels taking Damascus less than two weeks afterwards. This was the culmination of nine years worth of military and diplomatic support, representing Russia’s inability to have maintained the regime fully, especially given the nation’s current struggles.

Syria is home to the only two military bases in Russia’s possession outside of the former Soviet Union, providing the state with an ideal geopolitical position for both Middle Eastern and African affairs. Syria’s new leadership, which Russian forces targeted for years prior, however, has not yet provided Russia with concrete plans regarding the bases. These bases have been of special importance in Russia’s growing ventures in Africa, which have primarily been pursued through the use of private military companies such as the Wagner Group, which is now known as the Africa Corps. The Council on Foreign Relations has noted that Russia has provided its support to authoritarian regimes in Africa, curbing aspirations around the continent for democracy through the use of militarization. Due to Russia’s airbase in Syria serving as a supply and stopover hub for their African operations, the loss of military power in Russia would prove to be a loss to their aspirations in Africa.

On a more immediate level, the loss of the bases and the strong relationship with the al-Assad regime will make the Middle East a weak point for Russia. Despite the state’s development of relationships with autocratic leaders in the region for years, Russia’s relationship with the al-Assad regime was potentially the strongest that they were able to maintain. However, Putin has also been able to develop a strong relationship with fellow autocrat President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, as well as begun to depend quite heavily on Iran for military and geopolitical support as their military capacity has steadily reduced. Russia’s relationship with Iran has also put a major strain on the relationship between Israel and Russia since October 7th. However, it is very likely that in the event of war breaking out between Israel and Iran, Russia could not truly threaten to intervene on behalf of Iran due to their loss of faith in their capacity globally. Thus, Russia, while not completely unable to achieve their Middle East interests, has lost major partnerships, and, in turn, bargaining power in recent years–a trend which the events on December 8th have exacerbated.

Since December, Russia has slowly and silently pulled its military equipment out of the territory, despite the Kremlin’s previous expressing that they want to maintain their base in Syria. However, in the wake of such a humiliating defeat of not only the al-Assad regime but Russian military power, the new leadership in Syria has expressed its distaste for the Kremlin through its demands of reparations from the nation and its rumored cancellation of the lease which would allow them to maintain their military presence. These demands especially come in the wake of the Russian bombing of opposition-occupied territories in November, the largest of any such attack since a 2020 ceasefire. However, this assault was largely a failure on the end of Russia, further diminishing its position as a powerful military force.

It has also been asserted that the fall of the al-Assad regime will help rid Russia of a problematic partnership. Throughout the final years of the al-Assad regime, the Syrian economy was facing collapse and the public, as well as their military, were facing despair and a loss of faith in the regime, essentially leaving the responsibility of the regime to the hands of the Russians or no one at all. In the wake of all of their hardships, Russia was not able to take on Syria and its regime through financial and military involvement, and the fall of the regime reduced the pressure which Russia was facing to do so.

Additionally, the relationship between the new leadership of Syria and the Kremlin may have a chance of rebuilding, despite Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime. As the transitional government has reportedly begun demanding al-Assad so that Russia can maintain its military bases in the region, which are its only two outside of the former Soviet Union, Russia has not said anything, yet had delegates in Syria almost simultaneously. Reparations, both financial and political, were demanded by the new government as well to help prevent the complete loss of the partnership between the two nations.

For now, it can be said that Russia, whose military power and public image as a global superpower has faced numerous humiliations in recent years, has been adversely affected by the fall of such a close and important ally in the Middle East, despite what the Kremlin has said to the contrary. Isolated, the fall of the al-Assad regime is a loss to Russia’s Middle East policy and geopolitical position. On a global scale, however, it is yet another example of Russia’s losses in terms of military capacity and of being able to uphold its fellow autocracies. Whether this is a representation of the dire standing of autocracies or poor military strategy, it is clear that Russia no longer holds the power it did several years ago.

February 24, 2025 302 comments

Artic China Russia

The ‘Cold’ War: The Silent Battle for Control of the Arctic

written by Chaitanya Kishore

Donald Trump has begun his second term as President and one of his immediate goals for office was for the United States to buy Greenland from Denmark. At first glance, this desire seems outlandish and invokes the American idea of “Manifest Destiny.” However, upon closer inspection, it seems that this move is part of the United States’ nascent efforts to strengthen its position in the Arctic. As climate change melts Arctic sea ice, control of the Arctic will define the global economy and international security. However, for the United States and its allies, the Arctic has been a historically neglected geopolitical battleground. This has led to Russia and China developing a much stronger military and economic presence in the Arctic, which the United States and NATO are just now beginning to try to catch up to.

Eight countries are considered Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. These eight countries make up the Arctic Council, which works to promote cooperation between the countries on Arctic development and environmental protection. The primary law governing the region is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, countries have exclusive economic zones up to 200 nautical miles from their coastline and a territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from their coastline. The eight Arctic states have established their sovereignty over parts of the Arctic region through UNCLOS.

China is generally not considered an Arctic state since it has no territorial claims in the region under UNCLOS. But, in 2014, China declared itself a “Near-Arctic State,” a distinction not recognized under international law, and has sought to increase its involvement in the region. Since then, President Xi Jinping has made it a goal of his government to make China a “Polar Power.” To further this goal, China and Russia have developed a partnership to strengthen each other’s positions in the Arctic and combat NATO’s power in the region.

Economic gains and control over trade routes have been one of the main points of contention in the Arctic. By the summer of 2035, parts of the Arctic will not have ice, which will permit trade through the Arctic and shorten travel times between North America, Asia, and Europe. The key centerpiece of Russia and China’s Arctic alliance is the Polar Silk Road (PSR), which was first proposed in 2017. The PSR fits within China’s ongoing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is China’s initiative to build physical infrastructure around the world to spread its influence. The PSR is specifically working to develop trade corridors through the Arctic and extract Arctic resources.

China is working with Russia on the PSR because of Russia’s territorial claim to the Northern Sea Route, which is one of the two Arctic sea routes. The United States has particularly struggled when dealing with the Arctic because it does not have control over either of the two routes. While Canada, an ally of the US, controls the Northwest Passage (the second of the two Arctic sea routes), the United States objects to Canada controlling it. Instead of working to establish trade cooperation with Canada and other Arctic countries, the United States has been more focused on making both Arctic trade routes considered international waters. The US has held the position that under UNCLOS, both Arctic routes cannot be regulated by one country because they are used for international navigation. This has not been a successful strategy because neither Russia nor Canada have backed off from their positions of controlling their respective sea routes.

Additionally, the United States and Canada have fallen behind Russia and China in developing trade infrastructure in the Arctic. Russia already has two operational Arctic ports in Murmansk and Sabetta, which it uses for trade and the extraction of natural gas. COSCO, a Chinese shipping company has begun shipping through the Arctic since 2013 and made 22 shipments through the Arctic between 2013 and 2018. On the other hand, the United States only began the development of its first deepwater Arctic port in early 2024 in Nome, Alaska. Canada is in the midst of completing its first two deepwater Arctic ports, but both have been marked with serious delays in completion. In 2022, close to 1,700 ships travelled through the Arctic, almost always going through Russia’s Northern Sea Route. Out of these ships most have been Russian or Chinese ships and almost none of them were Western ships since Russia heavily regulates the shipping traffic through the Northern Sea Route. The delay in building deepwater ports in the Arctic has put the US and Canada at a severe disadvantage in competing with Russia and China economically in the Arctic. Since Arctic trade will likely become very prevalent within the next decade, the United States and its allies will not be able to utilize the benefits of quicker travel times for trade through the Arctic as it stands right now. Over the next decade, the United States and Canada must invest in icebreaker ships to make the Northwest Passage usable for trade at the level of Russia’s Northern Sea Route.

Additionally, there has been growing militarization in the Arctic. Russia and China have been developing a stronger military alliance within the Arctic. Additionally, Russia has continued to build military infrastructure, while the US has closed numerous military installations in the Arctic region. For example, in July 2024, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) intercepted Russian and Chinese bomber planes near Alaska. This marked the first time Russian and Chinese planes had been intercepted together near Alaska. However, the Chinese Defense Ministry later confirmed that the flight that had been intercepted was the eighth such aerial patrol conducted by both countries over the Bering Sea since 2019.

Russia has been working on reopening Soviet-era Arctic bases and strengthening its navy and weapon capabilities in the Arctic since 2005. After the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Defense shut down or downsized almost all of its Arctic bases in Alaska, especially since its focus has moved to other regions of the world. Additionally, NORAD’s North Warning System, which is responsible for protecting US Arctic airspace, is heavily reliant on aging radar technology, which could explain the delay in detecting Russia-China aerial patrols in the Arctic. Experts have stated that it will take the West close to ten years to catch up to Russia’s Arctic capabilities. Underdevelopment of military technology in the Arctic for the United States and its NATO allies drastically reduces their ability to respond to an attack by Russia or China through the Arctic. The United States has already been unable to detect Russian and Chinese flights in the Arctic which is concerning if either of the countries was to launch a full-scale attack on the United States or another NATO country.

Russia has also been harming Western infrastructure in the Arctic to further strengthen its position and has not claimed responsibility for the damage. In 2024, the Pentagon reported that Russia had been jamming the United States’ GPS systems in the Arctic. Other Arctic countries like Finland have reported similar cases of GPS jamming by Russia. Additionally, in 2021, a fiber-optic cable used by Norway to monitor activity on the Arctic seafloor had been suspiciously cut. Similarly, in 2022, two cables connecting the island of Svalbard to mainland Norway through the Arctic seafloor were also cut. In both these cases, Norway had to rely on weaker backup systems, exposing vulnerabilities in Norway’s communication systems in the Arctic. Although these two incidents could be unrelated or accidental and there is no proven link to Russian involvement, Norway’s defense chief has stated he thinks Russia is capable of carrying out these attacks.

Another example of Russia’s advantage in the Arctic is how it has been able to nuclearize the region, while the United States has largely refrained from taking similar actions. Russia has been largely secretive about its nuclear capabilities in the Arctic. However, Norway has detected high levels of Cesium-137, a radioactive isotope that can be used to make nuclear weapons, along its Arctic border with Russia. Russia has also developed eight nuclear icebreaker ships to use in the Arctic, which it can use both militarily or to support commercial trade. The country also maintains two complete nuclear power plants and has been rapidly building numerous nuclear reactors in the Arctic. In the past five years alone, Russia has increased the number of nuclear reactors it has in the Arctic by 30% and is predicted to have over 100 reactors within the next ten years. These reactors will not only provide the significant energy needed for continued Arctic infrastructure development for Russia, but also pose a great threat to the environmental safety of the region and could be used in the development of nuclear weapons. Russia’s nuclearization of the Arctic is deeply threatening to the United States and NATO because neither has anywhere near the same level of nuclear capabilities in the region.

However, the United States has begun to make significant progress in catching up to the capabilities of the Russia-China alliance in the Arctic with the collaboration of its NATO allies. Recently, Finland and Sweden became members of NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, joining the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway as the Arctic NATO states. Finland and Sweden joining NATO means that all of the Arctic states besides Russia are part of NATO. This gives the United States and its NATO allies an improved position to catch up to Russia’s continuous Arctic investments and the Russia-China Arctic alliance. In late 2024, NATO, in partnership with Norway, opened an amphibious warfare center in Norway’s Arctic region. Within this new training center, troops from NATO countries like the United States and the United Kingdom are training in the Arctic conditions.

Additionally, in response to President Trump’s demands to buy Greenland, Denmark has committed a $2 billion investment in its Arctic military capabilities in Greenland. As part of the investment, Denmark is planning on purchasing patrol boats for the Arctic and modernizing aging military infrastructure. Denmark has moved to make these investments to show its commitment to NATO and that it is in line with the recent American focus on Arctic defense. Denmark’s political leaders believe that Trump is much more serious about buying and taking control of Greenland than he was during his first term in office, especially because of his threats of military action and high tariffs against Denmark. The larger goal of these investments is to quell Trump’s desire to gain control of Greenland, as well as ongoing calls for independence by Greenlanders. These recent Arctic investments by NATO countries show promise that NATO is planning on prioritizing its military capabilities in the Arctic. The United States and its Arctic allies within NATO have fallen far behind Russia in terms of their economic and military capabilities in the region, particularly now that Russia and China have developed a strong partnership in the region. The United States and NATO must focus more defense funding on the Arctic region. They must also prioritize rapid development of infrastructure in the Arctic to support and protect trade in the region. This will likely require hundreds of billions of dollars of investments into infrastructure and the development of modern military technology in the Arctic. This would match the over $90 billion China has invested in the Arctic and the over $300 billion Russia has committed to incentivizing Arctic infrastructure development. However, the US and its allies will likely need to commit even more money than China and Russia to match the Arctic capabilities of China and Russia because of US and its allies’ lack of development in the Arctic so far. As climate change melts Arctic ice, control over the Arctic will be a defining characteristic of the geopolitical landscape of the future. It is imperative that the United States and NATO not lose focus on matching the capabilities of the Russia-China Arctic alliance.

February 24, 2025 344 comments

Russia

Russia’s Escalating Hybrid War: The “Shadow Fleet” and Undersea Internet Cable Sabotage

written by Brianna Bell

“If I had a nickel for every time a Chinese ship was dragging its anchor on the bottom of the Baltic Sea in the vicinity of important cables,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis posted on X (formerly Twitter) in November, “I would have two nickels, which isn’t much, but it’s weird that it happened twice.”

Landsbergis is right. It is weird that twice now, a Chinese ship has damaged a vital undersea internet and communications cable in the Baltic Sea. But what is weirder is the fact that not just two, but eleven important undersea cables have been damaged by ships in professed accidents in the Baltic region – all in only the past fourteen months.

Beijing has denied any involvement in the two instances of dragging anchor, but in many ways, this concern is overshadowed by what many NATO countries consider to be the bigger issue at play: Russia. It is Russia, not China, that has most countries worried, as it is the presumed suspect in the other nine instances of cable damage.

Most countries suspect Russia for one main reason: since 2022, Russia has been waging a hybrid war against the US and NATO more broadly – a covert campaign of sabotage against supporters of Ukraine that is now escalating in both scope and intensity.

Sometimes referred to as “shadow” or “grey-zone” warfare, hybrid warfare is a military strategy in which a country uses both military and non-military strategies and instruments to cause instability without declaring an all-out war. Russia has long preferred “punching back at NATO in the shadows,” as journalist and Washington Post columnist David Ignatius describes. But in the past few years, these covert attacks have become far more serious. Using strategies such as cyberattacks, political manipulation, and the spread of disinformation, Russia has caused disruption and created chaos in ways that might look minor in isolation, but taken together indicate a new phase in Russia’s war against the West.

Now, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explains, it seems that “sabotage actions against critical infrastructure” – specifically undersea cables – amount to Russia’s next stage in its hybrid war.

These claims of sabotage are further bolstered by the fact that Russia’s “shadow fleet” has become more and more active in the Baltic region over the past year. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Russia has been building up a fleet of mostly aging and repurposed ships – “shadow vessels” – which it has used to circumvent the G7 price cap on Russian oil exports. These vessels have obscure ownership, are poorly maintained, and often obfuscate their movements by manipulating or disabling their AIS, the tracking system required on all commercial vessels for the safety of maritime traffic. They also frequently change their flag registration, flying under so-called “flags of convenience” to enjoy more permissive regulations, evade sanctions, and distance themselves from Russia.

Growing steadily in number since 2022, around 17 percent of all oil tankers on the oceans today are estimated to belong to the shadow fleet. Used primarily in the past to transport Russian crude oil, it appears that these ships are now being used to conduct espionage activities for Moscow, including charting – and sometimes destroying – vital undersea cables.

In January 2025 alone, two undersea cables were destroyed by vessels suspected of being part of Russia’s shadow fleet: the Cook Island-registered shadow tanker Eagle S and the Maltese-flagged Vezhen. So at this point, “no one believes that [the] cables were cut accidentally,” as German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said. As Landsbergis makes clear in his quip regarding China, the idea that so many cables have been damaged in the same region accidentally is hard to believe. NATO is convinced, but this has led to speculation as to what Russia’s end goal might be.

These cables are what German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock calls the “communication arteries that hold our world together.” There are hundreds running across the seabed of the world’s oceans, forming a network through which most communications and internet traffic travels, as well as accounting for more than $10 trillion in daily worldwide financial transactions. A coordinated attack could therefore disable a critical piece of the world’s communications infrastructure, significantly disrupting private, government, and military communications, as well as industries that rely on such information, including financial markets and energy suppliers.

Since these cables also play a role in energy supply and production, Russia’s ability to monitor and supposedly damage these cables is “the equivalent of Russia having an off switch for a big part of Europe’s energy production,” as Foreign Policy columnist and Atlantic Council senior fellow Elisabeth Braw explains. By sabotaging these cables, Russia could have the ability to disrupt the whole of Europe.

Moscow has not claimed responsibility, but it is not going to. It is clear that Russia’s efforts to monitor and access undersea infrastructure are expanding, becoming formal, systematic, and far-reaching. As former Russian president and close Putin ally Dmitry Medvedev stated in 2023, there are no longer any constraints left “to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies.” It is clear that Putin holds a similar view, spreading the task of maritime special operations across multiple organizations within the government, including a dedicated military unit called GUGI, or the “General Staff Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research.”

Knowing the stakes, governments are working quickly. NATO has started increasing patrols of the Baltic Sea by way of a new operation, the “Baltic Sentry,” the US and UK have instituted new sanctions on Russia’s oil sector to target the shadow fleet, and many countries have prioritized introducing and strengthening insurance requirements, port restrictions, and collective monitoring of suspected shadow vessels.

Any remaining doubts as to Russia’s culpability have practically disappeared, and NATO countries are responding accordingly. But this leaves them in a difficult situation. If the US and countries surrounding the Baltic are correct in their accusations of Russian sabotage, it amounts to a major escalation of conflict on the world stage. Even as they institute these defensive measures, many countries are questioning what such an escalation might mean, as well as what will happen next.

The fact that Russia is now likely targeting such important infrastructure in ways that have had, and will have, such enormous consequences for a large portion of the world, suggests that Moscow is becoming far more brazen in taking its war west. By targeting undersea cables, Russia aims to sow discord and uncertainty, with the likely goal of undermining Western unity in opposing Russian aggression and switching the focus from Ukraine.

The German Foreign Minister calls these cable cuttings an “urgent wake-up call,” and she’s right – it’s one we need to listen to. Living in a digitalized world, an attack on undersea cables is an attack on our communication life force. Therefore at the same time that NATO continues the fight against Russian aggression in Ukraine, it also needs to correct the vulnerable nature of undersea digital and energy infrastructure – one cannot distract from the other. In order to fully close enforcement gaps, and to avoid any sabotage operations that could plunge data and energy systems into crisis, NATO-allied countries can work to enhance intelligence sharing and monitoring, address and target flag of convenience states, and establish collective cable security standards and regulations across both the physical and digital domains.

Neither Russia nor NATO would benefit from all-out and head-on conflict, but every time one attacks and the other responds, the danger of a misstep gets worse. In every tit-for-tat action, one truth becomes more and more evident: Russia’s hybrid war is escalating, and soon it will reach a tipping point.

February 24, 2025 295 comments

China Donald Trump North Korea Russia Ukraine

Proxy War in Ukraine: An Examination of the Other Actors Involved

written by Charlie Donlan

As the war in Ukraine nears the three-year mark since Russia’s invasion, both sides have become increasingly reliant on outside state actors to support their military campaigns. North Korea and China continue to supply Russia’s aggressive invasion with various forms of aid. While support for Russia’s war effort grows throughout East Asia, the election of Donald Trump threatens to disrupt the flow of American aid to Ukraine. While Russia and Ukraine have a direct stake in the outcome of the war for their national security, the United States, North Korea, and China each have their own geopolitical and economic incentives that motivate their extensive involvement in the conflict.

As international involvement has escalated in Ukraine, the “proxy war” label has increasingly been used to describe the conflict. Oxford Dictionary defines a proxy war as a conflict “in which a third party intervenes indirectly in a pre-existing war in order to influence the strategic outcome in favor of its preferred faction.” Despite the efforts of governments to downplay their involvement in Ukraine, the war is now largely fueled and sustained by outside powers like the United States, China, and North Korea.

In February of 2022, Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine that has since evolved into a full-scale war. Until late October, Russia and Ukraine were the only two states with troops actively involved in combat. By October of 2022, Russia had annexed four Ukrainian territories. In August of 2024, Ukraine launched a somewhat successful counter-offensive, even seizing some Russian territory. However, since then Russia has continued to make advances into Ukrainian territory and there has been little success at de-escalation from either side.

Since Russia’s invasion in 2022, the United States has provided substantial military aid to Ukraine. The Department of State estimates that American aid to Ukraine since February of 2022 has consisted of military equipment worth approximately $61.4 billion. American equipment is used by Ukrainian forces in almost every area of combat and is more comprehensive than ever, now including not only air defense systems, but both short and long range ammunition and artillery, ground vehicles, aircraft, maritime equipment, and more. The United States is by far the largest source of aid to Ukraine in the world. In comparison, Germany is the country with the second largest share of aid to Ukraine worth just over $11 billion. Additionally, the United States provides Ukraine with strategic intelligence and military advising. Just short of introducing American troops on the ground in Ukraine, the United States is involved in almost every other aspect of Ukrainian defense.

As the war has progressed, the commitment of Americans to unconditional support for Ukraine has weakened. An August 2022 Gallup poll found approximately 66% of Americans supported reclaiming Ukrainian territory over bringing a quick end to the war. As of this past December, only 48% of Americans continue to favor reclaiming Ukrainian territories over ending the war quickly. While public opinion may have shifted, American foreign policy continues to focus on bolstering the Ukrainian military rather than pursuing peace negotiations, with the latest American aid package totaling about $1.25 billion in military equipment. Clearly, the trend in American public opinion for ongoing defense aid to Ukraine is not consistent with the U.S. Government’s foreign policy goals.

Despite the increasingly popular opinion that America should shift its priorities toward bringing about a swift end to the war, some argue that continued support for Ukraine may also benefit the United States. According to one study, about 90% of the money allocated for aid to Ukraine never leaves the United States. Because most of the munitions and equipment sent to Ukraine are fully assembled in the United States, ongoing aid to Ukraine could lead to an increase in domestic manufacturing jobs and economic growth. Another argument for the continuation of American support of the war effort in Ukraine is that it could help set a precedent for other NATO countries in Europe to take on more of an economic burden in international security and defense going forward. There are now 11 members of NATO spending more than 2% of their GDP on defense, compared to only two NATO members before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

While the United States has been heavily involved in the war in Ukraine since its inception, North Korea just recently elevated its involvement in the conflict. Since last summer, North Korea has supplied Russia with weapons including artillery shells and ballistic missiles. But in late October, North Korea took the unprecedented step of deploying troops to assist the Russians in their ground invasion of Ukraine. The alarming move directly contradicts the strict isolationist policies practiced by North Korea throughout the 21st century. North Korea is often referred to as a “Hermit Kingdom,” because it is one of the most isolated countries in the world. The country is known for cutting off its citizens from any outside influence, having little to no foreign trade relations, and maintaining a strict closed border policy since the COVID-19 pandemic. North Korea has never involved itself in a foreign military operation until now. Not only does sending troops thousands of miles to Ukraine represent a clear departure from North Korea’s isolationist practices, but it is also a sign that the war in Ukraine may continue to escalate and expand.

While North Korea may not have a direct stake in the outcome of the war, most assume that North Korea will expect reciprocity for its aid to Russia. Some speculate that North Korea could be seeking nuclear technology or information to support the development of their nuclear weapons program from Russia in exchange for the recent deployment of North Korean troops to Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea is expected to leverage its significant military support for Russia to support its efforts to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and other international organizations. The CSTO is a mutual security pact between Russia and five other countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. Joining the CSTO would offer North Korea increased defense capabilities and further solidify their anti-Western alliance with Russia, ultimately, cementing their strong partnership with Russia and advancing their efforts to gain international prestige for years to come.

North Korea is not the only country to back the Russian war effort, with China also supporting Russia through trade. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 it was met with harsh trade sanctions from many Western states opposed to Russia’s aggression, including the United States. However, Russia’s economy quickly recovered and is even estimated to have grown by approximately 0.7% in 2023. Russia’s ability to weather Western sanctions can be attributed in part to backing from China. In 2023, trade between China and Russia increased by about 26 percent from the previous year. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has made clear that the majority of Russia’s “battlefield goods” are currently imported from China. While these goods do not include weapons per se, China’s provision of “dual-use technologies” to Russia is critical to the offensive in Ukraine. China has also been one of the few countries to publicly oppose Western sanctions against Russia. Without China’s economic support, it is likely that Russia’s war effort would not be financially sustainable.

China’s motives for supporting the Russian military campaign differ from North Korea’s concern with international recognition. Trade with Russia has significantly benefited the Chinese economy since the beginning of the conflict. While China exports a wide variety of goods, Russia relies almost entirely on crude oil exports. Consequently, China has experienced a trade surplus with Russia, which has led to significant economic growth for China and caused Russia to become dependent on machinery imported from China. The growth in trade networks with Russia will continue to benefit the Chinese economy even after the war. Western trade sanctions on Russia, intended to weaken the Russian economy, have had underwhelming effects on the Russian war effort and have instead resulted in a more advanced trade partnership between Russia and China.

The war in Ukraine, which began as a regional conflict, has developed into a global war with outside state actors fighting for their own geopolitical and economic interests. The involvement of the United States, North Korea, and China has transformed the regional war into an international proxy conflict. While Ukraine and Russia will feel the consequences of the war most directly, the other states involved will be impacted by the conflict’s ramifications concerning international alliances, institutions, and trade relationships. The escalation of the war in Ukraine has forced states to consider the balance between the pursuit of global peace and the pursuit of domestic prosperity. Ultimately, the more the war expands internationally, the more difficult it will be for the domestic interests of every party involved to align with a peaceful end to the conflict.

January 13, 2025 7 comments

Security and Conflict Technology Ukraine United States

Starlink and Ukraine: How Elon Musk’s Company Has Made Him a Key Figure in Global Affairs

written by Brianna Bell

In February 2022, two days after Russia invaded and launched a cyberattack to take down the satellite system used by the Ukrainian military, Ukraine’s Digital Minister Mykhailo Fedorov sent a tweet to Elon Musk. In the tweet, Fedorov urged Musk to do his part in aiding their war effort, asking him “to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations.” Less than 48 hours later, Musk had adjusted his Starlink satellites and sent internet-ready Starlink terminals to Ukraine.

Starlink, the satellite internet technology made by Musk’s rocket company SpaceX, has seen its influence grow over the past few years. Since 2019, Musk has been delivering dozens of satellites into orbit almost every week that can transmit high-speed internet by communicating with terminals on Earth. Today, Starlink satellites make up more than 50% of all active satellites, with around 6,426 Starlink satellites in orbit as of September 2024 – facts which have together pushed the value of SpaceX to nearly $210 billion.

But recent events have made it abundantly clear that Musk’s technology is not just a valuable technological innovation, but also a significant political tool. Starlink is often the only way to get internet access in war zones, remote areas, and places affected by natural disasters, and it has become integral to Ukraine’s war effort. Fedorov called Starlink the “blood of our entire communication infrastructure,” and indeed it has enormously aided Ukrainian success. However, the sheer magnitude of Musk’s influence over the conflict has raised some serious concerns.

Already leading SpaceX, Tesla, and X, Musk has become the dominant power in satellite internet technology. Starlink has made him a key player in global affairs, a fact he acknowledged in April 2023 when he boasted that “between, Tesla, Starlink & Twitter, I may have more real-time global economic data in one head than anyone ever.” With so much data “in one head,” Musk has become a power broker that US officials cannot ignore, especially considering his vacillating, ambiguous politics and wide-ranging business interests. With little oversight or regulation, political leaders around the world have become increasingly concerned over his next moves, as well as his motives.

A large part of the problem is that Musk’s views on Ukraine are alarmingly contradictory. At the same time that he has provided Ukraine with Starlink terminals, Musk has also echoed many pro-Russian viewpoints, including the belief that Russia should be allowed to keep the annexed territory of Crimea, and has reportedly spoken directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin over the phone.

Unelected, unvetted, and with no clear loyalties, Musk has proved willing to flex his near-total control of the Starlink system. He alone can decide to shut down Starlink internet access for a customer or country, and already, he has restricted Starlink access for Ukraine multiple times during the war. Last year, he denied the Ukrainian military’s request to turn on Starlink near Crimea, the Russian-controlled territory, which disrupted a Ukrainian sneak attack on the Russian naval fleet.

Musk defended this decision by asserting that such an attack would lead “to a major escalation” in the war, explaining that “we did not want to be a part of that.” Yet in so condemning and interfering with Ukrainian strategy, Musk gave the Russian naval fleet the freedom “to fire Kalibr missiles at Ukrainian cities,” as Mykhailo Podolyak, top advisor to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, explains, which led to significant Ukrainian civilian losses. Podolyak insists that “this is the price of a cocktail of ignorance and big ego” that is Elon Musk.

More recently, reports from Ukrainian defense and intelligence officials have suggested that Russian forces are now using the technology in Ukraine. These reports, as well as an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, indicate that Russia has acquired Starlink terminals through third-party intermediaries and neutral countries. These black market networks have funneled thousands of the devices not only into Russia, but also into the hands of certain American adversaries and accused war criminals, granting SpaceX – and Musk – an acting role in the turbulent geopolitics of warfare. The proliferation of the technology inside Russia has significantly improved the operational coordination and efficiency of Russian troops, and has contributed to Ukrainian connection problems.

Democrats on the US Congressional Oversight Committee wrote to SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell due to these reports, explaining that they were “concerned” that the company “may not have appropriate guardrails and policies in place to ensure … technology is neither acquired directly or indirectly, nor used illegally by Russia.”

Musk has denied any involvement, stating on X that “to the best of our knowledge, no Starlinks have been sold directly or indirectly to Russia.” He has also assured that the company is working with the US Department of Defense to find and disable Starlink satellite terminals that have fallen into Russia hands.

So far, however, the problem has not improved, in fact, Ukrainian intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov has stated that Russian use of the technology “is starting to take on a systemic nature.”

In a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin in May, Senator Elizabeth Warren voiced her concerns about unsanctioned Starlink terminal proliferation, stating that the status of efforts to remedy the problem “is unclear at best,” despite Musk reportedly being aware of “hostile actors circumventing US sanctions to acquire its terminals since at least February of this year.” Warren explained that even more worrying was the report that Ukrainian officials made Starlink aware of their concerns over Russia using the service, but allegedly “feared pressing the issue with SpaceX because of the ‘unpredictable’ nature of tech billionaire Elon Musk.”

The past few years have shown that Musk has the power to change the outcome of conflict operations – and that he is willing to use it – single-handedly affecting the tide of foreign policy. Cybersecurity expert Dmitri Alperovitch explained why this development is so concerning, pointing out that “this is not just one company, but one person … You are completely beholden to his whims and desires.”

With the three-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion looming, Ukraine and US officials are in uncharted territory. Musk has become a separate actor in the war – another factor to balance – and relying on the goodwill of an unpredictable billionaire has become a crucial part of the war effort. Now, in light of Musk’s burgeoning relationship with president-elect Donald Trump, who has cast doubt as to continued US commitment to Ukraine once he begins his presidency, this goodwill may very well dry up.

Even as Starlink’s satellite numbers continue to rise, Musk’s political, social, and economic influence only grows, seeming, at least for the near future, a fixture of modern global affairs.

Image source: Flickr

December 26, 2024 311 comments

China Diplomacy Donald Trump

BRICS Is Growing, But Its Future Remains Uncertain

written by Zack Apt

President-elect Donald Trump’s recent tweet threatening a 100% tariff on BRICS nations comes at a pivotal moment in the group’s history. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) was created sixteen years ago by Russian President Vladimir Putin to create a counterweight to the Western-dominated financial and political order. At the 16th BRICS Conference held in Kazan, Russia welcomed four new members: Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The threat of tariffs, if countries choose to abandon the dollar, provides an insight into the strategy for countering the growing organization, which demonstrates the expanded role it will play in the global future. While BRICS is unlikely to overtake the liberal international order, the inevitable multipolarity calls for a reevaluation of US-led institutions and deeper engagement with critical developing regions.

BRICS aims to increase economic opportunities for developing nations in the Global South by coordinating trade deals and creating an alternate currency for global trade. The organization created new financial institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB), which President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping hope will compete against the World Bank. While this is unlikely in the near term, BRICS has proved effective in evading Western sanctions and can provide an effective alternative trading system. New members such as the UAE and Iran are notable due to their large oil and energy exports (increasing BRICS global oil share to 44%) and the increase of prominent African nations in the organization is a sign of a shifting continent. The members also presented a list of 13 ‘partner countries’ including Indonesia, Bolivia, and Nigeria, indicating a growing reach in the Global South. Leaders such as President Xi and President Putin have been explicit about the goal of BRICS: to create a multipolar world in which America and the dollar are not singularly dominant in global finance and international relations.

Russia’s push for BRICS expansion reflects its reliance on the bloc to counteract the impact of Western sanctions. British policymakers recently warned that the realization of a BRICS alternative currency “would make it impossible for the West to impose sanctions on countries like Russia, China, and Iran”. Western sanctions are levied on a variety of behaviors, but if the main three adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) are immune to sanctions, they are essentially given a free pass to continue acting with impunity. Even without a BRICS financial system, Russia’s economy has not weakened to the extent experts predicted following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia surpassed expected growth in 2024 by 0.4% due to its ability to find alternative trading partners for oil export. As BRICS expands and adds nations adversarial to the US, the rise in sanction evasion reduces the US’ ability to enforce its version of international law.

China’s growing prominence on the international stage and decades-long desire to dethrone the US is reflected in its active role in expanding BRICS. Through this forum, China is undeniably a dominant global player who oversees the burgeoning world order as Western institutions decay. China must note how Russia has swiftly avoided the threat of Western sanctions through BRICS as it eyes a potential invasion of Taiwan. A strengthened BRICS means their sphere of influence grows with the hope that reliance on the US diminishes in the long term. As China continues its unprecedented non-wartime military buildup, BRICS increases reliance on the Chinese economy and makes middle powers hesitant to oppose potential Chinese aggression. Russia and China undeniably seek to use BRICS to reshape the global order and dethrone the US, though it remains to be seen whether the heterogeneous group they assembled seeks the same.

A key country to watch as BRICS grows is India, which has proven uniquely effective in walking the tightrope between the East and West. As an original member, India’s global influence has grown in recent years as China and the US have increasingly courted their support. While its recent surge in trade with Russia, particularly in oil imports, has helped Moscow evade sanctions and bolstered BRICS’ position against Western pressure, India’s trade relationships with the US remain indispensable. The US is India’s largest trading partner, with a diversified portfolio of exports including IT services, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. President Biden solidified the status of “The Quad”, an intelligence-sharing organization that incorporates India into Western security-related institutions. However, Trump’s threat of tariffs could force Modi’s hand, reducing his ability to balance relations between BRICS and the West. As the animosity between the US and BRICS intensifies, India’s ability to act as a stabilizing force in global geopolitics will be critical in determining the trajectory of this competition. As the US builds relations with India, it remains to be seen whether it is a transactional effort to grow economically or a deliberate effort to draw India deeper into Western institutions. This dual reliance underscores India’s challenge in navigating an increasingly polarised global order and will be an indicator of geopolitical winds.

The incorporation of prominent African nations into BRICS is a telltale sign that the West is losing influence in Africa. China aggressively courted the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative, investing heavily in Egypt and Ethiopia. Russian proposals have bolstered Africa’s economic outlook through the development of power plants, favorable bilateral trade deals, and the promise of global leadership. The UN Secretary-General recently stated that “no African countries had a seat at the table during the creation of Bretton Woods”, implying that the new world order would be created with the needs of the Global South at the forefront. Many African nations view Russia and China as good faith actors compared to the old global order tainted by colonialism and slavery. Public opinion in Africa shifted to favor China over the US for the first time in decades, as the US fails to match the Chinese efforts to modernize Africa. These worrying signs reiterate the obvious: the US must articulate a compelling vision for African partnership that prioritizes development and collaboration, or risk being left behind in shaping the continent’s dynamic future.

Despite undeniable progress, BRICS remains undecided on its identity as an organization. There is a clear split between middle powers who seek to benefit from both West and East, and burgeoning superpowers who want to create a rival global system. Members of BRICS range from monarchies (UAE and Iran) to democracies (South Africa, India, and Brazil) to autocratic regimes (China and Russia), creating a lack of shared values and varied obligations to public opinion. In addition, China’s slumping economy may give pause to member countries who joined on the assumption that China can compete against and surpass the American economy. Member nations disagree on significant topics, such as the war in Ukraine or UN Security Council reforms. It appears each nation utilizes the ambiguity of BRICS to improve its own geopolitical standing without consistent and shared values, calling its long-term viability into question.

The US must improve institutions and conditions for Global South nations to slow the momentum of BRICS. They can begin by improving trade relationships with middle powers such as India and Egypt, and formalizing trade deals in Africa. US trade with Africa was cut in half between 2010 and 2017, and is among the lowest trading partners of the continent. Since 2006, the US dropped from having 130 major trading partners to just 49 in 2021. The US must use its economy as an asset to assist development projects and create lasting trading partners in critical regions such as Africa and Latin America where it is losing influence. The US should also look to the future and formalize AI governance rules that safeguard democracy as technology continues to dominate crucial industries. By assuring countries that they take this issue seriously and will assist in the proper implementation and security of AI, the US will gain credibility in the future. Finally, the US should re-engage with crucial partners in the BRICS sphere as it has done with India. These steps can effectively counter BRICS by providing legitimate reasons to deepen relations with the US beyond punitive measures.

If recent social media posts are any indication, a confrontation between BRICS and the West is imminent, and the US needs to be careful not to respond in a manner that self-fulfills the prophecy China dispels. An effective American foreign policy to counter BRICS must involve strengthening global institutions to provide more economic opportunity for developing nations in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and Latin America. The instinct to sanction BRICS nations into compliance is a counterproductive step that ignores the causes behind BRICS expansion. The US must revamp the existing international order to fit the needs of developing countries, or they will be successfully persuaded by China. The dollar will not be dethroned anytime soon, but the growing influence of China and Russia must be countered with better solutions, not only tariffs and threats.

December 23, 2024 314 comments

Military North Korea Russia

The Great Escalation: North Korea’s Concerning Deployment of Troops to Russia

written by Madeline Abellera

Back in April, I wrote an article detailing the actions that Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken around the world in order to secure control over a new Cold War-style eastern bloc. Since then, Putin has taken his plans even further. According to a report by the Defense Ministry of South Korea, approximately 12,000 North Korean troops are set to soon be deployed to Eastern Europe in order to fight alongside Russia in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War. These troops are allegedly part of North Korea’s most elite fighting force: the XI Corps, which in total consists of 200,000 soldiers. On October 23, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John F. Kirby stated that the U.S. has already tracked around 3,000 troops who were transported from North Korea to Vladivostok on Russia’s eastern coastline.

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia marks a disturbing escalation of the Russia–Ukraine War for multiple reasons. First, there are clear concerns regarding the ability of the Ukrainian forces to continue to repel the Russian army with their new reinforcements. The Ukrainian government has reported that some North Korean troops have appeared on the front lines in Kursk, a Russian border region in which the Ukrainian army is carrying out an incursion. While Putin’s choice to utilize North Korean forces indicates that Putin is hesitant to continue to draft Russian citizens (as 600,000 Russian citizens have already been killed or wounded), the move also solidifies the fact that Putin does not intend to give up the fight any time soon.

To counter the North Korean forces, conversations have reignited about sending Western troops to aid Ukraine. Philips O’Brien, a professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews, sums up his thoughts: “Everyone flips out whenever they talk about European troops going to Ukraine, that it’s far too escalatory. And then the Russians just go ahead and bring in outside troops. The escalation has already happened.” While the United States and western Europe—though expressing alarm over North Korea’s moves—have not officially committed to any new course of action, these new updates will undoubtedly lead to questions over if more should be done to protect Ukraine from invaders. North Korean involvement in the war has also led to increased anxiety among the governments of both South Korea and Japan. South Korea is purportedly considering sending arms to Ukraine, as well as translators to help Ukraine interrogate any North Korean prisoners.

Another issue that has arisen from the North Korean deployment is the secrecy in which the troop movements are carried out. NBC News, utilizing information from South Korean intelligence services, reports that newly-dispatched North Korean forces have received Russian military uniforms, Russian weapons, and false identification documents claiming that the North Koreans are actually Russians from the far east. (AI facial recognition technology, however, has proven that the soldiers are indeed North Korean.) Pyongyang and the Kremlin also both maintain that the reports of North Korean troops in Russia are false. At the United Nations on October 21, North Korean representatives referred to the accusations as “groundless, stereotyped rumors.” As its troops have not directly engaged in fighting yet, North Korea’s precise next moves are unknown—adding a new layer of obscurity to a war already rife with misinformation.

Perhaps the greatest concern related to North Korea’s troop deployment, however, is the fact that North Korea is doing it for a reason. Western analysts just don’t know what that reason is. “Sending weapons is one thing, but sending your own men is another level of investment and commitment,” stated defense analyst Rachel Lee. “I find it hard to believe that Kim [Jung Un] would send troops without a down payment.” This “down payment,” experts think, could likely take the form of Russia helping North Korea build its nuclear arsenal. There’s already some evidence to point to this conclusion: large cargo-transport planes have been spotted flying from Russia to North Korea, and some policy analysts see it as a possibility that those planes are carrying supplies to help North Korea build nuclear missiles. If Pyongyang is indeed building its arsenal with the support of Russia, it marks a significant break from past Russian foreign policy. As reported by Slate: “Back during the Cold War, the Kremlin blocked its Warsaw Pact allies from developing or obtaining nuclear materials….Putin’s short-term needs in the war may have been compelling enough to justify compromising one of his long-term interests against the spread of nuclear weaponry.” A more lenient Russia and a more powerful North Korea spells out danger for Ukraine and its allies and signifies a changing world order.

With all of this said, North Korea’s military is far from perfect. Isolated from the rest of the world and plagued by economic problems, North Korea does not have experience in fighting modern warfare and relies on Soviet-era weaponry. Additionally, there exists a language gap between the Russians and the North Koreans that may render communication difficult across troops. However, Putin likely seeks to use the North Korean forces to overpower Ukraine by strength in numbers—especially in areas like Kursk, where the Ukrainians are barely holding on to their land. Furthermore, the training of North Korean troops by Russian soldiers will undoubtedly increase the future capabilities of North Korea’s military, modernizing a fighting force already incredibly disciplined and staunchly anti-West.

The deployment of North Korean troops has the potential to change the nature of the Russia–Ukraine War in ways that Western analysts do not yet fully understand. The actual intentions of North Korea, how well they perform alongside foreign troops, and the impacts of their arrival in Eastern Europe remain to be seen—though it can already be said that this move has increased tensions in an evermore volatile situation.

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

October 29, 2024 275 comments

Featured Geopolitics Russia

CA5 + The West: An Eye on Central Asia

written by Madeline Abellera

Beginning on Monday, April 22, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron embarked on a week-long trip across Central Asia. His visit took him to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – countries that typically fly under the radar both in terms of the Western foreign policy focus and in general discussions about geopolitics.

Cameron stated that his excursion was carried out with the goal of “signal[ing] a new era in relations between Britain and all of the Central Asia republics.” The trip is similar to the one made by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2023, who visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in an attempt to fortify France’s own Central Asian influence. Macron signed a variety of economic deals with both the Kazakh and Uzbek governments, partnering with them in industries such as agriculture and uranium. Cameron, now, is making similar commitments: in addition to announcing new programs to expand the study of the English language in the region, Cameron pledged to spend 50 million British pounds over the next three years on the countries’ development.

However, Cameron did not carry out his visit with the simple goal of strengthening the U.K.’s ties to a historically underlooked region. Collectively the five Central Asian countries (all of the countries listed previously, with the exception of Mongolia, which is considered an eastern Asian state) are bordered by Russia, China, and Iran – in other words, strategically situated in the center of regimes hostile to the West. The backdrop of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War, in particular, provides clues to deciphering Cameron’s true mission. Central Asia has been accused of helping Russia sidestep Western sanctions, such as in the case of Kyrgyzstan, a country recently implicated in importing luxury vehicles totalling nearly 230 million U.S. dollars into Russia (clearly in violation of U.S. and E.U. sanctions banning the sale of luxury cars to Russia). Drawing countries like Kyrgyzstan into the Western bloc, and hence encouraging those countries to enforce wartime sanctions against Russia, would undoubtedly be influential in preventing the continuation of the Russia–Ukraine War. It would also deter Chinese economic influence that has been slowly making its way into Central Asia.

There are a few major hurdles that come with partnering with Central Asian states from a Western perspective. On the surface level, Cameron’s diplomatic visit is not all that abnormal: it is reasonable for a country to want to establish connections with other states that are strategically situated and offer opportunities for international trade. In addition to a prime geographic location, the CA5 hold coveted natural resources, such as oil and minerals important for the construction of electric cars. However, the extreme authoritarianism exhibited by the governments of the CA5 (again, excluding Mongolia) may cause some to analyze Cameron’s friendly rhetoric with raised eyebrows.

Take Kyrgyzstan, for instance. The landlocked nation of about 7 million people is a rather young republic, having gained independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1991. The 2010 Kyrgyz Revolution saw the ousting of president Kurmanbek Bakiyev followed by months of unrest and ethnic violence, eventually leading to a stronger parliamentary system of government and the establishment of a free press. However, though the turmoil of the 2010 revolution had a beneficial resolution, Kyrgyzstan is still marred by severe corruption. The democracy watchdog and research institution Freedom House rates Kyrgyzstan as “not free” and classifies it as a “consolidated authoritarian regime.” The former is mainly due to extreme concentration of power in the hands of the executive leader and the general erosion of the rule of law; the latter is due to detention of activists and discriminatory legislation. Allegations that the Kyrgyz government has imprisoned and abused journalists have also recently surfaced. Another watchdog, Transparency International, labeled Kyrgyzstan as a “country to watch” in 2023 due to the country’s alarming levels of democratic backsliding caused by the erosion of civil liberties compounded by state corruption presided over by President Sadyr Jarapov.

The other Central Asian states were subject to similar scrutiny by Transparency International. On the organization’s 2023 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Turkmenistan received a score of 18/100, Tajikistan 20/100, Uzbekistan 33/100, and Kazakhstan 39/100. Turkmenistan’s score, notably, is lower than Afghanistan’s (20/100), and both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan fared more poorly on the CPI index than Russia (26/100). Transparency International attributed these low scores mainly to executive overreach into the judicial branches of the countries’ governments, as well as measures that make it easier for the government to avoid accountability.

Other factors that influence the political landscapes of the Central Asian states – and may pose hurdles to Western figures like Cameron who seek to establish ties to the region – relate to economics beyond the recent sanctions enacted largely as a response to the Russia–Ukraine War. Kazakhstan (which has the largest economy of the Central Asian countries) and Kyrgyzstan are both part of the Eurasian Economic Union (E.A.E.U.), an organization propelled mainly by Russia with the goal of achieving an economic coalition similar to that of the European Union but with post-Soviet states. While the actual power of the E.A.E.U. is not remotely close to that of the E.U. because the E.A.E.U. remains a loose confederation and not the true integrated Russia-central customs union that figures like Vladimir Putin seek, the economic interconnectedness between Russia and the Central Asian states poses problems for Western governments which seek to establish their own trade influence. China, the other major powerhouse east of the CA5, has been making its presence known as well: the path of the controversial New Silk Road project, a plan initiated by China in recent years with the self-proclaimed goal of facilitating global trade and infrastructure development, runs right through Central Asia. Western figures have cited concern that the New Silk Road is a means for China to assert its economic hegemony, spelling future difficulties for the U.K. and similar countries who want to promote their own economies in young nations like the CA5.

Macron and Cameron are not the only leaders who have their eyes on the CA5. In September 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden met with the presidents of all five states at an inaugural meeting of the “CA5+1,” a U.S.-facilitated summit with the goal of discussing Central Asia’s “sovereignty, resilience, and prosperity [i.e., investment and defense], while also advancing human rights.…”

As Russia and China seem to keep reminding the world, though, building lasting ties with Central Asia will not be as simple as a few diplomatic meetings. Major deals will need to be made by Western states hoping to gain power in the region, and democracy-and-freedom-favoring leaders like Biden will need to contend with new partners accused of corruption and human rights abuses. The CA5 hold the key to influence in a contested region – whether Russia and China or the U.K. and its friends ultimately win the diplomatic war remains to be seen.

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

May 20, 2024 284 comments

Newer Posts

Older Posts