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Africa Featured Geopolitics Guest Article Military National Security Political Upheaval Security and Conflict Territorial disputes

Mali on the Brink: Is al-Qaeda About to Inherit a Country?

written by thegeneration

By Lou E. Cardot, University of Toronto

Background: Mali’s Security Crisis

For more than 10 years, Mali has been at the centre of one of the world’s most persistent and complex security crises. In early 2012, a Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, fuelled by weapons and fighters spilling over from Libya after Gaddafi’s fall, overwhelmed Malian army positions. A military coup in Bamako that March further weakened the state. In the chaos, jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and MUJAO, sidelined the Tuareg separatists and seized control of major northern cities such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

France intervened in January 2013 with Operation Serval, pushing jihadist fighters out of the main urban centres. Serval soon morphed into Operation Barkhane, a broader counter-terrorism mission spread across the Sahel, and the UN deployed MINUSMA, a large peacekeeping mission meant to stabilise Mali. On paper, this combination of French forces, UN peacekeepers, and the 2015 Algiers Accords should have restored order. But violence didn’t disappear: instead of open occupation of northern cities, insurgents embedded themselves in rural areas and in the centre of the country.

From around 2015 onward, central Mali became a new epicentre. Katiba Macina, a jihadist group rooted partly in Fulani communities, expanded attacks in the Mopti and Ségou regions. Local conflicts over land, herding routes and community rivalries became entangled with jihadist recruitment and self-defence militias, producing cycles of reprisal massacres. In 2017, several al-Qaeda-aligned factions merged into Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a Jihadist organisation responsible for more than half of violent events across the Sahel region. The UN describes JNIM as al-Qaeda’s official branch in Mali, bringing together AQIM’s Sahel wing, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun and others under a single command.

Over the same decade, Mali’s political institutions eroded. After the 2012 coup, two further military takeovers in 2020 and 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goïta and a junta (a committee of officers who seized power and now rule by decree) to power. Promised transitions back to civilian rule have repeatedly been delayed; in 2025, the government even advanced a bill granting Goïta an extra five-year renewable term, while dissolving political parties and repressing critics. All of this unfolded as jihadist attacks continued to spread into neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, forming what analysts now call the Sahel’s “coup belt.”

What’s New: The GSIM Blockade and Economic Suffocation

Despite years of French operations, UN peacekeeping, and regional initiatives, Mali is less secure today than when the crisis began. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and other conflict trackers show that international missions like Barkhane and MINUSMA failed to achieve lasting stability, even as the number of violent incidents rose and spread geographically. By 2024, the Sahel region accounted for almost half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide, and deaths from terrorism in the region had increased nearly tenfold since 2019, with Mali among the hardest-hit countries.

For most of the 2010s, jihadist groups attacked military bases, ambushed convoys, and exerted influence in rural zones. But today, the JNIM has shifted toward a strategy that directly targets the country’s economic lifelines. Reports now show GSIM militants imposing a blockade on fuel imports into Mali, a landlocked country heavily dependent on trucking routes from coastal neighbours. The group is effectively choking the national economy by blocking or taxing shipments at key transit points, leaving entire regions without gasoline for weeks.

The impact has been severe. Mali relies on fuel for almost every major function of daily life: diesel generators power hospitals and schools, long-haul trucks deliver food and medicine across vast rural distances, and thermal power plants supply the majority of the national electricity grid. When fuel stops moving, everything stops with it. Furthermore, the capital of Bamako has been receiving “less than six hours of electricity per day,” with long lines forming outside the few stations that still manage to secure limited supplies. Many provincial towns have no fuel at all.

This marks a profound evolution of the conflict. Instead of simply degrading security conditions, GSIM is now influencing the material conditions of life itself. Political analysts have long warned that jihadist groups in the Sahel are moving toward forms of shadow governance, adjudicating disputes, imposing taxes, and regulating trade. But a nationwide fuel blockade represents something more direct: the ability to disrupt a country’s core infrastructure. Blocking fuel means blocking electricity, transport, food supply chains, and humanitarian operations. It is a demonstration of power far beyond the bombings and ambushes that characterised the earlier years of the war.

Why France Is Reducing Its Diplomatic Staff Now

In late November 2025, France announced that it would reduce its diplomatic and consular personnel in Mali, citing a sharply deteriorating security environment and growing risks to its staff. This move follows similar decisions by the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which had already evacuated non-essential personnel due to escalating instability.

The immediate reason for France’s decision is the rapid intensification of jihadist violence. Groups like GSIM now control or disrupt key transport routes into Mali’s capital, and their blockade on fuel has made mobility, electricity, and supply chains increasingly unreliable. Diplomats depend on secure transit, consistent power, and state protection, all of which have become difficult to guarantee. Le Monde reports that France has maintained a standing advisory urging its roughly 4,000 citizens in Mali to leave “as soon as possible,” reflecting the same calculation: when a government cannot ensure basic safety, foreign missions cannot operate normally. Earlier this month, the United States warned Americans in Mali to leave the country immediately after increasing pressure from al Qaeda-linked.

Regional & Global Implications

A Collapse of Western Engagement

France’s diplomatic reduction is part of a broader withdrawal of Western influence from the Sahel. Over the past three years, France has ended major military operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger; the EU training mission has been suspended; and the United States has drawn down security cooperation. These departures have not been replaced with equivalent civilian or diplomatic engagement, leaving a vacuum in a region where state institutions are weakening and jihadist groups are expanding. The USA, UK, and France’s drawdowns reinforce Mali’s growing isolation from partners that once underpinned its counter-terrorism, development, and governance programs. With Western embassies scaling back operations, Mali risks drifting further from an international order that offered security guarantees and economic support, and deeper into a cycle where crises escalate with fewer external constraints or mediators.

Rising Russian Influence

As Western governments disengage, Russia has positioned itself as Mali’s primary external partner through the Wagner Group and its rebranded security networks. The junta has embraced Russian advisors, weapons, and contractors as symbols of sovereignty and resistance to France, using this alliance to consolidate domestic support. Yet on the ground, Russian involvement has not improved security: Wagner deployments have been linked to mass civilian casualties, short-term territorial gains, and rapid reversals once fighters withdraw. This pattern, visible in Mali as well as in the Central African Republic, reflects a model of security assistance that prioritizes regime survival over long-term stabilization. As Mali grows more dependent on Russia, it risks becoming locked into an alliance that trades legitimacy and human rights for coercive force, while offering little capacity-building for state institutions. The result is a geopolitical shift that strengthens authoritarian tendencies without addressing the structural drivers of the conflict.

Humanitarian Fallout

The economic and infrastructural consequences of the GSIM blockade create severe humanitarian risks that extend well beyond just fuel shortages. Fuel drives food transport, powers generators in hospitals, and underpins urban water pumping systems. When GSIM blocks shipments, food prices rise, electricity cuts deepen, and rural markets become inaccessible. The blockade has halted 95% of Mali’s fuel imports via trucking from coastal neighbors (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire), disrupting food supply chains. This affects ~6.4 million people (27% of population) needing humanitarian aid, with 3.7 million facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+). Rural deliveries are down 70%, exacerbating malnutrition in 1.9 million children under 5. Bamako receives less than six hours of electricity per day, and some towns have had no fuel for weeks. Diesel powers 80% of off-grid hospital generators; shortages have caused 50% of facilities in Mopti/Ségou to cut emergency services, threatening 2.5 million with severe health risks (e.g., no power for ventilators/surgeries). Similarly, 60% of Bamako’s water supply relies on diesel pumps; blockades have reduced output by 40%, leaving 1.9 million without clean water/hygiene access and spiking cholera risks (up 25% in 2025). These constraints widen inequalities between urban centres with some state presence and rural regions increasingly governed by armed groups. If the blockade persists, it will trigger a humanitarian emergency across central and northern Mali, with a Phase 5 famine for 4.5 million Malians, and displacement up 20%, in central and north areas where state services have already virtually disappeared.

The Sahel as the World’s Fastest-Growing Terrorism Hotspot

The crisis in Mali is part of a regional surge in jihadist activity that has transformed the Sahel into the world’s deadliest terrorism hub. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, conflict deaths in the region exceeded 25,000 in 2024 for the first time since tracking began, with terrorism fueling over 15% of that toll, a dramatic escalation from 2019 levels. The collapse of Western partnerships, combined with political upheaval in Burkina Faso and Niger, has created a contiguous belt of military juntas with limited state capacity and growing ties to Russia. Niger, once considered the region’s “anchor state” and key partner for U.S. and French forces, has pivoted away from the West following its 2023 coup, dismantling the regional security architecture that once balanced jihadist expansion. With no state in the central Sahel capable of filling that role, armed groups now operate across borders with unprecedented freedom, adapting faster than fragmented state forces and exploiting governance vacuums.

What’s Next for Mali and International Diplomacy?

For international actors, the situation in Mali questions how states engage with governments that lack both territorial control and administrative capacity. Diplomatic presence traditionally depends on predictable security environments, functioning institutions, and avenues for political dialogue, all of which are eroding in Mali. The withdrawal of Western missions reflects not only rising operational risks but also a collapse of the shared frameworks that previously structured cooperation: counterterrorism partnerships, electoral transitions, and multilateral stabilization efforts. With those frameworks gone, embassies are retreating from a space where their influence has sharply diminished, leaving Malians in economic suffocation with shrinking humanitarian access and an erosion of public trust, ultimately accelerating the country’s fragmentation.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

January 4, 2026 0 comment

Africa Global Health National Security Women Women's Rights

Does Restricted Abortion Access Present a National Security Threat? Looking at the Case of Madagascar

written by Lea Walters

There are no firm boundaries regarding what issues should be considered national security threats. Certain issues—such as terrorism, foreign relations, espionage, the military, and intelligence—are widely accepted to fall under the traditional umbrella of “national security issues.” However, that traditional definition has expanded in recent years. For example, due to its massive impact on infrastructure, weather, food, and public health, climate change has generally come to be acknowledged as a core component to national security. Given that this definition is somewhat blurred, it is worth exploring other issues—particularly that of abortion access—and determining whether or not they should be included in definitions of national security threats.

Depending on how you define national security, a country’s policy toward abortion access, depending on its effects on that country’s population, should potentially be included in a country’s list of national security issues. A wider definition of national security states that it is simply the ability of a nation to protect its citizens; this definition could be interpreted to include protection from bodily harm, protection of personal autonomy, and safety. Defining something—or not—as a national security issue is important because it brings attention to the saliency and potential danger of that issue. A definition too wide could cause the phrase “national security” to become altogether meaningless, whereas a definition too narrow could cause major issues to be overlooked simply because they lack the national security label. Issues such as abortion access are generally not included under the umbrella of national security. However, due to the potential harm to countries’ citizens which could result from certain abortion policies, this is an issue worth including in the conversation. One major example of a state in which abortion constitutes a genuine national security issue is Madagascar.

Madagascar currently has a very restrictive abortion policy regime—and the consequences of these policies on its own citizens are large. Madagascar is described as having one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Africa, prohibiting abortion access in all cases. However, as in many cases of restricted abortion access or the criminalization of abortion, these laws do not stop the citizens of Madagascar from seeking abortions, and the situation is becoming more and more unsafe.

Multiple national and international political factors have led to Madagascar’s current abortion crisis, and the United States played a major role. Shortly after the January 2017 inauguration of Donald Trump in the United States, Trump reinstated a policy called “Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance.” As an extension of Trump’s own national policy toward abortion, this policy placed a condition upon international NGO recipients of U.S. funding; they were legally no longer able to perform abortions. This policy, also known as the “Global Gag Rule,” forces NGOs to choose between U.S. funding and the right for their citizens to legally access abortions. Thus, given that Madagascar is highly dependent on donor funding from the U.S., this policy resulted in very restrictive abortion laws in Madagascar which criminalize abortion (and assisting abortion) in virtually all cases—making Madagascar one of the only countries in the world with a total ban on abortions.

However, despite Madagascar’s sweeping abortion ban, the amount of unwanted pregnancies ending in abortion rose. Due to their illegality, this statistic indicates that a vast number of abortions in Madagascar are being performed under unprofessional, unsafe conditions. This presents a public health problem due to the severe health consequences that unsafe abortions can have for the women who must undergo them—including things like severe disability, heavy bleeding, damage to internal organs, or even death. With many women dying from unsafe abortion as a result of these restrictive abortion policies, this issue certainly presents a health crisis for the women of Madagascar, and it threatens their safety.

Madagascar serves as just one example of the potential for restrictive and punitive abortion laws to cause major public health issues within a country. In discussions of an issue which impacts the health and safety of so many of a nation’s citizens, including such a public health crisis under the umbrella of “national security” would help to bring attention and urgency to the situation; however, an excessive expansion of what it means to be a “national security concern” could result in decreased priority for the issues of the highest and most immediate concern.

Thus, it is critical to strike the right balance in terms of what issues should be labeled as falling into the realm of national security—in order to strike this balance, crises relating to things like abortion access should be considered when discussing these boundaries. If we define national security to mean the ability of a nation to protect its citizens from harm, then we ought to consider including major public health issues such as abortion access within the conversations surrounding the blurred boundaries of what defines national security.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

December 13, 2025 128 comments

Africa France Geopolitics Military Security and Conflict Terrorism

The Sahel Without the West

written by Sage Ruttenberg

In September 2025, France suspended all counterterrorism efforts with Mali. This severing of relations followed Mali’s arrest of a French agent accused of plotting to destabilize the government. Mali and France, once teammates in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, had already begun to experience growing tension back in mid-2021. To understand the full scope and implications of this break, we must first examine the history of terrorism in the Sahel and France’s role in counterterrorism in the region.

The Sahel, a semi-arid belt south of the Sahara stretching from Senegal to Sudan, has become a hotbed for terrorism, driven by weak governance, corruption, and porous borders. Countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have faced escalating extremist threats, prompting international intervention. Starting in 2013, France launched Operation Serval at Mali’s request, later expanding it into Operation Barkhane to counter militant groups across the region. Alongside the G5 Sahel Force formed in 2017, France became the principal foreign actor supporting regional counterterrorism.

However, the campaign’s results were mixed. Militants dispersed rather than disappeared, and resentment toward France deepened in its former colonies. By 2022, France and its European allies ended up withdrawing from Mali, ending a decade-long intervention and leaving a power vacuum. In response, Mali turned to Russia’s Wagner Group for support, cutting all remaining defense ties with France and the EU. Despite their new alliance, violence surged in the Sahel. Mali’s military and its new partner, the Wagner Group, were enabling and exacerbating this violence through mass executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture of civilians in missions that they carried out. These operations deepened anti-government resentment and strengthened extremist movements in the Sahel. Mali’s government forces and the Wagner Group were even accused by the UN of committing war crimes. This extreme uptick in violence highlighted the full collapse of regional counterterrorism operations and their effects—demonstrating how vital France’s presence had been despite its mixed success, and how detrimental Russia’s intervention proved to be.

Despite France’s troop withdrawal, intelligence cooperation between Mali and France persisted until recently. Diplomatic tensions escalated in August after Mali arrested a French intelligence officer working at the French Embassy. The final break came in September 2025, when Mali expelled five French Embassy employees, declaring them persona non grata and ending all counterterrorism cooperation.

Even with Western international military and intelligence support, terrorism in Mali and the Sahel remained rampant; its escalation after the withdrawal of foreign assistance, however, underscores how vital that support was. Now, with the complete end of French and Western intelligence aid, the Sahel has become fertile ground for juntas and terrorist organizations to gain power. As foreign involvement recedes, insurgency and instability will almost certainly expand. The region risks becoming a hub for jihadist coordination, training, and recruitment, reminiscent of Afghanistan in the early 2000s. As extremist groups consolidate power, they can more easily plan transnational attacks and exploit weak neighboring governments. The stronger these networks grow, the harder they become to contain—raising the risk of a resurgence in global terrorism similar to its 2015 peak, when attacks and civilian fears surged worldwide.

Beyond security, the Sahel’s pivot from Western (French) to Russian support signals a broader erosion of Western influence. It opens the door for Russia—and potentially China—to fill the power vacuum, using security aid as a tool for political leverage. If Moscow continues aligning with unstable regimes, it will strengthen its geopolitical position and expand its sphere of influence, making the United States’ and its allies’ efforts to counter authoritarian powers even more difficult. Given current tensions between Russia and the U.S., this new alignment is especially troubling. In recent years, non-Western powers have risen—China’s economic expansion, India’s growth, and Russia’s resurgence all reflect this shift. Globalization and the diffusion of technology, capital, and information have dispersed critical resources worldwide, while allowing them to reconcentrate in certain non-Western states. Meanwhile, political and social divisions within Western democracies like the United States make global leadership increasingly difficult. Between 1996 and 2023, four Western countries increased their embassies in sub-Saharan Africa from 151 to 159, whereas four non-Western states rose from 95 to 143 embassies. This trend marks not the disappearance of Western power, but the waning of its dominance, as emerging actors step forward to shape global norms. Given these shifts, it may only be a matter of time before the conflicts in the Sahel escalate into something larger.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

December 6, 2025 0 comment

Africa Featured

Chad’s Election: Is Democracy on Trial?

written by Josef Sinigiani

The Sahel is a vast biogeographical region in Africa, stretching from Senegal to Sudan. Not only is it an epicenter of criminal activity, disinformation, illicit trafficking, and environmental degradation, but it has also seen the most extreme growth in violent militant activity on the continent. Due to the terrorism and conflict there – accounting for 43 percent of all deaths from terrorist activity in the world – the state of democracy is fragile. As put into perspective by Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow J. Peter Pham, “One can literally travel eastward across the African continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean without once setting foot in a country with an elected civilian government.” Since 2020, this region of Africa has experienced seven coup d’etats, four of which were successful, arguably due to the economic stagnation and persistent insecurity of unstable governments.

In Mali, two coup d’etats occurred within nine months. The first coup was in August 2020, in which the military, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keira. The military government decided to establish a transitional government with Goita serving as Vice President due to three months of protests, demands for security, and calls regarding respect for democratic norms. However, before the 18-month transitional period ended, Goita seized power from interim president Bah Ndaw on May 24, 2021, accusing Ndaw of administrative incompetence. Since May of 2021, Goita has remained in power as the interim President of Mali.

Burkina Faso, Mali’s neighbor, also witnessed two coups within a nine month period in 2022. Rebel groups from both countries cited insecurity and other forms of misgovernance as justifications for their military overthrows. Most recently in Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, head of an Armed Forces artillery unit, ousted the country’s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, in September of 2022. Additionally, Niger, a relatively politically stable country with a decade-long democratic history, experienced a coup in July of 2023 when General Abdourahamane Tchiani ousted democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum.

While many view these coups as unconstitutional, unnecessary, and dangerous for democracy, such overthrows have garnered considerable support from the populations of the countries themselves. Many people in the Sahel are not necessarily worried about what type of government forms from a coup; rather; they care about a government that will deliver, simply, good governance. An increase in education and the widespread use of social media in this region have more young adults asking questions about how and by whom they are governed. In fact, as long as a so-called democratic government does not deliver positive dividends, citizens are likely to support almost any alternative, including military rule. Supporting a junta does not mean that the regime it is replacing was democratic or popular – hence, another reason for mass demonstrations supporting various coups. The issue in the Sahel may not necessarily be democracy itself but rather the inability to promote a strong democratic culture and ensure fair governance.

It is important to recognize that mass demonstrations supporting a coup often do not last for long periods of time, and if the military leaders do not quickly and consistently deliver security and development, support may begin to lean towards another junta. However, it is incorrect to believe that military juntas are the most effective choice to combat terrorism or human trafficking. Democratic states, according to Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are states with ambition, will, and means to create new opportunities for their people. The heart of this crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy, in which citizens view their government as valid, equitable, and able to meet their needs. J. Peter Pham succinctly argues, “If you want to prevent democratic backsliding, establish governance first.”

In order to establish stability, African states have started to create regional partnerships, one of which is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Institutions like this have placed a large emphasis on the need for democracy, yet they have struggled to uphold democratic values and prevent unconstitutional coups. Some of this issue is rooted in the lack of ECOWAS’s ability to promote its mission without falling into traps set by regimes that “rely principally on manipulation and disinformation.” Juntas, for example, exploit anti-French sentiments, which often stem from Russian disinformation campaigns. The Russian campaigns also create false perceptions of military success to foster national cohesion – and to hide regime failures. In fact, while military juntas in the Sahel argue that the reason for the overthrow of the government is for increased security, it actually often leads to a power vacuum, increasing the violence and irregular warfare.

Military governments do not improve the lives of everyday peoples. Instead, they decrease the wealth and security of populations poorer and cause rates of violence to skyrocket by 150 percent in Mali, 77 percent in Burkina Faso, 38 percent in Mali, and 42 percent in Niger. Boubacar Moussa, once a member of a Mali-based, al-Qaeda-linked extremist group who now works in a deradicalization program, told AP News that the recent coup in Mali was welcomed by extremists as an opportunity to expand operations.

On May 6, 2024, Chad held its long-delayed presidential election after three years of military rule under interim president Mahamat Deby Itno. In 2021, Deby seized power after his father – who ruled the country for 30 years – was killed fighting rebels. When Deby took control of the government, he decided to hold an 18-month transition period to civilian rule…which was then extended by two more years. Scholars argue that the importance of democracy lies in elections and peaceful transitions of power; however, Chad has not had a free and fair transfer of power since its independence in 1960. Chad is viewed by the United States and France as one of the last remaining stable allies in the Sahel, as Mali and Niger have expelled French forces and turned to Russia’s mercenary groups for counterterrorism assistance. A large concern about the election was that it was just a seemingly legitimate mechanism to formalize the military’s hold on power.

The election was tumultuous. Leading opposition figure Yaya Dillo, who founded the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders, was killed in February 2024 in a largely disputed extrajudicial murder. His murder was a clear signal to all opposition candidates in Chad that Deby would not tolerate any threat to his power. Deby, in fact, was suggesting changes to a December 2023 constitutional referendum, in which Chadians voted “yes” on new measures, such as 1) a presidential term limit decrease from 6 to 5 years, 2) a reduction in the age limit of the president from 40 to 35, and 3) the creation of local councils to devolve power from the center.

Deby’s challenger at the polls was once a vocal critic of him. Succes Masra, who led opposition protests against the 2022 coup, was recently appointed Prime Minister of Chad by Deby himself, which greatly angered citizens. Such tactics either suppressing or elevating the powerful opposition leaders as well as extending election dates mirror Deby’s father, Idriss, who was able to hold six consecutive terms in a two-term-limit constitution. In fact, elections in 2011, 2016, and 2021 resulted in an easy defeat of opposition candidates – largely popular in urban areas – as they hold little support from the rural areas where 76 percent of Chadians live.

While this is “the first time a president and prime minister of Chad have tussled at the polls,” experts believed that the elections were merely a formality used to solidify his power. This strategy is called electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism is characterized by the idea of presenting a democracy with multiple parties and free elections while actually removing the true efficacy of an election. The results of such elections are known in advance, as they are subject to state manipulation. For example, the new electoral code in Chad eliminated the obligation of the National Election Management Agency to publicly post the election results at every polling station. Instead, the only obligatory information for publication is regional tallies, making it impossible for observers to verify the results at individual polling stations.

Furthermore, the agency largely consists of members and associates of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS). And, the Constitutional Council, which confirms the official results of the election, is headed by Jean Bernard Padare, a former MPS executive – appointed by Deby himself.

Another concern for Chad’s future lies in the growing dissension of the Zaghawa clan. Deby’s family is a part of the Zaghawa clan, which represents just over 5 percent of the Chadian population. Yet, members of the clan have ruled the country for over 30 years. The recent conflict in Sudan has also been a parallel source of tension because the Deby government has been supporting the UAE’s supply of arms to Rapid Support Forces who have attacked the Zaghawa clan from within Chad. Deby’s lack of support to those of his own clan being attacked may lead to a coup against Chad backed by ethnic Zaghawans.

600,000 Sudanese refugees have recently fled to eastern Chad – in addition to the 500,000 refugees already there – which creates more pressure for the government to supply humanitarian aid and more competition for resources. On the one hand, Mahamat Deby has focused on security by strengthening ties with the President of the Central African Republic and the Field Marshall in Libya to carry out counterinsurgency military operations in the region. Moreover, Deby has strengthened ties with France and opened up economic partnerships with the UAE, Hungary, and Russia. Specifically, as Central Africa expert Enrica Picco writes, “The recent wave of coup d’etat in Western Sahelian states, along with the outbreak of war in Sudan, have made Chad look like an island of stability in the greater Sahel, as well as one of the few reliable allies for western powers.” On the other hand, the Deby government has failed to improve the country’s socio-economic situation, as fuel prices continue to rise and the government frequently cuts electricity and water. The southern and central regions are in constant tension, and farmers and herders there add to secessionist movements. Thus, the results of the election are crucial for the future of security and democracy in the Sahel.

The results: Mahamat Deby has been declared the official winner of Chad’s presidential election. According to the state election body, Deby won 61.3 percent of the vote compared to Prime Minister Succes Masra’s mere 18.5 percent. Masra, before the results had even been released, declared himself the winner. After hearing of his loss, he argued that the victory had been “stolen from the people.”
The Coalition of Moral Authorities for Mediation, an association that includes clerics, former government ministers, and female leaders, has observed violence, threats, and fraud in this election. And, not only were the results released two weeks earlier than expected, but the country’s Constitutional Council is the “only body empowered to proclaim definitive results,” and an official proclamation has not yet been released. This evident victory, however, means that the Deby family’s 34-year rule will persist, as democracy continues to exist just out of reach.

May 20, 2024 282 comments

Africa Featured

The Innocent Ones: The Escalation of Conflict between Congo and Rwanda

written by Nathan Akiyoshi

Since the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, tensions have been high between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees fled to the DRC during and after the genocide. Among the refugees were soldiers, many of whom were responsible for the killings of 800,000 Tutsis and some moderate Hutus.

As a result of the genocidal perpetrators moving to the DRC, Rwanda and its northern neighbor Uganda attempted to invade eastern Congo, seeking retribution. The result of this invasion led to the toppling of DRC president Mobutu Sese Seko.

After Seko was deposed, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and his allies installed Laurent Kabila as President of the DRC. But, in an attempt to decrease rumors about excessive Rwandan influence in his administration, Kabila turned on Rwanda. He attempted to remove the Rwandan influence from the DRC during the Second Congo War in 1998, even removing ethnic Tutsis from his administration and forcing Rwandan forces out to the resource-rich eastern DRC. This second war ended in 2001 when Kabila was assassinated in a coup, leading to Kabila’s son Joseph assuming power in 2002.

Rwanda and the DRC have made attempts at peace since 2002. However, in response to former President Kabila’s actions of removing Tutsis from his government, radical groups, such as the March 23rd Movement (M23), began trying to take control of the eastern region of the DRC. M23 claims its motivations are in response to the DRC government not abiding by the rules of the peace deal by incorporating more ethnic Tutsis into its administration.

Although Rwanda denies any ties with M23, the DRC, along with United Nations member states, is now accusing Rwanda of backing M23 to gain control of the resource-rich area in the eastern region of the DRC. Its resources, such as cobalt and copper, are minerals that are essential for the production of many modern electronic devices. More than 100 rebel groups are currently taking advantage of the political instability and engaging in armed conflict for control.

The unfortunate reality of conflict over this resource-rich area is the humanitarian cost. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that the conflict has displaced 7 million people. Of that 7 million, around 1 million people are seeking refuge outside of Congo, many of whom are subject to violence. According to U.N. officials, many women and girls have been subjected to sexual violence on a “massive scale” in three of the DRC’s provinces. The United Nations has appealed to its member states for $2.3 billion to help alleviate the crisis. However, it has only received $764 million of that aid, meaning only “a fraction of the number of people in need” would receive it.

Within the northern Congolese town of Bambo, residents fleeing violence were the targets of bomb and mortar raids. 200,000 people have been displaced by attacks like these in the region north of Goma. The conflict between M23 and DRC militias has caused many civilian casualties, including the massacre of 171 civilians which the DRC accuses M23 of perpetrating.

Another example of the violence comes from an attack on a camp for displaced persons by a coalition of militia groups known as the Cooperative for Development of Congo (CODECO), leaving 45 people dead. According to the United Nations peacekeeping forces, they massacred the refugees at the Lala displacement site in the Djugu territory. The blatant attacks by militia groups on vulnerable groups constitute a severe violation of international law.

The displaced refugees place additional strain on the DRC government, which is already home to more than 500,000 refugees from other countries. Over a quarter of the DRC population is food insecure, and the World Food Programme estimates that 2.8 million children are acutely malnourished. Further strain was placed on the weakened government through outbreaks of cholera, measles, monkeypox, and ebola.

The conflict between the DRC and M23 is a mix of both ideology and control over resources. The instability of the DRC government seems to limit what it can do to prevent the armed conflict and protect its citizens. Yes, the United Nations is trying to raise funds and send peacekeeping forces, but conflict – and the suffering of the innocent civilians – is far from over.

Image source: United Nations on Flickr

May 20, 2024 307 comments

Africa Economics France International Trade

La Francafrique: Africa’s Last Colonies

written by Kosi Ogbuli

The era of what we referred to as ‘Françafrique’ is coming to an end. There is France and there is Africa. There is the partnership between France and Africa, with relationships grounded in respect, clarity and solidarity – Current French President François Hollande

With the official announcement of the replacement of the CFA franc by a new currency called “the eco” Saturday, December 21 2019 in Abidjan, French neo-colonialism of west Africa has run its course. France’s relations with Africa have been profoundly transformed in recent decades. Today they show little resemblance to the admittedly unhealthy relationship of the post-colonial years. The first Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny introduced the expression ‘La Francafrique‘ in 1955 to define the wish of some members of the African elite to maintain special relations with France after their independence. Since then, this term has been used several times in a pejorative meaning to describe French neo-colonial dominance in Africa. Today, the meaning of Françafrique is largely used to refer to France’s ‘sphere of influence’ in Sub-Saharan Africa hallmarked by its economic partnerships and military operations reminiscent of its colonial control of the 19^th and 20^th centuries. The nations within this sphere of influence have begun to separate themselves from the vestiges of French colonial control, but how France has maintained La Francafrique provides a rude awakening to the practice of neo-colonialism in modern times.

According to Franc Diplomatie, over a third of French exporters export to Africa.This skewed trading relationship is a legacy of French colonial rule and the special relationship it maintains with many of its former colonies. The CFA Franc is a modern symbol of this reality at play. The CFA Franc (African Financial Community or Cooperation Franc), created in December 1945 under the government of De Gaulle, is the last colonial currency still in circulation today. It is the common currency of 14 African States in Central and Western Africa (+ The Comoros) bounded by a policy of monetary cooperation incentivizing countries using the CFA Franc to give unrivaled market share to French imports. It is the French Treasury that guarantees the unlimited convertibility of the CFA Franc to the euro. In return, countries in the CFA Franc zone are required to deposit 50% of their foreign exchange surpluses into a French operations account. However, due to the fixed parity, countries that use the CFA Franc suffer from the highly valued euro and have difficulties exorting their goods. Consequently, La Francafrique nations have been economically bound to France until the announcement of “the eco” in late 2019.

However, while its economic influence wanes, France remains a major military force in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, France has a military presence in francophone areas of eastern, central, and western Africa, with a commitment of 8,700 troops, half of which are permanently stationed. France maintains four permanent bases in Africa: Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, all being former colonies. Those forces have a strategic role, which is to protect France and its economic interests as well as intervene quickly when necessary. Emmanuel Macron, president of France, inherited two external operations in Africa and on several occasions has expressed the ambition, like Hollande, to continue them. The first, Mission Corymbe, was originally aimed at preserving French oil exploitation and other economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, but nowadays is intended to reduce maritime insecurity and contribute to capacity-building in fighting piracy and illicit trafficking, for example by hosting naval exercises for navies in the region. The second is Operation Barkhane, a counter- terrorist operation in the Sahel region. It was launched by Hollande in 2014, with a contingent of 4,000 French troops positioned in cooperation with the five countries concerned, all former French colonies: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, and Chad, a partnership known as the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5S). Exactly how France’s military presence and engagements may evolve is not dependent on its will alone. With their operations, France has married its national interests with the stability of La Francafrique, justifying a military presence that would be observed as foreign occupation in any other context. With the emergence of a new generation of leaders in many African countries, it remains to be seen how political support for French involvement might evolve over time.

The nature of ‘La Françafrique’ has changed with the shifting economic and geopolitical realities over time.Even if relations between France and Africa are weaker today than they were in the colonial times, ‘La Françafrique’ is not completely over as François Hollande affirmed. Indeed, insofar as the CFA Franc exists and there remains excessive French military presence in the region, France has the means to interfere in African affairs. We cannot speak of an eventual end of ‘La Françafrique’. Africa and its resources are still a topical issue in French politics but more worrisome is the model Francafrique gives for other nations to create monopolistic control within the continent. Today France is facing growing competition from emerging powers, such as China, which has become the largest trading partner of the continent in recent years.In fact, Chinese firms are challenging French firms in development contracts, investment, and trade agreements. The announcement of “the echo” has caused the last dominoes of colonialism to start falling. For African countries, both within Francafrique, and the continent at large, France’s ability to control the affairs and destiny of a multitude of countries must be warning enough as the world looks to Africa again for their “national interests”.

August 22, 2020 385 comments

Europe Featured

The Malignancy of Multinational Currency

written by Katherine Jones

“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts,”

This hostile and controversial statement was leveraged by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s populist deputy Prime Minister, in a counterproductive attempt to deflect shared responsibility for Europe’s migrant crisis. However the currency in question should be a part of the larger discussion on globalization and post-colonial institutions. If European leaders were to earnestly evaluate the CFA franc not from their perspective but from the perspective of the affected Africans, they may find some unsettling similarities to the eurozone.

The CFA franc represents two distinct multinational currencies in Western and Central Africa. The currencies are effectively the same, as both have an exchange rate pegged to the euro (1 euro = 655, 957 francs), however they are not interchangeable. The logic behind the fixed exchange rate is to prevent inflation and promote investor security in nations where poor governance may otherwise threaten market stability. However, this comes at a very steep price for the nations involved. In return, they must keep 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury, follow the strict monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and attempt to develop their economies with an inevitably overvalued currency.

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In the current economic landscape, African nations should seriously consider if the sacrifice of sovereignty necessitated by the franc is worth the supposed increase in prosperity. The crux of the problem is that the CFA franc is essentially a version of the euro, and relatively weak economies using a strong currency is counterproductive to economic development. The strength of the franc encourages imports and makes exports less competitive on the global market, stagnating the development of member nations. Additionally, the main priority of the ECB is to maintain stable prices, with inflation at a maximum of 2%. This policy makes sense for the top members of the European Union (EU), but a developing nation should be focused on high employment rates and exports, ideally with inflation rates of up to 8%. Moreover, the 50% reserve requirement of the franc zone countries greatly limits their investment options. The French treasury gives them a return rate of only .75%, which sometimes does not even match the level of inflation, much less provide a desperately needed return on investment.

The franc becomes even less attractive when considering the performance of other African economies. Former French colonies that abandoned the franc, such as Morocco and Algeria, are more successful economically, despite using an independent currency. Overall income per capita, adjusted for inflation, has grown 1.4% in the franc zone and 2.5% in the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the line of credit extended to the franc zone is pitiful. In the western franc zone (see map) the credit to GDP ratio is 25% and in the central franc zone it is only 13%! This is in comparison with the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa around 60%.

So why keep the CFA franc? The franc is known to benefit a small percentage of upper and middle class African citizens by providing easy access to imports and the ability to invest abroad, while by and large disadvantaging the 75% of the citizenry who are working class. To exacerbate things further, France and other foreign interests greatly benefit from the franc zone as an export market, and France is granted special access to African resources as a part of the agreement. Furthermore, the franc’s status as a multinational currency provides greater benefit to outside nations wanting to facilitate trade, than the internal member states. The franc is after all very poorly integrated, with intra-regional trade accounting for only 15% of total trade, while trade with Europe accounts for 60%. The French, along with the remainder of the eurozone, clearly profit off of the CFA franc.

Many African economists and politicians acknowledge these flaws, yet the question of how to move forward still remains. The French have responded to the protestations of their former colonies by supporting the creation of a new multinational African currency independent of the euro, that will incorporate more– and larger–African states, including but not limited to Nigeria. However, this still appears self-serving. There is minimal justification for the existence of a new multinational currency in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as aforementioned, it primarily benefits outsiders. The best interest of the franc zone may be to follow the advice of former World bank director Carlos Lopes. He believes the CFA franc should be tied to a basket of other currencies, including the notoriously undervalued Chinese yuan, or to hover around a target exchange rate with the euro, both which will help to mitigate the overvaluation of the franc, while maintaining the currency as a pillar of stability.

The tragic irony is that France, along with a number of Southern European states, are the victim of the euro in much the same way that the CFA franc is. The euro is too strong for the economies of Southern Europe. Estimates peg overvaluation at 5% in France and 7% in Greece. Furthermore, the emphasis on low inflation within the eurozone is really to the benefit of the booming German bloc, at the expense of countries such as Italy and Greece that desperately need stimulus spending. In terms of real GDP, Italy was the same size in 2016 as it was in 2001. Much like the franc zone, Italy, among other countries, needs to focus on improving employment rates, infrastructure projects, and competitive exports, to ensure growth in coming years.

When comparing eurozone countries to those that chose not to adopt the currency, such as Sweden and Hungary, the results are disappointing at best. National Gross Income (NGI) per capita in the eurozone grew at a rate of 1.65% in 2015, whereas Sweden saw growth rates around 2.72%. Additionally, Hungary, an emerging European economy, witnessed even higher growth rates, with NGI per capita reaching 3.06% in 2015. The success of independent Eastern European economies makes evident the disadvantage Southern Europe suffers being a part of the euro. Furthermore, when examining the eurozone within the global context, it is evident that as a whole they have fallen behind other developed countries. The US economy was just 13% bigger than the eurozone at it’s genesis, but now it is over 27% larger.

So why keep the euro? This question is obviously more nuanced in light of the highly integrated European economy and greater cultural and political ties of the EU, than are present in the franc zone. Brexit, despite not having a monetary element, should be evidence enough that disintegration is not a feasible option for Europe at this point. However, the shortcomings of the euro must still be recognized. The euro, rather than being of overt benefit to a neocolonial power as the franc is, does disproportionately benefit Germany. The significant undervaluation of the euro in Germany (about 17%) makes its exports extremely competitive and creates greater economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this leads to a vicious cycle where Germany becomes more and more prosperous and the ECB creates tighter monetary policies to adjust for German strength (ie higher interest rates), all while neglecting the needs of the weaker economies in the eurozone. For the benefit of not only the European project, but the 147 million people who use the CFA franc, the Germans should ease their tyrannical monetary policy and cozy relationship with the ECB.

Realistically however, the prospects of Germany doing this are unfavorable, and as a result the euro’s most likely fate seems to be an eventual phase out. The currency once intended to unite Europe, has since contributed to the very economic stagnation and rise of isolationism that will eventually be its demise. But perhaps this is to be expected when inflicting stringent monetary policy on nations with diverse economic needs and dissonant fiscal policies. It may be time to reconsider multinational currencies as a whole.

March 15, 2019 386 comments

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Africa Featured Globalization International Trade

China’s Strategic African Exploitation

written by Tala Ahmadi

The minibus violently jostled left and right as we hit a road under construction. Awoken from my nap, I looked out the window half asleep. I figured I must still be dreaming as we passed Chinese signs, Chinese workers and Chinese machinery– wasn’t I in the West African country of Ghana? While accustomed to encountering diversity in Africa’s globalized metropolises, I was surprised to find a Chinese presence at a construction project en route to a small village in rural Ghana. As I traveled to more African countries, the image of Chinese investments against the continent’s cities and landscapes was a frequent recurrence.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has aggressively positioned itself in Africa through a host of economic activities ranging from infrastructure projects, construction, mining, social services, restaurants, retail and more. In what President Xi Jinping has deemed a “win-win” relationship, China extracts natural resources from the continent to fuel its economic development in exchange for cheap manufactured goods, roads, schools, hospitals, railways and more. A testament to its foreign policy commitment of “Go Global,” China surpassed the United States (US) as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009.

China’s appetite to forge international partnerships comes at a time when rising populism has forced many Western countries to look inward, with President Donald Trump notably proposing to cut foreign aid by one-third. The economic powerhouse is also ramping up its activities in Latin America in light of a diminishing US presence, doling out more development finance than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation combined. China has also set its eye on the Middle East, releasing its first Arab Policy Paper which describes how the country hopes to increase trade with the region mostly in exchange for oil.

By pouring $2.25 billion into Africa annually, China has positioned itself as a viable, and often more attractive, alternative to traditional Western aid and development organizations. Chinese money is accompanied by a policy of no interference, meaning few strings are attached for the recipient country besides access to natural resources or a local market. Unlike Western money that often comes with conditionalities like enforcing good governance, human rights or environmental protection, Chinese aid is doled out efficiently and projects are often completed on schedule or earlier. Their non-interference policy also means that the Chinese are willing to indulge African despots that many Western development organizations dare not. One such dictator includes Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s dictator that is purportedly using Chinese funds to increase surveillance capacities rather than assisting the 72% of Zimbabweans who live in poverty (national poverty line).

China has been criticized by many Western countries and media outlets as a neo-colonial force that disregards local labor regulations, funds dictatorial leaders, destroys local markets and invests in construction projects that lack quality and lifetime in the name of profit. While these accusations are valid, China is providing desperately needed infrastructure to a continent that still struggles to achieve fundamental levels of development even after the $30 billion in aid Africa has received since the 1970s. Western development agencies are known for their bureaucratic and top down approach to development that often imposes, unsuccessfully for the most part, western cultural norms and institutions on a continent that frequently does not share the same values. The Chinese have been able to successfully execute projects that Africans can make use of like roads, schools and hospitals.

China’s African foreign policy strategy is deeper than the superficial goal of economic exploitation or neo-colonialism. In light of shifting global paradigms, where the US seems more and more like a decaying empire, China is seeking to build strategic partnerships across the continent that result in international signs of support like at the United Nations. In fact, one of China’s first projects in Africa was the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Tanzania to Zambia. In exchange for the railway, China required support at the UN to be reinstated in the Security Council. AidData reveals that for every 10% increase in voting support at the UN, China increases aid by 86%. Another bargaining chip for access to Chinese money is often international recognition of China over Taiwan, which most recently occurred with the small, African island country of Sao Tome and Principe.

Another indication that China seeks strategic alliances rather than a form of pure exploitation is China’s establishment of the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. During the most recent FOCAC in 2015, where 50 African leaders attended compared to four in the first forum, President Xi promised $60 billion investment in Africa. In 2013, President Xi also revealed his One Belt, One Road initiative, an ambitious vision with a $1.6 trillion price tag, linking Asia, Africa and the Middle East’s trade routes to create a stronger Eastern trade bloc. Perhaps a flex of its geopolitical muscle and a wink to the West, China started building its first African military base in Djibouti— only about ten miles from the US’ largest African military base.

China is presenting itself as a champion of the East and an alternative option for financing the development of emerging economies. While characteristics of China’s foreign policy are accurately likened to economic exploitation, it appears China’s deeper goal in Africa is to forge lasting partnerships in exchange for political loyalty. This may also be influenced by the fact that the longevity of the Sino-African “win, win” relationship is contingent on the Chinese economy’s success. With Chinese economic growth consistently slowing and commodity prices fluctuating, a purely economic agenda may not be sustainable. China presents itself to African nations as an example of an alternative model for climbing out of poverty, an easier and more efficient financing partner and a global leader rivaling the Western hegemonic power structure. A testament to their attempt at cultivating an international image of partnership and leadership, the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana recently commented on the One Belt, One Road initiative, “The belt and road initiative comes from China, yet it belongs to the world.”

August 6, 2017 375 comments

Violence Against Women Source

Africa Featured Society and Culture Women's Rights

Domestic Violence in Ghana: Socially Accepted and Judicially Trivialized

written by Tala Ahmadi

The West African country of Ghana’s deeply entrenched patriarchal culture, where the husband’s exclusive rights to his wife trump her own, condones domestic violence. Most Ghanaian women are told that to be successful in life, they must find a husband and serve him adequately by fulfilling gender roles and continuing his lineage. Wives are told to be socially smaller than their husbands, who are their superiors, breadwinners and protectors. Across all the hundreds of ethnic groups in Ghana, women are viewed as inferior to men. One of the many social dimensions arising from this gendered culture includes an acceptance of domestic violence. The few women that legally report their instances of abuse are supposed to be supported by Ghana’s Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU), a branch of the Ghana Police Services. However, Ghanaian women still face extreme obstacles in preventing and reporting domestic violence as well as seeking and receiving justice from the Ghanaian criminal system. Despite the normal inefficiencies that plague most of Ghana’s institutions (the DOVVSU does not even have a website), the root of the Unit’s ineffectiveness remains Ghana’s deeply entrenched gendered culture.

Traditionally, when women are born they belong to their fathers. Once married, their cultural property title moves to their husband and his family— a sister-in-law can refer to her husband’s wife as, “my wife.” If a wife is disobedient, which includes failing to fulfill her traditional obligations like cooking, cleaning, taking care of children and being sexually available whenever her husband desires, domestic violence is often socially accepted by both men and women. According to Ghana’s 2003 Demographic and Health Survey,19.8% of men and 34% of women found it socially acceptable for a husband to beat his wife if she went out without telling him. The survey also showed that 10.1% of men and 19.9% of women considered it acceptable for a husband to beat his wife for refusing to have sex with him. These statistics are unfortunately not unique to Ghana and are part of an international and regional epidemic.

Within West Africa, domestic violence is widespread and often legally allowed. Globally, 30% of women experience violence from intimate partners and 36.6% of African women experience lifetime intimate partner violence. Section 55(1)(d) of Nigeria’s Penal Code legally condones an assault by a husband on his wife for, “the purpose of correcting his wife, such husband and wife being subject to any native law or custom in which such correction is recognized as lawful.” Spousal rape is also not criminalized in Togo, Ghana’s neighbor. In Benin, 68.6% of women experience violence at the hands of men, and 69.5% of those perpetrators are spouses or partners. One in four women in Senegal are victims of domestic abuse. These high statistics are the consequence of deeply gendered cultures where domestic abuse is socially accepted and frequently legal.

These embedded cultural norms were challenged in the past four decades by a global wave of women’s rights advocacy. Several international and regional treaties, bills, covenants and conventions geared towards women’s rights were adopted, including the UN’s notable Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. One of Ghana’s responses to this push included establishing the DOVVSU in February 2007. However, women who seek the DOVVSU’s support are often discouraged to report their claims and rarely see their spouses brought to justice. The DOVVSU fails in its mission to provide victims with adequate support services because it remains shackled to Ghana’s patriarchal culture.

Many Ghanaians traditionally believe that domestic abuse should be resolved within the household rather than externally via the justice system. This mindset causes judges to trivialize domestic violence cases or pressure women to drop their claims. Often times, Ghanaian women are too embarrassed, disheartened or discouraged to even report their cases of abuse—95% of Ghanaian women who have been raped do not report the incident. Even when women do pursue criminal charges many of their claims never get sent to court, they experience societal shaming and hardly any cases lead to convictions. A statistic from 2010 found that out of 12,706 cases in the country, only 954 were sent to court and of those only 118 convictions were obtained. These numbers are unacceptable given that the DOVVSU’s intent is to provide victims with the support necessary to seek justice. In actuality, those who are entrusted with the power to help victims find justice convince and encourage women to drop their claims and return to their abusive relationships to avoid disturbing the peace of their communities.

Another traditional belief contributing to the DOVVSU’s ineffectiveness and the prevalence of domestic violence is the cultural mindset that marriage equals consent. A 2007 survey found that 20.6% of Ghanaian women have experienced intimate partner violence in their lifetime and 44.5% have experienced physical and/or sexual abuse from intimate partners and/or non-partners in their lifetime. These high numbers are not surprising considering until 2007, Ghanaian Criminal Code section 42 (g) explicitly allowed marital rape by stating, “the consent given by a husband or wife at marriage, for the purposes of marriage, cannot be revoked until the parties are divorced or separated by a judgment or decree of a competent Court.” After the DOVVSU was established, section 42 (g) was revised to state, “The use of violence in the domestic setting is not justified on the basis of consent.” While the changes imply husbands can be criminally prosecuted for marital rape, there is no direct prohibition of marital rape statutorily in the Ghanaian Criminal Code. In addition, the revision in the law has yet to change cultural and patriarchal mindsets that contribute to the extent of marital rape and the attitudes of law enforcement officers who trivialize domestic violence cases.

The DOVVSU’s establishment marked a significant first step in improving the Ghanaian domestic violence landscape, however its effectiveness is marred by prevailing cultural norms. How can Ghana create an effective DOVVSU when major sources of its inadequacy are beliefs that can only be changed with time? This is a difficult question to answer, but the solution must include more rigorous sensitivity training for judges, police officers and leaders of communities, national emphasis on the issue and increased marketing about the DOVVSU. Queen mothers, who are the female leaders of many Ghanaian communities and dedicated advocates for women and children, and DOVVSU representatives should organize community discussions about gender roles and domestic violence. Similar conversations should be conducted in classrooms so from a young age children can start a normally nonexistent discussion regarding domestic abuse. Queen mothers should also spearhead female support groups as forums for women to talk freely about sexism and gender roles. Female focused NGOs must also work with Queen mothers and take advantage of their unique position with women and children. These open conversations regarding gender constructs and their societal influence will work to challenge the prevailing norms and change the mindsets that leave many Ghanaian women disentitled to their own bodies.

May 26, 2016 381 comments

Africa Featured Security and Conflict

Laurent Gbagbo and the Future of the International Criminal Court

written by Holt Alden

In November 2010 Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo lost the presidential election to rival Alassane Ouattara in an extremely tight and fiercely contested race. Gbagbo refused to step down, denying the results of the election, while Ouattara, as well as the Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council and international leaders, claimed Gbagbo had lost. The stand-off continued for months as violence spread in Abidjan, the nation’s capital. Gbagbo supporters were accused of murdering civilians from the opposition party and burning people alive, while others claimed pro-Ouattara groups also engaged in human rights abuses. By April of 2011 more than 3,000 people had died and claims of crimes against humanity surfaced in the international press. Soon after, Gbagbo was arrested and extradited to The Hague where he awaited trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This January, Gbagbo’s trial began and is still ongoing. Ouattara on the other hand, has not been charged, leading to pro-Gbagbo groups joining the chorus of critical opposition to ICC indictments, its current justice process and the court itself.

The Gbagbo case marks an integral test for the ICC’s effectiveness and legitimacy, as it exemplifies both the potential importance of the ICC in prosecuting heinous crimes and the problems associated with a supranational criminal court that tries individuals. The high-profile nature of the trial is also important, as it turns international media focus to the ICC and allows for a close inspection of how the court has evolved since opening in 2002.

The ICC–currently supported by 123 nations–was established through the Rome Statute with the mandate of prosecuting cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity. However, since 2002 the ICC has only completed twelve proceedings, resulting in two convictions. Gbagbo is the first former head of state to reach trial at the ICC, making this a landmark case for the court. The case’s high-profile status will test the ICC’s ability to act effectively and justly under intense scrutiny.

One of the most common issues surrounding the ICC is the possibility of political manipulation and unbalanced use of judicial power. The explicit purpose of the ICC is to fight impunity in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity; moreover, as a criminal court, it is also meant to prevent retaliatory vengeance by monopolizing legitimate justice. Gbagbo may have incited the violence in Ivory Coast by refusing to step down from the presidency, but the accusations that Ouattara groups also assaulted and murdered civilians shows that, in this instance, the ICC’s theoretical premise of preventing vengeance failed. The threat of punishment from the ICC did not stop Ouattara groups from attacking Gbagbo supporters. That being said, an increased efficiency in the court and the cooperation of international leaders in apprehending those indicted by the ICC may inhibit future groups from retaliating with violence. Prosecuting Gbagbo fairly, while also thoroughly investigating Ouattara and his actions in 2010-2011, would show the world there will not be impunity for similar crimes nor violent and heinous reactions from the victims.

Critics of the court, including pro-Gbagbo groups, also cite imbalanced investigations and prosecutions, as well as negative African bias. So far, the ICC has failed to adequately investigate Ouattara’s influence on the unrest, even as news reports claim both Gbagbo and Ouattara’s forces perpetrated extreme violence in the months following the presidential election in 2010. In this vein, the court is caught between domestic groups hoping the ICC can provide justice and others, such as African leaders, who critique neocolonial tendencies and bias. The Gbagbo case also continues the ICC’s questionable record of only indicting Africans, which must change. Much of Africa is mired in violence, as seen in the cases of Joseph Kony and others, but there are many conflicts outside the continent that deserve equal investigation. For instance, there is much evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s regime perpetrated crimes against humanity in Syria. France is currently investigating Assad’s possible war crimes, though it would show a strong commitment to unbiased justice if the ICC were to indict him as well. Each of these elements fuel claims that the ICC lacks legitimacy as an impartial justice institution.

The Gbagbo case alone will not solve these issues but a focus on thoroughness and unbiased justice for all those involved, as well as others in similar conflicts, will create an opportunity for legitimacy. Each of the previous critiques is important and relevant, yet they must not spell the closing of the ICC. Here, the importance of Gbagbo and the Ivory Coast becomes evident. Gbagbo’s trial is an important first step toward justice for those involved in the violence in Ivory Coast but it is only the beginning of a long process. The ICC’s investigation into possible violent crimes by Ouattara and his supporters groups is ongoing; investigations that involve issues of national sovereignty or that scrutinize governments currently in power are time-intensive and must be treated with patience.

Although the ICC’s negative African bias should be criticized, the court only has a short history of indictments. The method and focus of their investigations can easily be changed to incorporate trends of equality and objectiveness regarding who is charged and tried. Laws that are enforced unevenly are often illegitimate and discriminatory, which makes it imperative that the ICC broaden its gaze beyond Africa. Indicting Bashar al-Assad would be a promising step forward, showing the ICC’s commitment to equality under the law.

The ICC’s implicit narrative of vengeance prevention should also be looked at from a broader, long-term perspective. Many cases of crimes against humanity or genocide stem from intra-state conflicts or civil wars. The court will not be able to stop violent acts of retaliation by immediately indicting and trying national leaders. If the ICC gains legitimacy and more countries sign the Rome Statute, retaliation by victims in these horrific instances may be prevented. As the ICC grows into a meaningful supranational criminal court, its full body of work and unbiased effectiveness in prosecuting violent criminals should provide these incentives against vengeance. Victims of heinous crimes will feel confident that their persecutors will be brought to justice and will not think it necessary to seek out individual revenge. The successful prosecution of Gbagbo and a non-partisan investigation of Ouattara’s actions may be the first step in ending any future attempts at retribution.

The Gbagbo case allows the ICC an opportunity to prove to the world that it has grown and evolved over the past fourteen years. The international community must also pay attention, without focusing on the court’s failures or shortcomings. We must instead comment with a critical eye and support change that will allow the ICC to be more effective and just. The ICC is unlike any other criminal court or international institution created and it is still in its earliest stage. In order to reach the ultimate goal of denying impunity to warlords and leaders who commit crimes against humanity, the court must be allowed to push through growing pains and mold itself to the nuances of the world in which we currently live.

April 4, 2016 381 comments

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