Nuclear Deterrence

October 18, 2025 marked the official expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). What began 10 years ago as a moment of optimism for Western-Iranian relations and a future of nuclear disarmament has culminated in yet another missed opportunity for lasting peace. As this decade of volatile nuclear policy comes to an end, Western leaders have expressed no intention of deviating from the coercive disarmament strategies that contributed to Iran’s initial efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, trends towards isolationism and the decay of international institutions intensify the threat of nuclear annihilation. The next generation of leaders, who have grown up with the hope of a denuclearized world, are now left with the challenge of repairing a fragmented system of nuclear diplomacy.

In order to understand why Iran’s nuclear program is so contentious, it is important to lay out the history of nuclear diplomacy leading up to today. In 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech before the UN General Assembly, calling on world leaders to collectively decide that “the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life”. The speech inspired the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international institution promoting the development of safe and peaceful nuclear technology. However, this moment of unity also led the U.S. to begin sharing nuclear technology with Iran, which would eventually help kickstart Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

In 1968, Iran signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state, meaning that any future attempt to develop nuclear weapons would be a direct violation of international law. However, following its Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran began to develop its nuclear weapons program in secret. Iran managed to keep its nuclear weapons program concealed until 2002, when an Iranian dissident faction exposed the existence of two uranium enrichment facilities to the international community. This discovery began an extended period of international efforts to halt Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

Since the 1979 Revolution, the United States, European Union, and other Western powers repeatedly levied economic sanctions against Iran. Through the freezing of Iranian assets, trade embargo, taxes on corporations, and other strategies, the U.S. and other Western allies have significantly damaged the Iranian economy over the years. Despite their crippling economic effects, sanctions never curbed Iran’s ability or will to develop nuclear weapons.

However, a new era of diplomacy was ushered in when the U.S. and Iran began “back channel” talks regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear program in 2012. Over the next three years, Iran and the “P5+1” countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts, culminating in the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015.

The agreement mandated that Iran halt highly-enriched uranium production, decrease its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium, and comply with IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites. These demands were met with assurances from the P5+1 countries to gradually reduce sanctions on Iran. It is estimated that the JCPOA delayed Iran’s breakout time (the time necessary to amass enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon) from about 2-3 months to over a year.

However, the JCPOA’s effectiveness in limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities was short-lived. In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated heavy sanctions on Iran under the first Trump administration. Following the exit of the United States, it did not take long for Iran to reaccelerate its uranium enrichment, with the IAEA estimating it would take Iran just a couple weeks to develop enough highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon as of November 2024.

United States foreign policy in the years following their withdrawal from the JCPOA has directly led to the revival of Iran’s will to develop nuclear weapons and has contributed to the volatility of today’s international system. The withdrawal has significantly damaged the credibility of the United States in upholding security assurances going forward. During the Obama administration, the United States engaged in a strategy of multilateralism and seemed committed to tackling nuclear disarmament as a coalition of both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. By negotiating the agreement alongside the P5+1, the United States did not have the sole burden of enforcing the terms of the JCPOA, which gave the agreement increased legitimacy. Since their withdrawal, the U.S. has made a clear switch to a foreign policy of unpredictable, unilateral action.

The U.S. has returned to the ineffective methods of limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities through coercion. Before the JCPOA developed a framework of accountability between Iran and the P5+1, there was an intermittent cycle of Western powers exchanging sanctions relief for various demands. This kind of transactional diplomacy is what created the crisis of Iranian nuclearization to begin with.

However, sanctions have not even been the most provocative strategy used by the United States to coerce Iran. On June 13, 2025 the United States and Israel led a joint bombing of the Natanz and Esfahan nuclear facilities in Iran. The IAEA’s assessment of the U.S. strike estimates that the Iranian nuclear program was likely only set back a few months. Not only did this strike fail to destroy the targeted facilities, but it also further entrenched both sides in their respective positions of opposition to a diplomatic solution.

The collapse of the JCPOA has had broader implications on the legitimacy of international institutions. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to an unprecedented level of IAEA monitoring of its nuclear facilities. Now, the IAEA has lost almost all leverage in enforcing international law in Iran. After France, Germany, and the United Kingdom reintroduced sanctions on Iran in October, an Iranian minister claimed that cooperation with the IAEA was “no longer relevant.” The message this sends to states that might consider developing nuclear technology in the future is clear: complying with IAEA monitoring will be met with punishment and hostility rather than trust.

Additionally, the failure of the JCPOA sets a grim precedent for the future of multilateralism. In the first couple years after the JCPOA came into effect, there was international cooperation from ideologically dissimilar states around enforcing the terms of the agreement. Today, the international scene is much more fragmented. The collapse of the JCPOA has mirrored the declining effectiveness of other international coalitions, such as the UN Security Council. While the JCPOA’s collapse might not be directly responsible for the deterioration of other international institutions, the normalization of unilateral nuclear policy is a slippery slope.

When discussing Western nuclear policy with Iran, one popular mantra comes to mind: “insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” For Western powers to expect punitive sanctions or military assaults to result in Iran’s denuclearization is to blatantly ignore the past results of these actions. The only way to justify the abandonment of multilateral nuclear diplomacy in the long run is by believing that strength on the international stage can only be achieved through force. Clearly, unilateral attempts to coerce Iran have done nothing but weaken the position of Western powers and escalate tensions between states. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while not a perfect agreement, made significant strides towards Iran’s nuclear disarmament. The severity of the consequences of further nuclear escalation rests on the actions of the next generation of leaders. There is no group that is better equipped to restore hope for nuclear disarmament than young people. Evidence shows that today’s young people (Gen Z) are more skeptical that nuclear weapons make Americans safer and prevent conflict than any prior generation. As evidenced by movements to combat climate change and other man-made existential threats to humanity, the global youth are not afraid to take on the responsibility of protecting their future. When it comes to nuclear policy, it is in the best interest of humanity to put power in the hands of those willing to depart from the status quo.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

December 13, 2025 26 comments

AI Nuclear Deterrence Technology

Pumping the Brakes on Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command and Control

written by Charlie Donlan

In a meeting on November 16, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping found common ground on artificial intelligence (AI), recognizing the need for human beings to have ultimate authority over decisions to use nuclear weapons. Their agreement represents a rare moment of cooperation between two countries that are constantly competing in both AI and nuclear innovation. The rapid advancement in the capabilities of artificial intelligence and its increasing accessibility to the public is becoming a defining theme of the 21st century. The development of hyper-advanced machine learning algorithms, like those used in generative AI models like GPT 4, continues to increase the autonomy of artificial intelligence. As computers become less reliant on human intelligence, humans become more reliant on computers. Meanwhile, advancements in nuclear technology and renewed nuclear proliferation now tempt state actors to leverage the machine learning power of artificial intelligence and automate the decision to use a nuclear weapon. Given these incentives and the current capabilities of AI, the decision world leaders are faced with is not if AI should be used in nuclear command and control but to what extent.

In order to properly assess the risks of relying on the decision-making of artificial intelligence when it comes to nuclear weapons use, an understanding of existing nuclear weapons systems and the factors that would incentivize states to automate nuclear command and control protocols is necessary. The U.S. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system serves five main functions for the U.S. nuclear weapons program:

detection, warning, and attack characterization
nuclear planning
decisionmaking conferencing
reception of presidential orders
management and direction of forces

These primary functions are executed according to a rigid chain of command system involving a number of different government and military agencies. Ultimately, the President has the sole authority to authorize the use of a nuclear weapon.

Since the Cold War, the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have used artificial intelligence to improve efficiency in various sectors of the NC3 system. For example, the U.S. uses artificial intelligence automation in its early-warning systems to detect an incoming nuclear attack and guide outgoing attack missiles. These types of artificial intelligence tools generally belong to a category known as “rule-based AI,” which refers to AI models that operate based on direct programming from a human source. Currently, rule-based AI in nuclear weapons procedures is used in conjunction with human decision-making.

Artificial intelligence applications in nuclear command and control are contingent upon the principle that nuclear weapons states would only detonate a nuclear weapon in response to a foreign nuclear attack. Currently, the only nuclear weapons state with a comprehensive “no first use” policy is China. India also has a conditional “no first use” policy that warrants a nuclear response to chemical or biological weapons attacks. Despite attempts to pass legislation declaring a “no first use” policy in the U.S., current law allows for the U.S. to preemptively strike an adversary with nuclear weapons. However, former Defense Secretary William Perry acknowledges that no “rational president” would ever authorize the first use of nuclear weapons.

Because nuclear weapons states have demonstrated an adherence to the doctrine of “no first use”, the need for timely response to incoming nuclear attacks is critical. With the current state of nuclear weapons technology, governments would likely have only minutes to detect and respond to nuclear threats before they are attacked. However, the decision on how to proceed once an attack has been detected has become more and more difficult due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the U.S. military was able to develop detailed plans for responses to nuclear attacks because their only threat was the Soviet Union. Today, there are nine countries that possess viable nuclear weapons. Additionally, intelligence on adversarial nuclear powers has also become more ambiguous. For example, North Korea has been known to conceal its nuclear weapons program from international inspection and intelligence. Growing uncertainty regarding nuclear threats and the need for timely response to an attack has forced nuclear weapons states to look for ways to increase the efficiency of their nuclear response capabilities.

Existing difficulties in nuclear command and control operations cast additional doubts on the potential for safe integration of artificial intelligence. In 2015, The Union of Concerned Scientists published a report detailing historical examples of errors in command and control that nearly resulted in incidental or ill-advised nuclear detonation.

The first category of errors identified in the report related to ballistic missiles are instances of ambiguous data generated by early warning sensors. An example of this type of error was in 1995 when Russian early warning systems detected a Norwegian scientific rocket and classified it as a nuclear threat, nearly leading to a retaliatory strike from Russia. Even though Russia was previously notified about the launch, there was a lapse in communication.

Another category of errors identified in the report is false alarms caused by natural phenomena. In 1983, a Soviet early warning satellite detected five land-based missiles launched by the U.S. at the Soviet Union, which turned out to be reflections of the sun on the clouds that misled the missile detection system. According to the report:

“Since the satellite was found to be operating properly, following procedures would have led him [the Soviet officer on duty] to report an incoming attack. Going partly on gut instinct and believing the U.S. was unlikely to fire only five missiles, he told his commanders that it was a false alarm before he knew that to be true.”

In this case, a nuclear strike was saved by the “gut instinct” of the Soviet officer. Clearly, there are many challenges to the nuclear command and control framework exemplified by both human error and machine error.

While nuclear weapons states demonstrate a growing interest in leveraging the power of AI to improve the efficiency and accuracy of nuclear response, AI developers are showing more of an interest in military applications for their products. As mentioned, basic forms of artificial intelligence such as Rule-based AI have been used in nuclear command and control procedures since the Cold War era. Rule-based AI mimics human decision-making by operating based on conditions directly programmed by humans. This kind of artificial intelligence uses a network of syllogistic “if-then” instructions to make decisions based on input data. Because of the simplicity of the programmed instructions and the clarity in the decision-making process of the model, rule-based AI typically poses minimal risk of error. However, as the landscape of nuclear threats widens, leaders are looking at more advanced AI models that are able to process larger amounts of data more efficiently.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence have been centered around advancements in machine learning. Machine learning models differ from rule-based models in the source of their programming. Machine learning can be generally defined as “the capability of a machine to exhibit intelligent human behavior” – integral to that is the model’s ability to teach itself in the absence of human programming. Instead of operating based on a stagnant knowledge base of instructions, a machine learning model is able to constantly update its own instructions based on new data it receives.

There is no doubt that recent advancements in machine learning have made the world a safer place in many respects. Thanks to modern machine learning, self-driving cars can keep passengers safer than any human driver possibly could, banks can more effectively detect credit card fraud, and medical imaging can be more accurately analyzed to diagnose illnesses. Despite the many positive impacts modern machine learning AI has had on human lives, there are still several technical shortcomings.

The first technical issue that is characteristic of modern AI models is human bias. While the algorithms used by modern machine learning models have innate capabilities to self-modify, they are originally programmed by human beings. Therefore, the algorithms themselves can be subject to the same bias as the humans who created them. While this is also true of rule-based AI models, machine learning algorithms have the ability to extrapolate human bias in their programming. In generative AI models that use machine learning algorithms, such as GPT 4, human bias could be applied in unintended situations that prove dangerous. There are countless examples of human bias impacting AI outputs, such as the model Amazon used to filter resumes, which had a predetermined bias toward male applicants.

A 2022 report by Arms Control Today outlines the risks of human bias on AI as it relates to nuclear weapons. Modern machine learning algorithms are not developed by people with knowledge about nuclear threat detection, meaning the AI developer’s lack of understanding about nuclear command and control might create a human bias in their model. Although an AI model might proceed flawlessly according to its instructions, bias in the instructions themselves could lead to unpredictable outputs.

Another problem with modern AI models pertains to outputs generated from inaccurate information. A concerning characteristic of modern AI models is that their decision-making is solely based on the data they receive. This means that there is no way for an AI program to determine whether the data it receives is accurate or best suited for the job it is designed to perform. Imagine an AI model designed to read radar data and detect incoming missile attacks. If the model has been trained, even if inadvertently, using data from inaccurate radar readings, then it may produce an output based on the faulty data.

Even if an AI model is trained with accurate and relevant data, its algorithm still has the ability to produce unpredictable outputs that are unsupported by the training data. Applied to incoming missile detection, an AI model could be trained with completely accurate radar data and still produce an unintended output that may falsely identify or fail to detect a threat. AI outputs that do not align with the model’s provided training data are known as “hallucinations.”

The increasing complexity of modern machine learning algorithms come with increasing ambiguity over the steps AI models take to produce an output. The clarity of an AI model’s decision-making process is referred to by experts as “explainability.” In a highly explainable AI model, it is easy to discern each step the model takes from receiving data to generating a response. Models that use multi-layered machine learning algorithms are less transparent than those that use very simplistic algorithms, like rule-based AI models. Making decisions based on unexplainable AI-generated outputs would strip humans of the ability to check for errors in reasoning and refine models for future use.

Finally, unlike human intelligence, AI is vulnerable to external cybersecurity threats and attacks. The National Institute of Standards and Technology issued a report in January outlining the various methods and means used by adversaries to disrupt or influence complex machine learning models. The report breaks down cybersecurity attacks targeting AI models into four categories: evasion, poisoning, privacy, and abuse. These categories of cyber attacks involve adversaries gaining access to or manipulating AI training materials and input data with the goal of finding weaknesses in the model or generating unintended outputs. These cybersecurity threats call into question the extent to which AI should be implemented in nuclear command and control systems.

Artificial intelligence is very good at presenting data to human beings in a way that is manageable. However, when it comes to decision-making, AI is flawed. Artificial intelligence applications in nuclear command and control networks should be focused on assisting in areas where humans have demonstrated errors in decision-making. Reliable and explainable artificial intelligence models should be used in conjunction with human analysts for nuclear detection, warning, and attack characterization. However, the ultimate decision to deploy or detonate a nuclear weapon should only ever be made by human beings.

February 24, 2025 325 comments

Arms Control Donald Trump Economics Featured Middle East National Security Nuclear Deterrence

Global responses to lifting sanctions on Iran

written by Lucine Ekizian

The United States has an extensive history of sanctioning Iran, dating back to the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979. The major international crisis consisted of Iranian students in Iran seizing the U.S. Embassy and taking 52 Americans hostage; The crisis lasted 444 days and did not end until President Jimmy Carter’s final day in office. During the duration of the hostages remaining captive, President Carter imposed a series of sanctions against Iran, aimed at its economy and military, and effectively froze all Iranian government assets held within the U.S. The U.S. continues to sanction various aspects of Iran for 40 continuous years.

Following the Iran hostage crisis, President Bill Clinton responded to Tehran’s support for extremism by instilling a comprehensive embargo on bilateral trade and targeting energy. In 2002, the National Council of Resistance in Iran revealed two Iranian nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak – the facility at Natanz was a uranium enrichment facility and Arak was a heavy-water production facility. Because Iran had hidden the existence of these facilities, it raised suspicions within the International Atomic Energy Agency. European governments aimed to find a solution for this crisis but in 2005, former Iranian President Ahmadinejad rejected European negotiations.

The United Nations Security Council passed four resolutions that permitted states to impose sanctions on Iran but proved inefficient, and serious negotiations regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took place in the early 2010s. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to dismantle nuclear programs and stimulate more transparency in its facilities, in exchange for sanction relief. The United States has not been a part of the JCPOA since 2018 when President Donald Trump decided to withdraw. The Trump administration reinstated a “maximum pressure” approach on Iran, reimposing sanctions that were temporarily lifted and targeting Iranian financial institutions, including its Central Bank.

A 2018 study by Fatemeh Kokabisaghi uses the Human Rights Impact Assessments tool to conclude that sanctions on Iran have caused a severe depletion of the country’s revenue, devaluation of natural currency, and increased inflation and unemployment. This resulted in a decline in civilian welfare and limited access to necessities like medicine and healthcare. Because sanctions targeted almost all Iranian manufacturers, they could not pay timely wages and had to fire workers. A 2013 report by the United Nations General Assembly states, “Advanced medicines are produced primarily by firms based in Western countries and are subject to 20-year patents, rendering it impossible to substitute products from an alternative source.” Patients who require advanced medicine are met with inaccessibility, due to the severity and misaimed sanctions. The severity of these sanctions has resulted in economic struggles, such as unemployment and poverty, and affects the welfare of civilians through the inaccessibility of medicine.

Medicine and health care is increasingly affected by these sanctions, as a 2018 study to assess the accessibility of drugs from noncommunicable diseases in relation to sanctions on the Iranian financial institutions concluded that drugs, health care and medicine cannot be separated from sanctions, especially drugs that “depended on the import of their raw material or finished products.”

The sanctions on Iran, which once began as a response to extremism and nuclear regulation, have had a more direct impact on the welfare of civilians. If the main worry of foreign states is the nuclear developments of Iran, then the most effective solution may not be targeting civilians and decreasing diplomacy efforts. Iranian civilians have a right to health; if sanctions are affecting accessibility to medicine and healthcare and degrading air quality by forcing Iran to use older automotive technology, then other solutions must be considered.

Ever since the withdrawal of the U.S. from the JCPOA, there has been regulatory pressure from the U.S., and despite their best efforts, it did not slow down the development of nuclear proliferation in Iran. One potential step toward a solution would be easing the cycle of escalation, beginning with increased diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran. Furthermore, a maximum pressure sanction campaign should be amended to refocusing back on one of the U.S.’ main concerns, such as nuclear development, and stimulate a slow repair of civilian welfare.

Another step toward a solution would be increased transparency, which would include the UN inspectors and inspection of nuclear development sites. In the past, Iran has barred several UN Nuclear Agency inspectors from monitoring developments. A lack of transparency surrounding nuclear developments has festered into an environment of distrust and increasing skepticism, which may never result in a scenario beneficial for Iranian citizens.The Institute for Science and International Security, “The IAEA’s efforts to verify Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran’s decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors.” The lack of transparency – a result of withdrawing designation of nuclear inspectors – has harmed Iran’s foreign diplomatic relations.

There are gaps in this solution – the Trump administration has paused all U.S. foreign aid and the 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA has shown that the U.S. may not be willing to join back into a deal that eases its grip on Iran’s economy. The Trump administration has also signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum to restore its “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. Because Iran has only responded to this with increased proliferation, this pressure-filled policy has been ineffective. All parties must focus on the welfare of Iranian citizens. Sanctions aimed at nuclear proliferation and extremism have done little to downsize concerns, and in turn, have imposed hardships on civilians. Working toward increased diplomacy, shifting the focus of sanctions, and allowing UN Nuclear Agency inspectors into Iranian sites could have a positive impact on the welfare of Iranian citizens.

Image source: Flickr

February 21, 2025 314 comments

Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict

Relinquishing the Third Largest Nuclear Arsenal in the World: What Ukraine Teaches about Nuclear Proliferation

written by Taylor Fairless

President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk after signing documents whereby Ukraine agreed to dismantle all of its 1,800 nuclear warheads, Jan. 14, 1994, at the Kremlin in Moscow. Photo courtesy of the NPR.

The nuclear proliferation puzzle has long been thought of in relation to national security: states will build the bomb when they are placed in a significant military threat to which all other alternatives fail to suffice. Yet, Ukraine provides a counterfactual to security considerations by disinheriting one of the most powerful arsenals in the world amid military threats.

After the dismantlement of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly-formed state of Ukraine was “born nuclear” by inheriting about 4,000 of Moscow’s nuclear weapons, granting it the third largest arsenal in the world. This included some of the most technically-advanced weapons of the time: long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers. Yet, in 1994, Ukraine committed to full disarmament.

The history of disarmament in Ukraine can be reinterpreted to explain why states, or more currently terrorist organizations, seek to develop nuclear weapons. This explanation is tied to long-term international security objectives and current foreign policy efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons entirely. This article will better explain the path to nuclear achievement and challenge conventional ideas of why states build the bomb by illuminating multiple causalities in that process.

Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security, Scott Sagan, believes states build the bomb for three reasons. He refers to the first as the “security model,” which alerts us to states seeking nuclear capabilities when they face a significant military threat. This is the case with North Korea, whose nuclear accumulation is most considerably a reaction to America’s long desire to overthrow the Kim regime. There is little quarrel against the security model as the best explanation to many past and present nuclear buildups: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and Pakistan almost immediately acquired nuclear weapons after facing security threats. Yet, the delay between security stimuli and nuclear buildup in some cases points to a flaw in reasoning that states build their arsenal simply for national security. India, for example, developed their arsenal nearly a decade after China had, and as Ukraine will exemplify, security threats alone are not always enough to motivate the creation of a nuclear arsenal.

The second “domestic model” is a street-light perspective on nuclear weapons. This invisions nukes as a political tool for credibility; for example, despite conventional perceptions that India built their arsenal in response to China becoming nuclear in 1964, Prime Minister Indira Ganhi instead reacted to domestic pressure to commence a nuclear program. An act of nuclear proliferation can divert turbulence within a state to gain public support. In this sense, bureaucratic actors created conditions that promoted the acquisition of nuclear weapons through bottom-up activity that propagated extreme views on foreign threats while lobbying for political favorability. The case of PM Ganhi shows her motivation for creating India’s nuclear arsenal stemmed from its conference of legitimacy and national prestige.

The last point is the “norms model.” Simply put, if nuclear weapons adhere to a state’s identity, that state will likely want to build an arsenal, given it has the capacity to do so. For example, France emerged from World War Two significantly weakened, and thus vigorously explored ways to reestablish their strength. The best path was through nuclear weapons, and once created, France paraded their arsenal vibrantly on the global stage. Today, quite literally, entire parades dedicated to displaying nuclear weapons in Pakistan, North Korea, and India exemplifies the close relationship that nuclear weapons have with nationalism and identity. On the opposite spectrum, if nuclear weapons defy a state’s image, nuclear arsenals will be avoided, as is the case with Canada.

Let’s suppose these reasons as to why states build nuclear weapons can be reinterpreted into why they don’t build, or in Ukraine’s case why they relinquish, their arsenals. Ukraine is quite puzzling from both a realist and a domestic politics perspective: Russia’s hegemonic behavior, burgeoning tensions over Crimea, and growing public support between 1992 and 1993 for keeping nuclear weapons, even in spite of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, make an anti-nuclear position unlikely. Though, that’s exactly what happened.

In large, the NPT is credited for this result in four critical ways. As I delineate, I will compare these scenarios to those of the present, or cases that are predicted to ensue. Early in 1990, Ukraine tried to accede the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state to separate itself from the Soviet Union and buttress their claim to national sovereignty. This was an expedient blueprint to independence that the majority conservative communists voted in a 355-4 adoption of the NPT. In the future, Hong Kong may adopt a similar tactic of establishing sovereignty vis-à-vis treaties if they continue to seek detachment from China.

Moreover, international prestige granted through the NPT also seeded Kiev’s anti-nuclear position. Pro-NPT officials insisted that this endeavor would enhance Ukraine’s soft power by separating it from what we call “rogue states,” such as modern North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. NPT norms birthed the idea that new nuclear weapons states were unstable threats, which by the 1990s effectively meant that they received international condemnation. Thus, Ukraine’s adherence to the NPT defanged their potentiality as a rising state, and instead invited partnership and security assurances between themselves and the members of the NPT. Moreover, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state granted Ukraine the assurance of protection by nuclear weapon states in the treaty – a similar phenomena to the security assurances present in NATO.

Pipelining from this were economic pressures, which Ukraine certainly faced from America, and more generally NATO. The West maintained that failing to follow the NTP’s norms and regulations would result in economic restrictions, made easier by the NTP’s mobility and coordination of collective sanctions. Today, we can relate this to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 25-year nuclear agreement which limited the scope of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Last, the NPT created a sense of international responsibility. Ukraine was satisfying the global commitment to peace, which was being renewed at the conclusion of the tumultuous 20th century. Critically, America offered financial support for relinquishing Kiev’s arsenal, which made the negative proliferation decision a far easier endeavor and helped secure Ukraine’s position as a cooperative state. We may relate this today to China. Though the political future of a post-COVID China is uncertain, I think Beijing may be one to keep an eye out in this regard. The Trump administration is fighting to see China join the New START treaty as China continues to expand technologically and militaristically. Though, China’s long disapproval of joining has made this unlikely. In a world in which China may bear the international brunt of COVID’s spread, adopting this treaty may be a counterbalance as it would assume China as committing to shouldering a responsibility of international peace.

What’s of value with these four reasons is imaging Ukraine’s renunciation without the NPT. Though some case may be made for that, it’s nonetheless hard to imagine it being any easier. Nuclear treaties may be thought of as an investment into furthering the nuclear taboo and mediating the security dilemma. As was the case in the 1960s, testing nuclear weapons and acquiring an arsenal granted positive international recognition. Yet, today’s taboo causes immediate condemnation of any state attempting to do so. This signifies the progress of the nuclear taboo, and scholars today tend to view the NPT as a way to further it into one that eventually chastises the mere possession of nuclear weapons.

States build the bomb for many reasons, and at the same time, as Ukraine exemplified, states may also relinquish their arsenal for multiple purposes. No single policy can expedite creating a nuclear free world, nor advance international security measures. It suffices to say that multicausality best explains the nuclear existence present today and the troubles that policymakers face when formulating antiproliferation measures. What Ukraine’s deviation from conventional perceptions on the security dilemma shows is that future scholarship needs to be driven by comparative studies to determine the conditions that states fall under when acting against the nuclear taboo, and more presently should expand to single actors and organizations.

As Sagan puts it: “a focusing on how different governments assess the nuclear potential and intention of neighbors, on why pro-bomb and anti-bomb domestic coalitions form and gain influence, and on when and how NPT norms about legitimate behavior constrain statesmen will be extremely important.” For certain, the world may see a Ukrainian repeat in the future, but at the same time, the current nuclear tongue cannot dismiss the possibility of a rogue actor or state dismantling the nuclear taboo. It is thus imperative that scholars continue to expand their theories and look more deeply into the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and what shape that may take on in the coming decades. Moreover, we may look at the NPT’s furthering of norms as the argument for continual enhancement of the treaty and continuing to create new, comprehensive laws and regulations agreed upon by both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

July 9, 2020 416 comments

Asia China Military North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict Technology

China, the US, and THAAD: A Case for the End of Ballistic Missile Defense

written by Abdus Najmi

Imagine this: A nuclear-arms race between the US and China. Collapse of the “No First Use” doctrine of deterrence. North Korean missiles actually being able to reach the US mainland.

As frightening as these phrases sound, all of them are very possible within the next decade. China or America could easily break their pledge to not use nuclear weapons first in warfare. This may seem like mere alarmist rhetoric, but the empirical track record of actions by states foreshadows this scenario as plausible. Just seven months ago, China launched its very own Starry Sky-2, a hypersonic aircraft that moves at “six times the speed of sound.” High tech aircraft isn’t the only new development in Chinese military technology, as hypersonic glide vehicles (or HGVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) put Chinese modernization at light years ahead of the US. The DF-ZF hypersonic vehicle has been successfully tested 7 times, and MIRV technology would allow China to launch multiple warheads from a single missile at a given time.

It would be misleading to characterize China as an irrational actor who seeks modernization as a means to revisionism. After all, the universal law of cause and effect would deem China’s actions as stemming as an effect. So – what is the cause?

US ballistic missile defense systems have elicited a hard-line response from China, and justly so. These systems attempt to intercept missiles during their trajectory in air, and some scientists and policymakers are even attempting to accurately take down missiles during boost phase. THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, is exactly that system – a form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) that is being deployed in South Korea to counter the North Korean threat, or so the US claims.

Wait – if the US deploys THAAD in South Korea, why would China care? Are we not just deploying it to protect our ally against a potential threat from the North?

Many would point to the necessity of THAAD as a resource to counter the North Korean threat. This argument is misleading, as THAAD is only “designed to intercept missiles within a range of 200 kilometers.” The unit’s location in Seongju County falls out of the range of Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city.

In addition, THAAD doesn’t prevent a North Korean conflict – it causes it. There are three key reasons for this. To start off, the empirical track record proves so. When the Reagan administration proposed “Star Wars,” the Soviet Union responded by upping its nuclear stockpile. This is basic IR theory 101 – states respond to military threats militarily. Second, there are geographic limitations for why THAAD cannot prevent a conflict. The geographic dimensions of the Korean peninsula make it extremely difficult to shoot missiles down, as the peninsula is “mountainous and lack[s] spatial depth.” While this technology seems promising, physics tends to err on the side of caution – BMD has a “dismal flight test record of nine successful intercepts in 17 attempts since 1999.” Lastly, the status quo proves the uniqueness of the situation. Currently, the US already has BMD elsewhere in Northeast Asia and North Korea is still testing new missiles. If ballistic missile defense was such a good deterrent, why hasn’t North Korea ended its testing? There clearly is no fear of US capabilities or practices in the region. If anything, THAAD is just another match that ignites the larger flames of the North Korean threat.

THAAD is much more political than it seems. This system is strategically positioned in Korea for other reasons – specifically to bolster a US presence in Asia. THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar has such a long range that it can peer into the Chinese mainland, strong enough to even detect Chinese missiles in centimeters through electromagnetic reflection. China’s concerns “come not from the interception component of THAAD, but rather the detection capability” which renders its military secrecy useless. This is why China has been developing MIRVs and HGVs. Both of these forms of tech provide ballistic credibility by rendering the radar system obsolete, in case of a necessary attack.

In the long run, it might be necessary for the US to end ballistic missile defense in South Korea. It is uncertain whether a Trump presidency (which tends to be hawkish) would support this type of policy. In the meantime, it might be worthwhile for the United States to develop transparency and confidence building measures with China over the deployment of THAAD. These could include agreements about data collection and forcing the US to not “conduct engagements beyond the range of their […] radar.” This might give the US the best of both worlds – maintaining THAAD but assuring China of its non-encroaching use. If neither of these worlds are met, the US might have to prepare for a hardline world of Chinese revisionism.

April 2, 2020 397 comments

Donald Trump Environmental Change Europe Featured Geopolitics International Trade Interview Military North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict The International Economy United States

Adam Schiff: Bernard Brodie Lecture and Interview

written by Andrea Zachrich

Congressman Adam Schiff came to UCLA to give the Bernard Brodie Lecture on the Conditions of Peace on May 31st of this year. Before the lecture, members of The Generation were fortunate enough to sit down with Congressman Schiff and ask him questions about the House Intelligence Committee- of which he is currently the Ranking Member- his responsibility to his constituents and the American people, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the reputation of the United States internationally. He echoed and elaborated on many of these topics during his lecture and audience questions, which we were also able to attend following the interview. While there has been a summer that has past since the time of interview, many of his comments remain relevant as we’ve watched President Trump’s antics unfold over the past few months.

Congressman Schiff has a great sense of humor. He began the lecture by telling an anecdote about when President Trump called him “sleazy”. Schiff said that he felt the need to explain to his son what had happened in case the other children at school talked about it. He told his son that “the President called your dad sleazy”, and his son, wholly unconcerned, replied, “Can I call you sleazy?” Congressman Schiff used humor frequently throughout his lecture to highlight the absurdity of some of the administration’s recent actions, such as President Trump calling Vladimir Putin to congratulate him on his win. He even went so far as to mimic how that phone conversation might have gone, which had the entire audience laughing.

In the interview with us, however, Congressman Schiff’s tone was markedly more serious. We began by asking him about the partisanship on his committee in the House of Representatives, which is the House Select Intelligence Committee. The committee has been charged with conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible connections between President Trump and members of his team and Russia. Despite the traditionally bipartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee, Schiff noted that one particular instance- what he called the “midnight run“– which divided the committee along partisan lines. The “run” occurred in March of 2017 when Republican Chairman Devin Nunes went to an undisclosed location to reportedly receive classified materials unmasking a conspiracy that claimed that the Obama administration had done surveillance on members of President Trump’s transition team. Nunes then went to the White House to present this evidence. However in a matter of days it as revealed that the supposedly undisclosed location was the White House. Schiff states, “But we learned within a matter of days that in fact the secret location he had gone too had been the White House and the materials he had received were from the White House that he was presenting to the White House.That kind of blew up the investigation because it became clear that the mission for the chairman was to protect the President at all costs rather than doing an objective investigation. The incident troubled Schiff for illustrating Nunes’ blatant disregard for the committee’s constitutional duty and for demonstrating the vastly different goals of its members.

We then asked Schiff what would change on his committee if Democrats win a majority in the House in the upcoming midterm elections and he becomes chairman. His first priority, he said, would be a return to “comity” on the committee, and blames the current chairman Nunes’ divisive actions for the current level of partisanship. When asked a similar question during the lecture, Schiff responded that he would like his committee to “get back in the oversight business”. Based on some recent special election results, Schiff may get his wish for his committee from the midterm elections. In a recent special election in Ohio, the vote came down to closer than 1 percent in a district that has had Republican representation in Congress for 35 years, the past incumbent consistently cruised to victory by 10 percentage points, and where Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a whooping 11 percent. These election results, while not representative of the entire nation, have led many to predict that Democrats may shortly regain the majority in Congress, making Congressman Schiff the leader of the House Intelligence Committee.

On a different note, one idea that Schiff kept highlighting throughout both the interview and his lecture was the breakdown of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and how this is affecting the U.S.’s reputation and negotiating power abroad. Schiff even went so far as to say “I think that the health of our democracy is very much at risk”. He mentioned numerous examples that ranged from President Trump’s tendency to ban reporters from news outlets he doesn’t like such as the New York Times and BBC from press briefings, to discussing the possibility of him pardoning himself for any possible crimes he may be charged with in the future. Additionally, the president’s constant Twitter tirades about the “fake news” press and special counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation have led many of his supporters to distrust both the press and the Justice Department. The United States was downgraded from a full to a flawed democracy by the “Economist Intelligence Unit” the year Trump came into office, and has remained in the flawed category for its 2018 ranking, currently ranked 21 out of 167 countries for its democracy score. It seems as though Schiff may well be justified in worrying about the state of our democracy.

On a similar note, Schiff also noted his concerns with the way the rest of the world currently views the US, stating “our America first and everyone else be damned has really left us isolated and the rest of the world deeply concerned”. As evidence, he cited examples of this poor perception of America from our allies such as a Politico article titled “Leader of the Free World meets Donald Trump” referring to Angela Merkel, and Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. Since this interview, President Trump has continued to take actions that worry world leaders and isolate the U.S. on the world stage, such as placing tariffs on Chinese and European goods against the advice of most of the world’s economists and Trump’s troubling actions during and after June’s G7 meeting such as arriving late for the first meeting of the conference and acting outraged at Prime Minister Trudeau’s easily predictable retaliatory actions to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Congressman Schiff stated in the interview that “It’s hard to imagine a time when the United States has been held in lower regard around the world than right now”, but after Trump’s antics this summer, we may be even lower in the opinion of the world than we were in May when the interview was conducted.

This interview was conducted shortly before the first North Korea negotiations had occured. Congressman Schiff was glad to hear that the negotiations were back on after being canceled for a spell, but was concerned with this administration’s approach to North Korea, calling it “erratic and at times dangerous”. He warned that North Korea’s nuclear program was not going to be an easy problem to solve stating, “If it were not a hard problem, it would have been solved by any number of presidents in the past”. This statement has proven to be true since the interview. While President Trump and Kim Jong-Un did sit down for negotiations in June, the joint statement that came out of this was widely criticized as vague. President Trump conceded an important bargaining chip by agreeing to give up military exercises in South Korea while gaining no time table for denuclearization from the North Korean leader. Additionally, on August 24th President Trump called off talks between North Korean leaders and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, citing concerns that not enough progress has been made in regards to the country’s denuclearization. Congressman Schiff’s warning has proven true; it seems that the problem of North Korean denuclearization has shown itself to be trickier than President Trump first believed it to be.

In a time where dishonorable behavior has come to be expected from the current administration, the political backbone displayed by Congressman Adam Schiff was refreshing. He asked his audience “What’s the point of being there [in Congress] if you’re not going to do what the country needs you to do when they need you to do it?” At one point during the lecture, he received an spontaneous round of applause from the audience after declaring he believes politicians should “do the right thing and still find a way to get reelected”.

It was a pleasure speaking with the Congressman and listening to his lecture, and it will be interesting to witness any potential changes within his Committee following the November midterm elections.

September 10, 2018 15 comments

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The Art of “No Deal”

written by Zach Emanuel

After many months of debate within the executive branch, on May 8th, 2018 President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The agreement, more commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal was reached in 2015 and later signed onto by Iran, the U.S, China, Russia, France, the U.K, and Germany. The intent was to limit the advancement of Iranian nuclear capabilities. The deal mandated that Iran reduce its uranium-enrichment activities for the next fifteen years and agree to increased inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance with the agreement. Assuming Iranian cooperation, the other parties agreed in exchange to terminate the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions against Iran for its past nuclear activities, freeing up billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, and to provide Iran with economic relief. While much has been made of the deal’s shortcomings, the overwhelming consensus is that the agreement is the best option available for avoiding either a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or another American-led war in the region.

Yet despite the consensus, Trump has long railed against the deal as a poor choice on the part of his predecessor, President Barack Obama, calling the agreement “an embarrassment” and “the worst [deal] the U.S ever entered into”. In both his speech withdrawing the U.S from the agreement and his campaign rallies before that, Trump justified and encouraged America’s exit from the agreement on the basis of three points. First, the President claims that the deal does little to limit Iran’s access to a nuclear weapon. Second, he maintains that it encourages Iranian meddling in the Middle East, such as support for the Assad regime in Syria and Houthi rebels in Yemen, threatening the region’s stability as well as U.S and Israeli national security. Third and finally, President Trump claims that withdrawing would demonstrate a renewed sense of American strength and leadership to the world, as it shows that the U.S will not be cowed into compromise. Unfortunately for Trump, the U.S, and the rest of the world, he is wrong on all three fronts. In fact, on each point, Trump’s decision to leave the JCPOA will have the opposite effect than the one he claims.

At the beginning of his speech announcing America’s intent to withdraw, Trump justified his decision by saying that if the deal were not to be altered or adjusted, then “in just a short period of time, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world’s most dangerous weapon.” Contrary to his claim, this assessment is false. There is an overwhelming consensus amongst government officials and nuclear experts that the current deal is, and remains, the best available option to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. According to a poll of international relations experts conducted by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) organization, an astonishing 94% of international relations scholars agree that remaining in the deal is the U.S’s best chance of limiting Iran’s access to a nuclear weapon. Jeffrey Lewis, for instance, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, has said that pulling out of the deal will actually allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons faster, a sentiment often echoed by President Obama. Kingston Reif, the director of Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy for the Arms Control Association agrees, saying that the move will actually “[increase] the risk of an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program.” Additionally, General Joseph Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, has maintained that the deal “has delayed the development of a nuclear capability by Iran.” Moreover, despite a barrage of criticism leveled at the deal by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who recently accused Iran of cheating on its commitments, Israeli Defense Forces Chief-of-Staff Gadi Eisenkot has noted that Iran has yet to violate the deal and that the agreement, so far, “is working…putting off realization of the Iranian nuclear vision by 10 to 15 years.”

Even many officials within Trump’s inner circle have argued on behalf of the constraints the deal places on Iran’s nuclear activities. Dan Coats, Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, said in May 2017 that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce…a nuclear weapon.” Defense Secretary James Mattis has also advocated for remaining in the deal, calling the inspections the deal requires “pretty robust” and the text written “almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat.” Finally, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also disagreed with his former boss on the deal, and lobbied hard for the U.S not to renege on its commitment. Thus, despite Trump’s constant stream of claims that the deal assists Tehran in its quest for a bomb, scholars, military officials, and even members of Trump’s administration believe that leaving the deal will actually result in a stronger Iranian nuclear capability.

The second argument Trump made to justify America’s exit from the Iran Deal was that remaining in the agreement would cause a “nuclear-arms race in the Middle East,” and would allow Iran to continue its “destabilizing” and “menacing activities” in the region and across the world. These assertions too are false. Mark Fitzpatrick, the former U.S Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for nonproliferation has said that allowing Iran’s nuclear program to proceed without the limits and transparency the deal creates actually increases the potential of an arms race in the Middle East. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson concurred. Appearing on Fox News just days before Trump’s announcement, the former London mayor warned that pulling out of the deal would cause “an arms race in the Middle East…the Saudis wanting [a nuclear weapon], the Egyptians wanting one, the Emiratis [wanting one].” Thus, contrary to Trump’s claims, a Middle Eastern arms race is now much likelier following America’s exit from the agreement.

Moreover, the U.S’s best bet to deal with Tehran’s “destabilizing” and “menacing” activities in the Middle East is to empower moderate factions within Iran, including the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who struck the deal back in 2015. This will have the additional effect of bolstering American and Israeli national security. Elected on a promise to spur the economy, Rouhani and his Moderation and Development Party’s gamble was that an end to the U.N sanctions and the subsequent growth that ensued would be enough to convince ordinary Iranians of the deal’s merits and his decision to engage with the West. Therefore, the U.S’s exit and its choice to reinstate sanctions discredits Rouhani and the moderates while empowering the religious and political hard-liners who have been actively attacking the agreement. In the words of one Iranian diplomat, having lost the support of the people Rouhani is now operating essentially as a “lame-duck” president. These hardline factions will destabilize the Middle East– through ramped up Iranian intervention in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen– and threaten American and Israeli national security more than Rouhani will. The effects of this can already be seen with the recent missile exchanges between Israeli forces and Iranian militias along the Syrian-Israeli border; the first time Iranian forces have fired directly on Israeli soldiers. As the Washington Post reported on May 10th, America’s exit from the agreement gives Tehran “less to lose by retaliating” against Israel and has “served to embolden hard-liners…who want to show strength.” Iranian missile launches against Israel are both destabilizing, menacing, and a threat to the national security of the U.S and its Middle Eastern allies. Therefore, despite Trump’s supposed desire to bring “peace and stability” to the Middle East, pulling out of the deal has already, brought about the exact opposite and will likely continue to do so.

The third and final justification Trump gave to defend his decision to leave the JCPOA was demonstrating a renewed sense of American strength and leadership to both Iran and the rest of the world. In his speech Trump said, “America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail,” that “we will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction,” and that the U.S “no longer make[s] empty threats.” In Trump’s eyes, refusing to compromise shows strength and acting unilaterally, and independently from our allies, constitutes leadership. Unfortunately for the United States and the rest of the world, the President’s understanding of what makes America strong is flawed. Since the end of World War II every President- Republican and Democrat- has supported the international-liberal order in which American-led multilateral action has been the response to international crises. This belief that the U.S, given its overwhelming economic and military might, has a unique responsibility to lead on global issues has not only guided American foreign policy for the last 70 years but has been of tremendous benefit to the world. Trump’s choice to pull the United States out of the Iran deal, and his previous decisions to do the same with both the Paris climate agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade deal, demonstrate an end to this consensus. While the President may believe that pulling out of these agreements show strength, breaking promises, cheating commitments, and acting without regard for any country but our own are hardly traits indicative of a strong, consistent, reliable nation, nor ones that other nations are likely to look for in a leader.

Furthermore, while Trump may believe that leadership is demonstrated by independent action, such an understanding is only valid when there is actual action being taken. Despite references to a better deal, there is no strategy within either the administration or the State Department on how the U.S plans to improve on it. Taking an axe to international agreements with no concrete movement towards correcting the flaws that inevitably arise from negotiation does not constitute leadership. On the contrary, it simply shows laziness.

If Trump was truly committed to limiting Iranian nuclear capability, a peaceful and stabilized Middle East, and American strength and leadership, he would proudly keep the United States in the Iran deal. It is to the detriment of both the U.S and the world that his decision to pull out of the agreement will likely contribute to the loss of all three.

May 16, 2018 14 comments

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My Button’s Bigger

written by Landon Hsieh

May 10, 2018 409 comments

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Tension in the Korean Peninsula: Is There a Way Out?

written by Jenny Wang

Ever since North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s, its threat as a potential nuclear power has fluctuated as attempts at negotiations were often postponed in the past. Since Kim Jong-Un came to power, the number of missile launches and nuclear tests by North Korea increased drastically, nearly tripling the total number of tests conducted under his father and grandfather combined. The United Nations Security Council has successively passed tighter economic sanctions, ranging from bans on military-related technology and seafood to caps on oil and refined petroleum. On top of tighter sanctions, threats exchanged between Kim Jong-Un and Trump only serves to exacerbate tensions between North Korea and the rest of the international community.

Will peaceful negotiations be able to resume and achieve their goals, or will direct conflict be unavoidable? In the past two years, North Korea has tested a total of forty-seven missiles, and in November, they have even successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that puts mainland U.S. within range. Unlike his father and grandfather who seemed more willing to negotiate the possibility of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong-Un has put nuclear and missile development as a top priority since his ascension to power. North Korea is led by a unitary one-party government, essentially a totalitarian dictatorship. Further pressuring by the international community would only make North Korea feel more threatened and vulnerable, which would accelerate their weapons program. It is important for the U.S. and its allies to reassure North Korea that they would not infringe upon the sovereignty of a denuclearized North Korea.

In the past, negotiations have taken place such as the Agreed Framework which was signed in 1994 between the U.S. and North Korea, and the Six Party Talks, which began in August 2003 involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. The former broke down with North Korea stretching the limit to test its missiles and the U.S.’s policy changes. Thereafter, negotiations shifted to the Six Party Talks. It appeared quite successful at first when North Korea agreed to abandon its weapons program in 2005. However, the talks came to a halt when the U.S. sanctioned several North Korean entities believed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities. Since then, these talks have continued intermittently but with little to no results. Obstacles that frequently stood between a successful negotiation include the unpredictability of the North Korean regime and the other countries’ divergent interests.

However, North Korea’s actions are not entirely illogical and radical. From their willingness to engage in dialogue, we see that they are not steadfast on a path towards complete isolationism. The formal talk between North and South in January further alleviates the concerns of war. But, on the more unpleasant side, this certainly does not indicate North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize, or even postpone their accelerated weapons program. It may be a sign that the sanctions imposed by the UN and other countries are hurting the North too much, and they hope to cut some of it through negotiations with South Korea.

During the meeting of countries that sided with South Korea during the Korean War in January, the U.S. Secretary of State warned that if North Korea did not come to the table, they would be choosing the military option themselves. The White House’s change of plan for the appointment of the U.S. ambassador to South Korea because of disagreements regarding policy towards North Korea further signals the U.S.’s serious consideration of war. Yet North Korea seems to believe that the only way to prevent a military strike by the U.S. is to secure nuclear weapons that target their mainland. Kim Jong-Un fears that the West will assimilate their ideology and overthrow the authoritarian dictatorship of the Kim family. Indeed, the choices are hard to make. Increasing sanctions may back them into a corner and cause retaliation through war, as predicted by Russia. But they are not about to abandon their weapons program anytime soon either.

Although the outlook for the prospect of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula seems grim, both sides should avoid direct confrontation in war at all costs. The formal meeting between the North and the South indicate a possible turning point. If negotiations could resume after the games, both sides should be willing to make some concessions. Sanctions could be slowly relaxed in exchange for halting the research in nuclear and missile technology. A complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula may seem an impossible task due to North Korea’s rapid progress in missile development. But ultimately, it should be pursued through peaceful negotiations, whereby each side takes a few steps back. Pressuring North Korea though various sanctions would most likely result to a harsher rebound.

February 28, 2018 425 comments

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