Putin’s Authoritarianism: Driven by Money

Annually, the Comparative Survey of Freedom evaluates nations’ political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are defined as how “people have a choice in determining the nature of the system and its leaders,” through free, fair, and frequent elections, while civil liberties are the “freedoms to develop views … apart from the state,” through the press, speech, and association. Together, these form the hallmarks of a democratic society. 

Under the reformist Yeltsin administration, Russia was rated as “partly free.” However, under Putin, Russia regressed into authoritarianism, as the Kremlin manipulated elections, eliminated countervailing forces by centralizing power around the executive, and instilled fear in the press corps. While some attribute this regression to Putin’s KGB past, I assert that the driving force behind the replacement of competitive democracy with what is termed sovereign democracy is business, as he realizes that in the modern age, there can be no lasting power without wealth — authoritarianism is a means to secure that end.

According to Professor Robert Dahl of Yale University, large-scale democracy requires that the people elect a government through free, fair, and frequent elections; there must be freedom of the press, speech, and association; and all adults must be allowed to vote. Comparing these criteria to the situation on the ground, by consulting quantitative and qualitative evidence compiled by Professor Daniel Treisman of the University of California, Los Angeles, will allow for a nuanced assessment of Russia’s regression.

Free and fair elections are characterized by “certain procedures [and] uncertain outcomes.” Under Yeltsin, this was largely the case as election results reflected a plurality of political views. For instance, during the 1995 parliamentary elections, the anti-Yeltsin Communists placed first, while the Yeltsin-backed party of power lagged in third. In contrast, to keep his party of power, United Russia (UR), dominant, Putin manipulates electoral procedures by silencing troublesome independent constituencies and small opposition parties. Accordingly, consulting Triesman’s research, one observes that in 2007, electoral rules were rewritten, raising the threshold for representation from 5 to 7% and eliminating single-member constituencies by switching to a pure proportional representation system. Furthermore, various opposition candidates were “struck from the ballot on technicalities or invented pretexts.” Only candidates which the Kremlin knows are weak, and will acquiesce, are allowed to run.

Manipulation encompasses not only institutional factors but also the deliberate misreporting of results. Analyzing a graph of the results of the 2011 legislative election by polling station, one would expect to see a relatively normal distribution from all parties. While this pattern is present for the opposition, Putin’s UR shows a fat right tail, and spikes repeatedly at even numbers, such as at 85, 90, and 95% of votes. It is almost as if polling stations were ordered to report certain numbers by some higher authority, ostensibly by Putin himself. While this evidence is circumstantial, it does provide strong evidence of some kind of manipulation, such as ballot stuffing, which might account for the spikes. As a result, while frequent, Russia’s elections are now anything but free or fair, as the party in power operates on an uneven playing field.  

Not only has Putin manipulated elections, but he has degraded countervailing forces by centralizing decision-making powers within the executive branch rather than with the (ostensibly) democratically elected legislature. This phenomenon is perhaps most prominently illustrated by the role that the Presidential Administration (PA) — composed of unelected appointees, has as the “command center from which the Kremlin manages politics.” For instance, in 1999, the PA, together with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Gleb Pavlovsky, created UR, merging Unity with another pro-Putin bloc to form a pro-Putin majority in the Duma. In 2007, PA officials formed A Just Russia (JR), UR’s ‘opposition party, to give off the illusion of plurality and political competition. While JR officially positions itself to the left of UR, it “vote[s] reliably with [Putin] on key issues.”

Consequently, both the frequency of debate and the frequency of vetoes within the Duma have decreased significantly under Putin. Under Yeltsin, “initiatives ping-ponged” in a pluralistic environment of competitive politics. However, the emergence of a pro-Putin majority has since stifled debate, with the former chairman of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, asserting that the Duma is “not a venue to hold political battles.” As a result, Putin-sponsored bills  “become law very quickly” without deliberation or veto. Therefore, while democracies must have elected legislatures that make the laws, but in Russia, “legislation is [no longer] made in the Duma, but by the Kremlin.”

Freedom of speech and, by extension, an independent press are essential because citizens cannot make informed decisions while voting if the government controls all information sources. Under Yeltsin, the press could be considered “generally free.” However, Putin initiated state takeovers of major news outlets, threatening their owners with jail if they did not acquiesce. Aside from major outlets, independent journalists were also intimidated. For example, journalists were handed questions in advance during press conferences and were threatened if they deviated from the script. To make matters worse, several journalists critical of the Kremlin, such as Anna Politkovskaya, have been killed in alleged contract hits. Rather than to “foster conditions favorable for healthy democratic competition,” it is clear that Putin’s Russia has regressed into authoritarianism. But why? 

Many attribute this trend to Putin’s nostalgia for his Soviet KGB past, claiming that his goals were always to “roll back the freedoms established by his predecessor [and] to restore the power of the security services.” While there is quantitative evidence for this explanation — by 2002, 33% of government ministers were siloviki (strongmen), this ‘Chekist’ explanation falls short when confronted with the fact that Putin uses the security services as a means to an end, and that siloviki in Putin’s inner circle are not influential because of their formal positions within the security services, but because “they [benefit] from close personal ties to Putin,” as they are his friends. In reality, while Putin is cozy with the Federal Security Service (FSB), he cannot be considered a Chekist in the traditional sense, given his pro-business attitudes, early economic liberalism, careful political maneuvering, and attempts to manipulate election results for appearance’s sake. A true Chekist, primarily concerned with maintaining order with an iron fist, would not bother with such circumspection. So, if Putin is not driven by his KGB past, what explains this trend?

In the wake of privatization during the 1990s, Putin recognized that “in the modern world, there could be no power without” wealth, since one needs to be able to “spend more than one’s enemies” to remain on top. Therefore, the explanation for Russia’s regression can be found in Putin and his associates’ state-owned business ventures such as Rosneft, and specifically the giant state-owned gas company Gazprom, where he serves as an unofficial but de-facto CEO. 

Reportedly, for Putin, Gazprom is a personal obsession. He has memorized the details of the company’s accounts and has personally approved all corporate appointments down to the deputy level — even going over the head of Gazprom’s actual CEO in some cases. While there is no direct evidence that Putin owns any part of these companies, his close friends, many of them siloviki billionaires, do, and therefore, by proxy, it can be inferred so does he to an extent. As Treisman asserts, Putin and his circle pretend to be democratic … [retaining] formal institutions” while subverting them to “preserve their power and enrich themselves.” Subsequently, through a lens of business, Russia’s authoritarianism can be contextualized.

The Yukos affair sheds light on why Putin engages in procedural manipulation and has centralized power. When he first entered office, Putin was confronted with the aftermath of Yeltsin’s privatization — a class of wealthy oligarchs, who in their largesse thought they could bend the legislature to favor their corporate interests. In the Duma, these oligarchs financed campaigns and consequently ‘owned’ parliament members once elected. For instance, in 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner and CEO of Yukos, the then-largest Russian oil company and Gazprom competitor, had “cultivated a large faction of deputies in parliament—more than one hundred … by some estimates.” Khodorkovsky then used this influence to rewrite proposed laws regarding the mining of hydrocarbons to benefit Yukos while sapping profits from state-owned competitors such as Gazprom and Rosneft and undermining Putin’s ability to shape policy through UR. Retaliating utilizing his siloviki connections, Putin threw Khodorkovsky in jail, and Yukos was nationalized. 

Following this episode, it crystalizes why Putin would have subsequently attempted to exercise greater control over the Duma — by cementing a sycophantic UR majority, silencing opponents and independents, and centralizing power around himself and his unelected appointees in the PA to prevent repeat occurrences. In addition, despite promising that under his administration, the “class of oligarchs [would] cease to exist,” the nationalization of Yukos and other firms created a new class of super-wealthy oligarchs, “drawn … from the circle of Putin’s close friends.” 

In this environment, Putin realizes that to stay in power, the “vicissitudes of Russian politics” necessitate wealth, and wealth necessitates authoritarian control over all facets of the political system and news media to guarantee it. For example, Gazprom was able to use its immense wealth to branch out into the media business, “buying various publications and taking over [NTV], which muted its criticism of the Kremlin” and helped to stifle internal dissent. 

Consequently, why even hold elections and then manipulate results? Would it be more conducive for business to do away with democratic institutions completely? 

The answer is no.

In 1999, 68% of Putin voters supported the idea of democracy. Furthermore, after the 2007 presidential election where power was ‘castled’ to Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin announced that “Russia is a country which has achieved democracy thanks to the will of its own people … and it will decide by itself” how democracy will be achieved. Accordingly, Putin plays the game to retain domestic legitimacy in line with managed sovereign democracy, which asserts that Russia is ‘democratic’ but in the face of aforementioned vicissitudes, reserves the right to control how democracy is carried out, to ensure control over “strategically important sectors” of the economy. In essence, control over the energy sector.

Obviously, there are stark differences between the Kremlin’s discourse and reality. The Russian people recognize this — but evidently believe strongly in their country’s democratic potential. Therefore, if Putin were to switch to a ‘harder’ form of authoritarianism, and say, abolish elections — the resultant massive upheaval would threaten the business climate, and resultantly, the performance of Gazprom and Yukos. Observe the recent civil unrest in Moscow over the widening “economic gap between the elite and ordinary people.” While such events only caused a slight drop in Gazprom stock prices, which quickly rebounded, they are merely a taste of the disastrous consequences that could happen. As a result, when practicing ‘soft’ authoritarianism, Putin can intimidate the opposition to secure his wealth and Russian state-owned enterprises’ prosperity, while maintaining outward appearances to appease both domestic and foreign actors.

To conclude, under Putin, Russia has regressed into authoritarianism, which can be explained by Putin’s realization that there can be no power without personal wealth. To guarantee that wealth necessitates implementing authoritarian measures — given the uncertainty of Russian politics and economics. Accordingly, the Kremlin has manipulated elections, eliminated countervailing forces by centralizing power, and instilled fear in the press corps. However, it has not gone so far as to eliminate democratic institutions and continues to hold elections based on sovereign democracy, given domestic popular support for democratic principles. 

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.